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Conclusions and 
recommendations 
Sustainability has become an important issue on the agendas of decision makers and is likely to remain important in the future. 
111erefore, the natural gas industry has no choice bur to rake a position o n the issue and to formulate a strategy that offers the greatest 
promises. In other words, what would be the wisest course of action for the natural gas industry? 
Opportunities and threats 
Most of today's energy scenarios project that natural gas will play the role of transitional fuel on the road towards sustainability. 111is 
provides an histo ric opportunity for the natural gas industry: to meet the growing dem and for natural gas in the coming decades, and 
to live up to the expectation that natural gas is clean, safe and reliable and thus the transition fuel par excellence. 
1his opportunity is surrounded by a large number of benign co nditions: 
• The growing demand for low carbon fuels in general and for natural gas in particular. 
• 111e demand for natural gas is likely to grow faster than demand for other fuels, because it is genera ll y considered 
convenient and reliable. 
• The application of natural gas may become broader: e.g., gas-ro-power; public and private transport, especiall y in large cities 
and m etropolitan areas in developing countries and industriali zed areas which suffe r from mass ive (local) air pollution; 
housing and small - and med ium -sized enterprises, especially in rapidly developing regions; or regions where reliable energy 
supply has been lacking so far. 
• Natural gas resources are enormous and seem relatively straightforwa rd to recover. 
• Securi ty of supply has become a high priority and natural gas is co nsidered to be a reliable source. 
• G lobal liberali zatio n may create additional opportunities for natural gas m arker expansion and for new, previously 
unfeasible, roles for natural gas. 
A number of aspects may, however, threaten this quire rosy outlook for the natural gas industry: 
Poo rl y designed regulation may threaten co ntinui ty of supply and demand and adversely affect business activity and 
inves tment. 
• Policy and other decision makers may increasingly feel that an energy future would need to be based enti rely on renewables. 
111is could undermine the ro le of natural gas as a transition fuel. 
• Growing debate about resource recovery and transport operations, particularly in unspoiled areas an d in areas where 
indi genous people try to exercise the ir claims on land, may increasingly compli cate exploration and production. 
• Production of gas from coal and coal-bed methane has great marker potential and may be able to increasi ngly compete 
with natura l gas. 
Other un conventio nal foss il resources may yield new fuel gases rhar are com petitive with natural gas, e.g., tar-sa nd 
gasificatio n. 
• Renewable sources of energy, e.g., wi nd , so lar and biomass, wi ll become more compet itive and widespread, possibly ar 
the expense of the role of natural gas. 
• Securi ty of supply may be adverse ly affected by: the relatively small number of mostly politically less stable natu ral 
gas supplying nations: the vulne rabiliti es of the international transport sys tem; and increas ing impon de pendency of 
the m ain des tination. 
• 111e scope for RD&D w ith rega rd ro gas may be constrained by m arke r liberali za tion and competition. 
• 111e long-term financ ing of production, transmission and di stributi o n system s m ay be hampered by a lack o f certainty 
about: the future development of market in centives (e.g., energy prices, C 0 2 credit prices, taxa tion ) ; rules and 
regulations (post-Kyoto , libe rali za tio n , sta re in volvement); and techno logy development (ro le of LN G, decentralized 
energy-sys tems, new gases and gas applica tions) . 
Dilemmas 
The above mix of opportunities and threats poses a number of dilemmas to the natural gas industry: 
• Will gas supply from the ex isting rese rves remain suffi cient, and at w ha t cos t w ill natural gas production be feas ible in 
the future? 
• Ca n the natural gas industry find a modus to e ffecti vely cooperate with other, potentially competing par ts of the energy 
secro r (coa l, o il , nuclear) in o rde r ro reap m arket synergies? 
• Can the natural gas industry es tab li sh mutually beneficial linkages w ith rhe suppli ers of renewable energy so that rhe role 
of narural gas as the transiti o n fuel ca n be supported ' 
• Can Aex ibility of supply (th rough productio n, trade and storage) develop in such a manner that dem and ca n be serviced 
smoothly? 
• Will the international gas market in the furure be dominated by free ly fun c tioning markets, or instead, by state inte rvention 
and rules, and will rhe natural gas industry be prepared for such alternative developments' 
• Wi ll the future gas marke t be do minated by Interna tional Oi l (Resource) Companies (JRCs) o r Nationa l Resource 
Co mpanies (N RCs), and how wi ll IRC-N RC coexistence affect the gas industry' 
• How w ill future techno logica l developments affect natmal gas dem and and supply structu res, the gas industry struc ture, and 
rechnological combinations w ith other (ene rgy) service suppli ers' 
• Ca n rhe narural gas industry mainrain its image of reliability in view of rhe m any fundam enral likely changes in the ene rgy 
markets? 
111ese dil emmas demonstrate that the natural gas industry, despite the promising opportunities it faces, needs to develo p an active 
strategy in o rde r to reap the latent benefits of the coming opportunities . 
Elements of a vision: some perspectives 
111e opportun ities, threats and resu lting dilemmas g ive ri se to some sto rylines that ca n be used to portray the international gas secror 
for the nex t three rn four decades and w hi ch illustrate the main issues that leading srakeholders in the industry may face. 
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Internationale Security 
of Supply Storyline 
Coal, Oil and Nuclear 
Storyline 
Underinvestment Storyline 
Transition Storyline 
Sustainability 
In order to broadly define the four storylines, two overriding dri vers of the natural gas industry have been linked: I . concerns about 
sustainab ili ty issues, including environmental protec tio n and, in particular, the global warming problem , and 2. future political and 
marke t stability concerns. The co mbinatio ns of these key sentiments within the industry have been ouclined in the above Figure, and 
basica ll y allow for four differenr projectio ns of the shape of the future gas m arket and the key challenges that the industry may face. If 
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environmental sustainability has a high priority, while there is limited concern about marker and political stability, the transition sro-
ryline broadly applies. If~ however, there is both less concern about sustainabi li ty and political and marker stab ility are nor considered 
a substantial issue, the coal, oil and nuclear storyline may be more relevant. In the case of considerable concern about political and 
market stab iliry, investment may be subdued, even if the sector would be convinced of the need to adjust to stricter environmenta l 
rules. In such a case, the underinvestment storylin e may become a reality. Finally, if there was no strong concern about sustai nability 
and the environment in particular, bur, instead , concerns abour energy marker and political stability would dominate, one would 
probably face a world with increasing concern about security of supply, the fourth storyline. 
1l1ere are no a priori reasons to put any probability figure to the four storylines. 111ey are all equally valuable as a means to show how 
rhe key issues to be addressed may vary depending on possible developments. They are, however, nor all equally va luable for mankind. 
ff sustainabi li ty is accepted as a major concern for present and future generations, then, clearly, the first storyline, in which gas can play 
an important role as the transition fuel, is rhe preferred one because it reAecrs a world in which political and energy marker stabili ty 
can be combined with sustainabi li ty. 
To start with, for the next few decades the gas industry seems to have a fai rl y strong card to be among rhe winners in terms of marker 
share in primary energy carriers. A number of factors contribute to this opportun ity: narural gas is rhe cleanest of all hydrocarbon 
energy sources because it results in very low emissions of pollutants such as particulate matter, su lphur and nitrogen oxides and emirs 
less than half of the carbon dioxide emitted by burning coal. New technologies for conversion of natural gas into electricity and other 
energy forms could reduce and virtually eliminate most of the adverse environmental impacts. 
These advantages of n·arural gas as an energy source and energy carrier have six important implicat ions. First, gas rakes a relatively 
favorab le position as compared ro other fossil fuels in contributing to rhe ongoing decarbonizarion of global energy, simply because 
rhe carbon emissions per unit of energy are relatively low. Second, based on the same characteristics, gas can be seen as one of rhe most 
su itab le cand idates for being the transition fuel par excellence in rhe rransirion towards more sustainable energy futures. 111e environ-
mentally friendly image of natural gas is further enhanced by its relatively low emissions of other greenhouse gases. Third, unlike oil, 
gas seems to face much less serious reserve and resource constraints which may lower its relative price. Fourth, efficiency levels of gas 
combust ion technology are among the highest. In addition, narural gas can be applied in a rather Aexible manner. Fifth, compared to 
most other primary energy sources including renewables, gas is relatively easy to store. Finally, natural gas can be seen as a precursor 
to hydrogen and therefore as a way ro prepare for a long-term development towards alternative energy systems. 
llrns, narural gas has a strong card to play. 111e perspective of gas maintaining its current image as a clean, safe and reliable foe!, and 
therefore the transition fuel par excellence, is clearly rhe one ro be preferred. However, the game will nor be won automatically. Fi rst, 
other fuels also have some strong cards in hand and this could unexpectedly airer rhe way in which the game evolves. Second, rhe gas 
sector typically also faces some major issues which, if nor tackled wel l, may substantia ll y disturb the game. "ll1e most severe issue will 
probably become the increasing concerns about international sernriry of supply. 111ird, ir shou ld nor be taken for granted that the gas 
industry wi ll automatically rake rhe measures and investment decisions that are needed to substantiate its prospective increasing role. 
As far as rhe first major issue, security of supply problems, is concerned, it needs to be acknowledged that many regions and countries 
in the world increasingly become dependent of narural gas import. In addirion, supply is li kely ro be increasingly concentrated in a 
limited number of countries, which are typ ically located in regions with vulnerable political systems. Moreover, the international gas 
transport infrastructure, particularly as far as LNG is concerned, seems to be increasingly susceptible to risks of accidents or even at-
tacks of transport bottlenecks and other supply inrerruprions. Also, rhe fact rhar international pipeline systems will connect a number 
of different countries adds to infrastructure vulnerab ility. 
The second major issue to rhe expected stronger role of natural gas relates to the fact rhar other energy sources such as for instance 
coal, nuclear energy and renewables w ill nor remain passive. For instance, clean-coal technologies are rapidly evolving, possibly jointly 
with C02 caprure and storage. 111e perception in some regions that nuclear energy is unsafe may shift gradua ll y towards an image 
of being clean, flexible and efficient. Moreover, a number of renewable technologies may develop towards large-sca le commercial ap-
plication, much more rapidly than anticipated. In other wo rds, other energy sources may wel l become stronger and reduce the marker 
share of natural gas, especial ly if ar the same rime natural gas wou ld increasingly be perceived as a problematic fuel from a geopo li t ica l 
perspective. 
"TI1e th ird major issue that could airer the picrure substantia ll y is rhar investments by the major players in rhe gas industry in the 
various stages of rhe supply chain will stay behind levels that would sustain a larger role for gas in the energy sysrem. 111e gas industry 
is typically facing a large number of uncertainties such as: rhe cl imare and orher environmemal policy regimes, rhe liberalization and 
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regulatory regimes, the link between gas and oi l prices, rhe public versus the private role with regard to investment, or rhe role of LNG 
and GTL. ln addition, rhe gas sector structure may face changes that wi ll shift attention and energy away from investment decisions. 
111is substantia l uncertainty may, understandably, cause rhe sector ro postpone significant investments, which may weaken the overa ll 
cha in . Given the long lead times and significant resources typically required for gas infrastructure development, rhis may undermine 
the potential role of gas during the next decades. 
Relevance 
The variety of storylines that present themselves ro rhe gas industry can be considered an open invitation to start a thorough debate 
about the position that the gas industry may want to rake to deal with rhe sustainabi li ty issue. If sustainability is accepted as a major 
co ncern for the present and future generations, then the first storyline in which gas can play an important role as rhe transition fuel, is 
clearly the preferred one, because ir reAecrs a world in which political and energy market srabi li ry can be combined with sustainability. 
Th e gas industry could consider trying to furrher develop its role in rhe spirit of rhis storylin e by actively trying to enhance the positive 
image of natural gas. 111e preferred scenario with respect to the ro le of natural gas in a world where susta in ability increasingly gains 
attention is rhe one where natural gas maintains its current image and position as a clean, safe and reliable fuel, and the transition 
fuel par excellence. In order to achieve the targets of such a strategy, a clear set of actions and policies may need to be implemented. 
A possible li st of such actions fo llows below (see possible actions towmds sustainability). It seems obvious, however, rhar if the gas 
industry wants to maintain its position as a clean, safe and reliable fuel, and rhe transition fuel par excell ence, there will be no room 
for complacency. Ir will require we ll -coord inated action. 
Another lesson rhat can be drawn from rhe possible storylines for rhe gas industry is that there are a number of threats that may 
undermine the promising future role of the gas industry and which shou ld be taken seriously. Examples are: the th reat rhat security of 
supply issues may increasingly dominate the po licy agenda and undermine the momentum in rhe gas sector development; the risk rhar 
efforts and lobbies, if left uncounted by rhe gas industry, of competing energy sources may overshadow the huge potential of natural 
gas as the transition fuel par excellence; or the risk that, for various reasons, investment in the gas industry remains subdued thereby 
adversely affecting the role of natural gas in rhe energy system. 
If the gas industry feels that ir wi ll benefit from embarking on a sustainabi li ty agenda and that serious and coordinated action wou ld be 
supportive to that end, a number of activities will probably need to be initiated in parallel. To start the discussion about what such an 
agenda cou ld look like, in order to respond to the cha llenge of sustainabili ty, and to solve the dilemmas that arise from the likely future 
mix of gas sector opportunities and th rea ts, the fo ll owing five possib le strategic goals for the natural gas industry can be formulated: 
Possible actions towards sustainability 
Develop a clea r and well-communicated common ly shared vision of the gas industry future and actively communicate 
rhe special features of natural gas as a source of energy. Remain focused on its image as the transition fuel par excellence. 
• Start a publicity campaign in which natural gas is presented as the transition fuel based on a package of positive 
characteristics. 
• Actively support the development and implementation of demonstration projects in different places in the 
world showing modern and green applications of systems based on natural gas. 
• Increase rhe emphasis in public statements and other communications on the proven track record of natural 
gas as a clean, safe and reliable fuel. 
• Stay wel l informed about new developments, new players, new technologies, and new marker opportun ities. 
• Develop an information system and expertise network for ana lysis (e.g., based on a institutionalized network of 
universities and research centres linked to !GU) rhar keeps rhe sector continuously informed about the most 
relevant technology and market developments in the secror, and put that in the perspective of the developments in 
the other energy sectors that may directly or indirectly affect the role of natural gas. 
• Systematicall y monitor and analyze the gas reserves/resources and gas exploration activities and in vestments 
worldwide and provide a reliable and up-ro-date source of information on such issues. 
• 111ink actively and creatively about estab lishing coa li tions by integrating natural gas supply with renewables. 
• Try to be optimally involved in relevant consultation and decision-making processes in international organizations, national 
and loca l governments, the knowledge community, and other energy stakeholders. 
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• Be better engaged in the debates on future climate policy regimes and policies and measures based thereupon. 
• Provide guidance to national governments about different ways to diversify their energy security of supply and the 
contractua l and infrastructural possibilities to do so. 
• Pu t pressure on national governmem s rn pay suffi cient arren rion in their foreign policies to the issue of security 
of supply of energy, and stress the need for more active d iplomacy and international po li cy coordinati on for 
this purpose. 
• Increase engagemen t and participarion in rhe discussions on rhe merits and risks o f o ther energy carri ers than 
natural gas, di scussions o n the international climate poli cy regimes, o r discussio ns on securi ty of supply and other 
fo reign pol icy issues. 
• Ensure that th e secto r's own product and processes are exemplary. 
• Stick to the IGU 'Guiding Principles for Susta inable D evelopm ent' (October, 2003). 
• Develop sta ndardized contracts and protocols for international gas trading and exploration m anagement that match inter-
nationally and provide des irab le levels of guarantees in terms of security of suppl y. 
Es tablish protocols for the safety and reliabi lity of internat io nal gas t ransport sys tems and try to activate 
govern ments to guarantee securi ty, if necessary, at vulnerable choke poi ms in interna tional gas transport. 
• Improve the international coordination of gas value chain invesrmenr decisio ns through internatio nal networks and 
information exchange o n the bas is of a clear internationally shared vision o n the future role of natural gas. 
• Es tabl ish and support internatio nal co nso rt ia that are able to finan ce and take respo nsibiliry fo r large-scale 
gas in frast ructure investment projects, along with inte rnati onal agreements on conducive and stable legal and 
regulatory regimes. 
• Suppo rt and stre ngthen the sector's Aex ibility to be able to cope with a variety of furure policy, technology, and market develop 
men ts. 
• Demo nstrate the clear and independent role of natural gas in the in te rnational energy marker by suppo rting the contrac-
tual decoupling of o il and gas prices in order to prevent gas prices to be unduly driven up as oi l prices increase due to concern 
about reserve levels. 
• Develop regulato ry sys tems that are sufficiently conducive to inves tmenc in gas infras tructure such that secu rity of supply 
problems ca n be prevented , and improve in ternatio nal coordinario n berween national regulato rs. 
Develop an information sys tem that can signal marke t and o ther trends in an ea rl y stage in order ro enable proactive 
coordinated action in the gas industry. 
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Introduction 
1l1is report discusses rhe future ro le of natural gas and has been prepared under rh e auspices of the JG U Special Proj ec t 'Susrainabiliry' 
and wi ll be presented ar rhe 23rd World Gas Conference in June 2006 in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. The report's main aim is to 
reAect rhe co nsiderable changes that energy markets, and rhe gas market in parri cular, are currently facing and w ill probably face in 
the foreseea ble fi.1ture. ll1e main trends, which ofren rake place simultaneous ly, seem to be: liberali zation and re- regulation , imer-
nationa li za tion , restructuring, and greening. Due ro the strucmral adjustments the gas industry is undergo ing, a player in the sector 
may co nsequently face: a rapidl y chang ing regul arory fram ework and reshuffling of marker pa rri es and their behavior as a result of 
liberal izat ion; rapidl y changing incemives ro imroduce othe r gases , biogases , and orher gas applicat ions as a result of environmental 
policy measures; in creas ing complexity of planning and in ves tment decision making due ro rhe inte rnation ali za tion o f the gas market; 
and a range of mergers and acquisitions, o n the one hand , and unbundling of action , on rhe orher hand. 
At th e sa me rime, new issues ari se which pose new chall enges ro rhe gas industry, such as: 
• Ca n natural gas play an important ro le as transitio n fuel towards a ca rbon- free energy sys tem , and how w ill this work out in 
the future rol e of gas on the energy marker' 
• To what ex tent will security of energy supply issues dominate public concerns and how may this affect the gas market 
co nditions? 
• To what ex renr may di mare change and other environmental and safety concerns aA-ecr the trends in foss il fi.1 el and renewable 
ene rgy use and how wi ll this aA-ecr rhe gas marker sha re? 
• Will interna t ionali zat ion and liberaliza tion of rhe gas marker lead ro more Flexible bur less predi ctable gas Aows, and to what 
ex tent ca n Fl ex ibility in demand be marched by Aex ibility of suppl y? 
All un certai nti es relared ro the above aspects make it very ha rd ro draft scenar ios or storylines with any degree of predictability and 
probability. In facr , des igning scenarios broadly based on ext rapolation of ongoing trends can be risky inso far as the struc tural changes 
mentioned and the ir possible impac t a re not suffi cienrly covered. 1l1ar is why the approach here is to focus on the ques tion: 
"What c;1n possibly be rhe main issues of concern rhar will dominate rhe future management challenges of the gas industry, given the 
likely struc rnral changes and new policy challenges the gas market may face?" 
In order to answer thar question, four non-traditional sro rylines wil l be described and the plausibility of their underl ying assumptions 
illustrated. Each sro ryline desc riprion has been drafred as if presented by its ex pli cit defe nder. 1l1at hypothet ica l 'advocate' of the 
storyline tri es to argue, as co nvincingly as poss ible, why the 13 storyline assumprions1 are indeed plausible. This approach se rves as a 
challenge for rh e reader: ir would be inconsistent if the reader were persuaded by all argumenrs; instead , the reader has ro decide which 
combination of arguments is most co nvin cing, and whi ch arguments are the best o r the worsr. 
The storylines emphas ize particular issues o f co ncern that may increas ingly dominate projec tions of the future world and its energy 
markets, namely: 
• "!lie rol e of gas as a tmnsition fuel in a rapidly greening wo rld ; 
• "ll1e sernrity of mpply in a world with increasing constraints ro gas suppl y o r rhe suppl y infrastruc rure; 
• The market share of gas, where other energy sources , bo th traditional (including nuclear energy) and renewable ones, arc 
increasingly successful in enlarg ing the ir share in overall ene rgy suppl y; and 
• ll1e investment issue in an internat ional gas marker where change is so do minant rhar ir may paralyze invcsrm enr activ ity. 
In rhe firsr storyline rhe sector g rabs its opportunities and plays rhe ga me fairl y we ll. In the three oth e r sro rylines rhe different rhrea rs 
become reality: an overriding concern about international security o f suppl y issues, a serious come-back of competing energy sources 
and a story in wh ich insuffici ent inves tment levels pose rhe major th rea r. In order to provide a clearer picrure of these four sto rylin es, 
for each of them the most essentia l underlying assumptions are worked out in so mewhat greate r detail: jointly they provide the picrure 
of a future gas world and rhe assoc iated dominating issues. 
1 NorL rha1 this 11u mbLr co rresponds wirh the number of playing cards per symbol; for more inspir:11 ion , please play wirh rhc c:irds provided wi1 h rhis report :H rhc 
occasion of the ICU World Gas Conlcrcnce in Amsterdam, rhe Ne1h crbnds. 
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In rhe fo llowing Table (see nex t page) rhe main characreri sri cs of rhe four scorylines have been summarized. 
Transition Storyline 
The first storyline depicts a future with a strong attenti on to climate poli cy accion and a large number of susra inabiliry aspects , as 
well as with much artention to energy efficiency improvements. Lifestyles are adjusted wo rldwide to a greener and more sustain able 
economic system . After a series of disasters, which are anributed to global climate change, particularly in developing countries, the 
environmental issue is considered one of rhe key priorities for global action . "01erefore, a wide range of policies and measures, inclu-
ding market-based incentives for G H G mitigatio n, are readi ly accepted almost everywhere. In this wo rld , nawral gas is co nsidered the 
transitio n fuel par excel lence, whi ch leads ro great optimism in the sector, significa nt inves tments in all segmen ts of the gas chain , and 
an increasing market share of natural gas in prim ary energy suppl y. 
International Security of Supply Storyline 
In the second storyline, internatio nal securiry of supply beco mes the overriding concern. Fossil fuels, notably o il and gas, remain the 
backbo ne of energy supply in a market, which faces significant increase in demand. Realizing that oil rese rves deplete rapidly, at leas t 
against acceptable production cost conditions, m any countries try ro secure their energy supply on the internatio nal gas market. With 
Europe, NAFTA, Japan , C hina and India all increas ingly competing for the ava ilable gas (a nd o il) resources, the world increasingly 
faces geopoli t ical tensio ns. Suppliers of natural gas on the international market may use their increas ing m arket power to fun:her 
boost prices by res tricting their supply. The securi ty of supply issue becomes a domin ant factor on the fore ign policy agenda of most 
cou ntries. Increasingly, supp lies are bei ng secured via bilateral contracts, and the world cannot avo id an increasing hostility between 
the various bl ocs on the issue of access to energy in general and ro natural gas in particular. 
Coal, Oil and Nuclear Storyline 
In thi s storyline various (especia ll y Asian) countri es increas ingly use their large coa l rese rves to fu el their econo mic growth strategies. 
In addition, various countries co nsiderab ly expand their nuclea r power capaciry (and some renewables) to be sure that energy shortages 
can be tackled. Ex tensive investments are made in the ex ploitati on of Canadian rar sands, especially for oi l deliveri es to the USA . 
Europe and Japan have a relatively strong focus on renewables and face no serious problems in meeting their energy demand by 
traditional impo rts of mainly o il , especially because oil rese rves rnrn out to be larger than anticipated . In short, the energy strategies of 
the various countries are assumed to be increasingly targeted on self- reliance, i. e. to make sure that energy will be produced as much 
as poss ible th rough domestic primary energy resources or rhose of close allies. 
ln this storyli ne there is quire some opt im ism that the combination of clean coa l technologies, the nuclear op tion and renewables 
can so lve the problem via technological breakthroughs. ll1us, coal will make a considerable comeback, also beca use of new clean coa l 
technologies, and the nuclear option ga ins considerable support as wel l. Accordingly, natural gas wi ll no longer be considered the 
transition fu el. Moreover, th ere may be co ncerns, especia lly regarding intern at ionall y traded LNG, thar gas could be an unsafe form 
of energy. ll1is leads to a marker share red uctio n of natural gas in overall energy supply. 
Underinvestment Storyline 
In this storyline it is assu med rhar for the period up to 2040 there are no clear trends with regard to: eco nomic growth in the various 
regions, energy effici ency, rhe use, availabiliry, acceptabili ty, and accessibili ty of parricular energy sources, energy prices, or even the 
directio n of climate and o ther environmental policies. Co nsequently, there is a serio us lack of certainty and conviction as to when, 
where, and how much investment would be req uired to secure a reliable and sufficient energy supply. Taking into consideration rhe 
huge amount of resources and finance, as well as lo ng lead times invo lved with mosr energy production and transport projects, rhe 
last ing uncertainty about energy world development paralyses investment both in ex ploration/exploi tat io n and internat ional energy 
transport capacity. 
This uncertainry is further increased due to limi ted in formation about the size and direction of internationally traded energy Aows 
(and LNG in particular), which is caused by the liberali zation trends that increas ingly characterize the va rious national and regional 
energy markets. The main result of the above w ill be under- investme nt, which creates securiry of supply problems for end-users. Even 
if porential energy supply rem ains avai lab le at acceptable co nditions, it wil l quire often not be able to satisfy demand because of a lack 
of infrastructure. Since a reliable infrastructure requires that all links in the chain are equally strong, there is a considerab le risk that 
the overall chain is too weak to serve rhe market properl y. 
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Transition (I) Securi of Su ply (2) Coal, Oil and Nuclear (3) Underinvestment (4) 
Economic Growth medium high medium variable 
Economic growth in No rrh 
Economic growth in South 
Globalization trends 
Disruptions of economic progress 
Population Growth 
Urbanization trends 
Energy Dimensions 
Energy effi ciencies 
Primary energy mi x 
Resources and reserves 
Technologica l change 
International cooperation on energy 
Energy {infrastructure) inves tment 
Energy liberalization and re-regulation 
Energy end-use pa rrern s, including 
decentralization trends 
Access ro energy fo r rh e poor, 
energy 'quality' (black-ours) 
Decoupling of energy prices of various 
energy carriers/ forms 
LNG growth 
Climate Policy Regime 
post-Kyoto regime (strictness) 
post-Kyoro regime (coverage) 
Methane emissions mitigation 
Sustainability Aspects 
Attention co local air quality 
Initiatives towa rds green gas 
Equity concerns 
Gas safety co ncerns 
Safety concerns co other fuel s 
Attention for heal th aspects 
med ium 
medium 
medium 
none 
low 
hi gh 
high 
rencwables: hi gh 
modest 
rapid 
medium 
hi gh 
medium 
high 
high 
yes 
medium 
high 
wide 
high 
high 
high 
high 
low 
high 
hi gh 
med ium 
high 
low 
yes 
high 
medium 
medium 
renew. low/gas hi gh 
high 
medium 
low 
medium 
low 
mediun1 
low 
yes 
strong 
medium 
low 
medium 
low 
low 
low 
high 
high 
hi gh 
low va ri able 
high variable 
medium va riable 
yes yes 
medium medium 
medium medium 
medium low 
coal/ nuclea r: hi gh average 
strong medium-low 
llledium/h igh medium/ low 
low low 
lllCdium/gas low low 
low mixed 
medium medium 
!llcdium low 
no no 
modest srrong 
low medium 
low medium 
mediulll low 
high low 
low low 
medium medium 
high high 
low high 
med ium medium 
Perception of Gas as Transition Fuel high medium low low 
Perception of Gas Scarcities low high low low 
The report is outlined as follows. "ll1e first chapter li sts a number of a uthoritat ive scen ar ios and storyl ines in o rd er to put the subse-
quent IGU sto rylines in the broader perspective of the lirera rure. The second chapter li sts t he key factors that m ay drive the furure gas 
marker and their underlying socio-econ om ic processes. In chapte rs three ro six, rhe four sco rylines un fo ld . A summary is provided at 
the e nd . 
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Figure I. I Schematic illustration of alternative scenario formulations, from narrative storylines to quantitative formal models 
Models 
Stories 
Source: Nakicenovic er al. , 2000. 
Examples of some seminal energy and other more general scenarios 
1l1e co nsrruction of scenarios to inves ti gate alrernative future developments under a set of assumed conditions dates far back. Scena-
rios were o ne o f rhe main tools used to address the co mplex ity and uncertainty o f future challenges, even if th ey had o ften different 
nam es in the past. In fact, the first and o ldest scenarios were des igned to help plan milirary operations, more recently cal led 'wa r games' 
(Nakicenovic et al., 2000). 
Scenario analysis as a professional undertaking was also associated with st rategic planning and wa r ga mes during the ea rl y yea rs of rhe 
Cold War (Raskin et al. , 2005), as popul arized by Herman Kahn and his co lleagues (Kahn and Weiner, 1967). Today, scenarios are 
used regularl y by military organizations aro und the world for training and planning purposes. Military strategists and teachers often 
use very soph isticated co mputer m odel s to develop scena rios for a mul titude of differem purposes. Sometimes, these are also developed 
by both mil ita ry and other security organizations to describe broader socioecono mic, cultural and environmenral developments (e.g., 
Schwartz and Randall, 2003). Most recentl y, many computer games have sophisticat io n that allows for inreracr ive construction of 
scenarios, each ga me being one example of how rhe h.1ture might unfold. 
1l1e more direct antecedents of co ntempora ry energy scenarios lie with th e future srudies of th e ea rl y 1970s (Rask in e t al., 200 5). "ll1ese 
responded to emerging concerns abo ut the long-te rm suffi ciency of natural resou rces including energy to suppo rt expanding global 
populari o ns and human activities. 111is first wave of global scenari os included ambitious mathematica l simul ation models aimed to 
forecast the behavior of these complex systems over many decades into the f·i.m1re (Meadows et al. , 1972, Mesarovic and Pes tel 1974) 
as we ll as equally speculat ive narrative approaches (Ka hn et al. , 1976). Perhaps, best known was the controversial report of the C lub of 
Rome on Limits to Growth (Meadows er al. , 1972) . Thi s was perhaps the first a ttempt to build an inregrared global model based on 
systems dynamics (Forrester, 1977) and thereby generate quamira rive scenarios. 111e Latin America n Baril oche wo rld model stressed 
social, politi ca l and equi ty concerns, rather than phys ica l limits, by positing a normat ive egalitarian future, characteri zed by quantira -
rive descrip to rs of human well being, and by examining the acrions required to achi eve it (Herrera et al., 1976). 
During the 1970s, a number of energy swdies that included scenari os have been co nducted . Perhaps two best known arc the C O -
N AES (Brooks and G inzton , 1972, Brooks and H o llander, 1979) and Energy in a Fini te Wo rld (H afel e er al. , 198 1 ), conducted 
by the Internat iona l Institute of App lied Systems Analysis (llASA). Ar this rime, scenario analys is based on narrat ives interlaced 
with quamirative illustrations was first used at Royal Dutch Shel l as a stra tegic management technique (Wack, 1985), an effo rt that 
spawned a small industry of consultants wo rking with majo r corporatio ns to broaden perspecti ves on how to pos iti on rhe firm in a 
changing world (Schwanz, 1991 ). 
A second wave of imegrared global scenario analyses began 111 rhe !are 1980s and 1990s, prompted by rhe new co ncerns about 
susta in ab le development and global change (WCED, 1987). Many of these were in the qualirari ve and narrat ive traditi on (Svedin 
and Aniansson, 1987; Toth er al. , 1989; Milbrarh, 1989; Burrows er al., 199 1; Kap lan, 1994 ; G allopin er al., 1997; Bosse!, 1998; 
WBCSD, 1997). In add ition, stimulated largely by rhe climate issue, there has been an explosion of new models tha t quantitatively 
lin k energy and other human activities to atmospheri c, ocea nic and terrestri al systems. Jn particular, the lo ng-rer rn nawre of the 
climate change issue spawned almost counrless world energy scenarios. For example, scenarios of future emiss ions played an important 
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role from the beginning of the IPCC work. In 1990, rhe !PCC initiated development of its first set of GHG emissions scenarios 
designed ro facilitate the assessments of climate-change (Houghron er al., 1990). Two years later, in 1992, IPCC developed a set of 
six exceedingly inAuenrial scenarios, called IS92 (Leggen er al., 1992; Pepper er al., 1992. A subsequent IPCC evaluation of the IS92 
scenarios (Alcamo er al., 1995) emphasized the need for analysts ro consider the full range of IS92 emissions scenarios, rather than a 
single 'business-as-usual' reference scenario. In 2000, the IPCC developed a new set of scenarios with six different JAM models based 
on four narrative storylines (Nakicenovic er al., 2000a) and in 2001 a set of mitigation scenarios that focused on emissions reduction 
possibilities in the energy secror (Morita et al., 2001). In 2005, rhe Millennium Ecosystems Assessment developed a set of four nar-
rative scenarios abom rhe furnre of ecosystems services and human well being supported by an analytical modeling framework (MEA, 
2005). 
As mentioned, another parallel developmem is that scenarios are increasingly used by enterprises around the world for many purposes 
associated with decision-making and more generally as a rool for strategic planning. 'The most famous are the Royal Durch Shell energy 
scenarios developed originally in rhe wake of the oil crisis of the 1970s. Shell scenarios were used ro plan rhe corporate response stra-
tegies (Schwartz, 1991). Today, the use of scenarios is quire widespread in rhe private secror. For example, the World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) developed a set of scenarios in collaboration with 35 major corporations (\VBCSD, 1998). 
Another inAuenrial series of energy scenarios was developed by the World Energy Council (WEC, 1993). During the 1990s, IIASA 
and WEC jointly presented a set of global and regional scenarios in Global Energy Perspectives rhar were developed with a set of 
integrated assessment models and then reviewed and revised through 11 regional expert groups (Nakicenovic er al., I 998a). 
An important group of energy scenarios from the lirerarnre was compiled during the last two decades from two international sce-
nario and model comparison activities. This first group is from the lmernational Energy Workshop (IEW) that involves strucrnred 
comparisons of energy and emissions scenarios since 1981 (e.g., see Manne and Schrartenholzer, 1996, 1997). The other group is 
the EMF (Weyant, 1993, Van Vuuren et al., 2006) that also involves regular scenario comparisons, in addition to standardized input 
assumptions, such as rhe international oil price or carbon emissions taxes. A third sciemific effort rhar involves scenario comparisons 
is rhe Energy Technology Systems Analys is Programme (ETSAP) supported by the Imernarional Energy Agency (LEA). The ETSAP 
work involves scenario analysis by more than 40 scientific groups from about 20 coumries using the same modeling approach. 
In addition ro the many scientific, governmental, and private organizations throughout the world engaged in scenario building, some 
imernational governmemal organizations regularly develop global and regional energy scenarios. For example, the !EA regularly 
publishes the very influential global energy outlook (IEA, 2004a). 
Today scenarios are being applied in an expanding array of business, community, policy and research contexts with highly varied aims 
- better management, consciousness raising, conAicr resolution, policy advice, and research (Raskin er al., 2005). The methodological 
approaches and ways of building scenarios are also many. ll1ey can be forward-looking, exploring how futures might unfold from 
current conditions and uncerraimies, or backward looking, beginning with a normative vision of the future and asking whether there 
is a plausible path ro it. ll1is is also the method adopted for constructing the four natural gas srorylines. ll1e approach ro generating 
scenar io can include rhe active engagement of targeted audiences through participarory processes and game playing (thus the metaphor 
of playing cards in the four srorylines), deliberation among expert scenario panels, and quanrirarive simulations by modeling groups. 
Fina ll y, scena rio srndies have begun recently ro synthesize the quantitative modeling and qualitative sroryline approaches, in order to 
blend srrucrnred quantitative analysis with textured and pluralistic scenario narratives (Raskin et al., 1998; Nakicenovic et al., 1998a; 
Nakicenovic er al., 2000). As mentioned, these developmems of methods ro effectively blend quamirarive and qualitative insights are 
at the frontier of scenario research roday. 
The narrative storylines give voice ro important qualitative factors shaping development such as values, behaviors, and institutions, 
providing a broader perspective than is possible by analytica l and numerical modeling alone. Srorylines are rich in derail, texture, 
metaphors, and possible insights, while quantitative analysis offers srructure, discipline, rigor, and reproducibility. The most relevant 
recent efforts are those that have sought ro ba lance these attributes. They provide importam insights into how current tendencies and 
trends might become amplified in differem future worlds (e.g., across the four methane srorylines) and provide a multitude of different 
derails across scales and systems. ll1ese new scenarios are often embedded in extensive assessmem of the main driving forces and their 
furnre developments across scenarios in the literature. 
In 1998, a set of three scenarios, based on elaborate narrative stories that described alternative futures, was developed by the Globa l 
Scenario Group (Raskin er al., 1998). In the same year, IIASA and WEC published a set of six scenarios developed by a set of inte-
grated assessment models (!AMs) that were based on narrative descriptions of three different future development paths, one of which 
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branched out in to three alternative energy sys tems futures (Naki cenovic et al., l 998a). 111e IPCC SRES approach was based on an 
extensive scenario literature review (Nakicenovic er al. , 2000). Based o n this review, fo ur alternati ve narra tive storylines were develo-
ped to cover the range of possibilities characte ristic of the underlying scenario literamre, from driving forces to energy and em iss ions 
outco mes. Finally, the four storylines were quantified with six differen t LAMs into a se t of 40 scenarios. The most recent ser of four 
scenarios to include narratives and models quantifica ti o ns are the four M EA scenarios. 111ey build on ea rli er scenarios and modeling 
efforts and also extend scenario analysis to include ecosystem services and rheir conseq uences fo r rhe human well-being, which has not 
been done before (Nakicenovic er al. , 2005). The MEA scenarios are rooted in very ex tensive sto rylines and were rhereafrer quantified 
with one lAM to a large ex tent based o n the IPCC SRES scenarios. Another new develop ment in scenarios is to reach across the glo-
bal/local gap, wirh a stronger focus o n local analys is of energy systems and servi ces or ecosystems and its se rvices (e.g., MEA, 2005). 
111e ideal artribures fo r such scenarios are: integratio n across social, econom ic and environmenral dimensions; regional disaggrega tion 
o f global patterns; multiple fu tures that reAecr rh e deep uncerrainries of long- range outcomes; and quanrificarion of key va ri ables 
linked to ecosysrem conditions. 
111e first decades of scenario assessmenr paved the way by showing the power - and limits - of both deterministic modeling and 
descriptive foture analyses. A central challenge of contemporary global scenario exercises is to unify these two aspects by blending the 
objectivi ty and clarity of quantification with the ri chness of narrati ve (Raskin er al. , 2005). 
Some on-going energy-related studies 
Energy perspectives have remmed ro the agenda recently especially si nce the rapid increase in oil and other energy prices. 111is has 
been compounded with other issues such as energy security and reliability, adverse environmental impacts from indoor air po llu tion to 
climate change, and fa lling of public resea rch and development expenditures in most of rhe OECD countries. -llrns, it is nor surpri sing 
that global energy smdies abound. Suffice it here ro menrion the lnterAcademy Council (!AC) smdy on rhe topic "Transitions to 
Susta inable Energy Systems." (lAC, 2005) . The lAC is a multinational organization created by Academies of Sciences of the world 
to provide a source of in-depth sc ience-based consensus advice on major sc ience- and technology-intensive issues faced by the imer-
nati onal community. 111is lAC smdy will rev iew the global research and development effo rts underway, assesses their adequacy and 
probable impacts, an d outlines an appro priate response. Ir also includes address ing the public po licy factors impacting on the direction 
and pace of technological rransirio ns ro susta inable energy sys rems, including the role of eco nomic policy insr rumenrs. Other broader 
energy- related initiatives rook place in preparation fo r rhe 14th United Na tio ns Com miss ion fo r Susta inable development rhat was 
held in New York, I to 14 May 2006. Many energy studies were prepared and presented ro the CSD-14. 
However, there are only a few new scenario smdies planned for rhe future. One of rhe efforts is by the World Energy Council to 
develop a set of energy scena rios th ro ugh 2050 building on a number of earli er scenarios fo r which the o rgan iza tion is well kn own. 
Also the International Energy Agency wi ll produce rhe new energy outlook this year including a reference scenario to 2030 roge ther 
with a policy altern at ive case and possibly also a 'broader brush' outline of longer-term development. 
Recently, Global Energy Assessment (GEA) was initiated by llASA in co ll aboratio n with a number of other insrimtions (GEA, 2006). 
Although other aurho rirarive publications on different aspects of energy are readily available, they do not adequately address energy 
challenges in an integrated way. G iven this need, GEA was initiated with the aim of nor on ly building upon and extending ea rlier 
assessment activities-such as the WEA (Goldemberg et al. , 2000) and others-to include mo re recent in for mat io n on energy issues 
and challenges, but also conducting a more integrated analys is accounring for the full range of activities, opportunities and threats 
linked with energy systems, includin g region-specific cha llenges. This integrative approach represents one criti ca l and unique element 
of rhe proposed Assessment that, unlike earli er srudies, wi ll provide rhe stro nger interdisciplinary policy ori enta ti on required for 
decision-making and capacity building. GEA is planned to last for fou r yea rs and will be orga nized in a similar way as IPCC and MEA. 
O ne of the main foca l themes is expected ro be explorati on of different energy perspectives based on a comp rehensive set of energy 
scenarios including storylines and a substa ntial regional and place-specific resolution . 
Historical evolution of energy perspectives and the role of natural gas 
From resource scarcities to energy security and the environment 
D uring the last decades numero us scena rios have been developed fo r many of the different purposes ment ioned above. Jo intly, 
they describe our changing perceptio ns about the future and most importantly they provide background fo r policy decis io ns about 
energy developments including for example a wide range of policies from technology to em iss ions miti gation. As mentioned, energy 
scenar ios in rhe li reram re range fro m a simple Gedankenexperiment (a 'tho ught experiment') ro ve ry elabo rate modeling and scenario 
efforts. Some are sufficien tl y si mple to be devel oped in a matter of hours while others req uire whole reams and many person months. 
Some scena rios are developed with in tegrated assessmenr models (!AM) or other elaborate model ing frameworks. fr is therefore nor 
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surprising that there are numerous scenarios in the literarnre and that the number of scenarios of regional and global developments is 
growing by the day (Nakicenovic et al., 2005a). 
A historically major motivation of energy srndies ever since Jevons -n1e Coal Question of 1865 has been the recurrent fear of im-
minent resource scarcity (Jevons, 1865) . Even if the dominant neo-Malthusian paradigm has largely lost its appeal in comparison to 
the situat ion that prevailed during the mid- l 970s in the aftermath of the first oi l crisis, im portant concerns on resource availability 
and resulting impacts on energy markets remain for both short-term (volati lity and supply disruptions) and long-term ("running out 
of oil by when") perspectives. Thus, it is probably fair to say that energy perspect ives, as reAected in the furnre srndies, have shifted 
emphasis from resources scarcity to scarcity of energy services, security, investment needs, market vo lati lities and so on. Nevertheless, 
the recent price increases have revamped a number of studies on the so-ca lled oil peak based on the pioneering work of King Hubba rt 
(Hubbart, 1949) during the 1960s. 
Before the earl y 1990s, approaches to resolving energy-related cha llenges focused on increas ing energy suppl ies (pr imari ly fossil 
fuel-based) to meet energy demand. Basically, the srndies were primary supply oriented looking into energy reserves and resources, 
conversion, transport and trade and much less into questions of energy end use and provision of services. During the last two decades, 
it has become increasingly clear that a new approach to energy is needed in order to meet a wide range of social, econom ic, and 
environmental objectives simultaneously. 1his requires, in fact, a fundamenta l reorientation from strategies that focus on conventional 
supply expansion towards those that give greater emphasis to energy end-use efficiency improvements, increased use of non-fossil 
energy resources, and cleaner fossil fuel generation and use. For example, such changing perceptions about energy futures are clearly 
demonstrated in the WEA (Goldemberg et al. , 2000; 2004). The four natural gas storylines presented in the report text the alternat ive 
furnre development from resource scarcities to more abundant gas supplies, from emphasis on energy effic iency and conservation to 
a sh ifr to alternative energy resources. 
In contrast, some of the current resources studies that an alarmist ' running out of resources' perspective is inappropriate in the com ing 
decades. In other words, 'scarcity' is unlikely to be the much-discussed need for a 'sustainabi li ty' trans ition in energy. Such a transition 
is a matter of socia l choice and not one of geological determinism. Considering conventional oil and gas reserves2 suggest that these 
could last at least some 40 years, whereas fossil fuel resources (includ ing coa l and unconventional oi l and gas) could last at least several 
hundreds if not thousands of years1. Conversely, renewable energy Aows are 1,000 times current global energy use but contrary to fossil 
fuels are disperse and have low energy density thus requiring elaborate infrastructures for capture, transport, storage and distribution, 
particularly to areas with high demand density such as cities. This wide disparity of views is one of the main fearnres of the four 
natural gas storylines that attempt to integrate them in different ways across the four furnre development paths. "llie illustrate both 
the nature of the social cho ice involved in choosi ng our co llective future as wel l as the decision options open to the industry and oth er 
stakeholders. 
During the 1970s, the neo-Malthusian perspectives of 'running our', of oil were persistent despite many stud ies that have outlined 
the vastness of hydrocarbon resources. Today, we have the recurrence of this view indicating that the 'o il peak' immanent and likely 
to occur during the coming decade or two. 1he logic of the argument is that that there have been very few large new oil di scoveries in 
the recent years. For example, most of the growth of the US reserves is due to the re-evaluation of known reserves, the so-called 'fie ld 
growth' . Fu rthermore, demand for oi l is perceived to grow very rapidly in the furnre both due to the 'motorization' of the world and 
especially in Asia. Rapid econom ic expansion of Ch ina and India in particular are considered to lead to large oil demand growth. Mo-
bility is increasi ng worldwide and is still growing in the most affluent parts of the world , the OECD countries. At the same time, the 
world production and refin ing capacities are becoming very old and overstrained. The recent afte rmath of hurricane Katrina illustrated 
these global bottlenecks in oil production and refining more than aptly. Also, most of the richest oil deposits are limited to a few places 
in the world located in areas of enormous geopolirica l instabilities (e.g. Iraq, Iran or Venezuela). All told, there is a perceprion that 
future production will be limited both by oi l supply facilities as well as by the lack of large discoveries in the future. 
Many of these insights into the finiteness of oil (and other hydrocarbon) reserves go back to the path-breaking wo rk of Hubbard 
(1949) . Hubbard, who worked for USGS at the time, noticed that the cumulative production profiles of major hydroca rbon deposits 
follow S-shaped, logistic development paths. By implication, the production increases exponentiall y, reaches a peak and eventually 
decl ines also at exponential rates (a long the derivative of a logist ic Fu nction ). This phenomenon has been used quite frequently to des-
cribe the time path of regional and global oil production profiles. Stati stica l estimates suggest that the 'o il peak' is near if one assumes 
2 Nore in p;uricubr the disrinci:ion between reserves (known, and rechnolog ically and econom ic 11ly recoverable <lf current prices) and reso urces (cirhcr nor yer 
discovered or recoverable only wirh lururc technology and/or prices). 
This would be the case wirh posrularcd hydrare occurrences if one day rhey become accessab\e as an energy sources. 
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King Hubbard 's model to hold fo r the global oil product io n and reserves e.g., see Ca mpell , 1997 and Ca mpell and Laherrere, 1997 . 
In face, chis wo rld view is very likely to be correct and hold for current relati vely cheap and easy to ex tract oi l reserves. lne question 
that must be as ked is whether these rese rves wil l nor be replenished in rhe future from very large resources that a re more difficult and 
more cosrly to ex tract. 1l1e recent o il price hikes of $70 per barrel would certainly imply tha t vast oil and gas resources may beco me 
eco nomic and ex tractabl e if in genera l rhe view preva ils that oi l prices will remain high. 
However, social, econo mic and technological limits for a continued expansion of fossil resource use mighr be reached much sooner 
than any physica l resource 'depletio n midpoints' o r 'peaks' : Current recoverable reserves amo unt to approximately 1,000 G tC 
(billion tons of ca rbon ), and fossi l fuel resources range berween 5,000 to 20,000 GtC (depending on the scope for 'exotic' hydroca r-
bon resources considered in the inventory such as methane hydrates) wh ich compares ro so me 760 GtC ca rbon in the atmosphere 
(see Table 1.1 ) . About a third of the atmospheric ca rbon is due ro accumulated fossil energy emissions and is already causing a 
'di scernable inAuence' on th e climate sys tem. In other words, the assimilative capacity of the plan eta ry processes for ever increas ing 
energy-related em iss io ns seem robe more limited rhan the geo logica l ava ilability of hydrocarbon resources. 
In fact, both coa l and methane resources a re quite abundant and more widely distributed th an those of o il. In particular, natural gas 
is much more abundant around the world than was estimated jusr a decade ago. In add ition, the more speculative occur rences of 
natural gas such as methane hydra tes a re truly vast and , if ever explo ited , could supply any conceiva ble fi.1rure energy demands for 
many cenruries to come (Tabl e 1.1 ). 
Table I . I Global hydrocarbon reserves, resources, and occurrences, in ZJ (I 021}) 
Consumption Reserves Resources Resource Base Additional Occurrences 
1860- 1998 1998 
Oil 
Conventional 4.8 0.14 6 5 11 
Unconventional 6 12 18 > 60 
Gas 
Conventional 2.3 0.08 4 8 12 
Unconventional 5 7 12 > 10 
Hydrates > 800 
Coa l 5.4 0.09 45 108 153 > 130 
oral 12.5 0.31 66 140 206 > 1000 
Data sources: Nakicenovic et al. , 1995; Nakicenovic et al. , 1998a, Masters et al. , 1994; and Rogner, 1997. 
Most drastic and very speculative hydroca rbon depos its are the porenrially gigantic quantities of methane trapped in ice, rhe so-ca ll ed 
methane hydrates (cla thrates). Some estim ates indica te tha t this form of methane might represent an energy resource for larger than all 
orher known hydrocarbon energy resources pur together (Table 1.1 ). "ll1e challenge is ro understand rhe conditions rhar would make 
so me of the enormous resources become future reserves that could be successfull y explo ited. 
Ev idently, supply securi ty and price vo la tility remain important energy concerns g iven the geographica ll y co ncenrrared production 
and supply particula rl y for o il. H owever, these co ncerns are shaped more by actua l and perceived geopolitica l ri sks and the impo nde-
rabiliti es (or 'ex uberances') of rhe in creas ingly speculat ive nature of energy markets rather rhan by acrua l physica l balances between 
demand and supply, and hence classical resource depl etion phenom ena . Nevertheless, loca l and regional supply disruprions are a 
rea lity and should be expected ro reoccur in the future accompanied by pr ice Rares and periods of vo latility. "ll1ere is no d oubr rhat 
these developments are closely rel ared ro rhe geopolitica l ri sks assoc iated with many large o il deposits in particular, and increased 
competition and energy rrade as the result of priva ti zation and liberali zat ion of energy markets in genera l. 
ll1is is parti cularly transparent in th e case of electric ity g rids and rhe recem increase in incidences of large-sca le ' blackouts' and near 
blackours. D ecl ining infrastructure in vestments have increased vulnerabiliry to supply di sruptions and also eA-ectively constra in large r 
market deploymen t of new energy technologies such as intermittent renewables that a re otherwise srimulated by a hosr of incentive 
and regulatory policy measures. Libera li za tion and reSL1 lting compcriri ve markets mea n that more elecrric iry is traded so chat traditio-
nal 'di stribution' grids are becoming also 'rrade' grids, a function char was no r a part of their o riginal purpose. ll1e integrated electric ity 
g rids ofNorrh Ameri ca and Europe were constructed during the 1960s and the 1970s and are generally not adequate for the large-scale 
electric ity trade and increasing role of intermittent energy sources. Mo re competiti ve gas markers, in parti cular through LN G (liquid 
na tural gas) , are likely to diversify supply and increase the security and reli ability of supply while at rhe same t ime probably enh ancing 
price vo lati lities. Last bur certa inly not leas t, rhe perception of an increas ing risk of acts of te rrori sm is likely to enhance so me of 
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these tendencies and further attract limited investments away from energy sector proper toward security and safety. In the past these 
concerns were limited more to nuclear power and large-scale hydropower, but are now pervasive in some quarters of the world. 
The situation with oil and gas production is not all that much different. Both production and processing capacities are becoming 
very old and reserve capacities are slim. Any major disruption, whether conflicts in oil-producing regions or natural disasters, lead 
to price and supply volatilities, amplifying the perceptions that the 'oil peak' is near or even behind us despite huge 'endowment' of 
hydrocarbons still underground. 
TI1is brief excursion in the controversy about whether we are running out of affordab le oil and gas deposits or whether these resources 
can last longer with appropriate investment and environmental concerns are at the hart of some bifurcations among the four storyli-
nes. Gas can become a limited energy source in the future and never be the bridging fuel or fuel of choice. Instead, rwo distinct, but 
related possibilities emerge, namely a return to coal (dirty with current technologies and possible clean in conjunction with carbon 
capture and storage) or a transition away from fossils toward renewables and possibly also nuclear energy. The storylines capture these 
possibi li ties in context of broader development paths. 
Historical evolution toward energy gases and electricity 
In contrast to some of these current uncertainties surrounding energy futures, the long-term historical evolution of the energy systems 
is continuously being transformed toward lever larger role of energy gases. Nevertheless, natural gas has not played a major role in the 
global energy system until recently, even though it has been used since antiquity. 
Global energy use has evolved from a reliance on traditional energy sources such as fuel wood and coal, and then oil and natural gas, 
and more recently, but to a significantly lesser extent, on nuclear and hydroelectric energy sources. Traditional energy sources and coal 
are solids. Oil is a liquid energy source while methane is gaseous. Figure I. I illustrates this rransformarion of the global energy system 
from solids to liquids and more recently toward gases. Consistent with this long-term transformation and structural change in the 
energy system, is the shift to methane as less carbon-intensive and perhaps even carbon-free energy source for the 21st century. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the evolution of the global primary energy supply during the last century. The contriburion of gas grew only 
modestly prior to the 1940s, but then experienced rapid expansion during the following three decades. Throughout its history, the 
marker share of gas has been determined by infrastructural bottlenecks rather than by the availability of exploitable geological deposits. 
Today, this is still the case, gas deposits are more pervasive than those of oil and the unconventional gas resources are truly huge. Figure 
1.1 illustrates that the share of gas in cumulative past production is small, but it implies that the future potential contributions may 
be extremely large and continue expanding for many decades. 
Figure 1.2 Global transformation of the energy system from reliance on solid energy sources (traditional fuelwood and coal) toward liquids (crude oil) 
and more recently toward energy gases (mostly methane) 
1900 1920 1940 
Source: Marchetti and Nakicenovic, 1979; Griibler, 1998. 
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At the beginning of the industrial revolution, traditional biomass and especially wood were the main sources of energy. They were 
used in the solid form. However, some of the biomass was transformed into work through working animals and human labor. Other, 
much sma ller contributions toward required work were hydrolytic power and wind power (mostly for pumps and mills). With the 
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diffusion of coal (the 'underground forest'), the role of solids was expanded manifold. Some of the coal was used to produce energy 
gases (city gas) and to generate electricity toward the beginning of the last century. Oil become the dominant energy source some 
70 years later and is virtually completely transformed into liquids and little electricity. Gas in contrast is used both directly and is 
converted to electricity. 
Figure 1.3 shows the transformation of energy that reaches the consumer, the so-called final energy. This includes all energy carriers 
at the point of consumption and shows increasing role of grid oriemed energy carriers during the last decades, energy gases and 
electricity. Figure 1.3 illustrates the developmenr in the United States that is representative for most of the highly developed parts of 
the world. 
Figure 1.3 Transformation of final energy structure in the United States 
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From virtually exclusive reliance on solid energy carriers (traditional fi1elwood and coal) a century ago, a gradual shift toward liquids (crude 
oil products) and more recently toward grid-oriented energy carriers (mostly natural gas) and electricity. Many developing parts of the world 
today have.final energy structures resembling those of the more industrialized countries almost a century ago. 
Despite all present uncertainties surrounding the future developments in the global and regional energy systems, one of the most 
pervasive historical tendencies that are likely to continue is the increas ing share of grid-oriented energy carriers - gases and electricity. 
Solids represent direct use of coal and biomass and exclude conversion of coal imo electricity (or in principle also conversion of 
biomass into liquids, but the quantities involved are so small today that this would not be noticeable). Liquids represent crude oil 
converted into oil products such as motor fuels and exclude liquids used to generate electricity. Analogously, natural gas used to pro-
duce electri city is not included under gases but rather only energy gases (mostly natural gas) . Electricity represents final consumption 
from all sources including solids, liquids and gases used in conversion and in addition also other sources of electricity such as hydro 
and nuclear power. 
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Figure 1.4 Global transformation of the energy system from reliance on solid energy carriers (traditional fuelwood and coal) toward liquids 
(crude oil products) and more recently toward energy grids (mostly natural gas and electricity 
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Jn 2000, solids, liquids and grids have about equal shares in final energy. !JASA SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic et al., 2000) portray a fi1ture 
shift toward larger shares of gird-oriented energy carriers across a wide range of jittures. liquid energy carriers of the more distant jitture 
would constitute methanol and ethanol made ji-om a range of solids in addition to oil products. In a more distant future energy gases would 
also include increasing shares of hydrogen. 
Figure 1.4 contrasts the historical evolution of primary and final energy systems structures with future transformations of final energy 
across a range of energy scenarios developed by IIASA for TPCC SRES (Nakicenovic, et al., 2000) . 
Again, like in Figure 1.3, final energy is shown disaggregated into solids, liquids and grid-oriented energy carriers . Definitions are also 
the same. 
Looking into possible future developments across these scenarios there is a surprising degree of convergence toward ever larger shares 
of gird-oriented carriers. A process very simi lar to the historical evolution of the final energy in the United States and other now highly 
developed parts of the world. 111e main difference is that future liquids would include synthetic liquid energy carriers in addition to 
oi l products. 111ese would include methanol and ethanol made from solids (coal and biomass, respectively). Also the nature of energy 
gases would change from alm ost exclusive reliance of natural gas today toward synthetic gases from biomass or coal as well as hydrogen 
from many different energy sources during the larter part of the century. 11rns, a broad trend toward larger role of energy gases and 
electricity is clearly predominant these scenarios that are based on a broad and varying assumptions about the unfolding of main 
driving forces form population and economic growth to resource endowments, energy investments or trade. 
Future use of energy gases across scenarios in the literature 
This study presents four different natural gas futures as they unfold in the four storylines. As a background to those developments, it 
is relevant to assess the role of natural gas across energy scenarios the literature. They cover a very large range indeed: In some of the 
scena rios the globa l gas consumption increase manifold even over the time horizon to 2020, while in others it maintains its current 
contribution . Figure 1.5 shows the gas contribution across more than 200 scenarios in the literature that were published by the end of 
2000. In the lowest gas scenarios, more than 50EJ per year of natural gas are consumed worldwide by the 2020s, while in the highest 
more than 250EJ per year, well over the half of the current g loba l energy consumption. Going further into the future indica tes that 
in the highest gas scenarios, the consumption continues to increase toward the middle of the century and thereafte r Aanens off. The 
reached level corresponds to some 400EJ per year and much more, in some cases wel l over the present total global energy co nsump-
tion. 
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Chapter 2 
Driving Forces of Natural Gas Perspectives 
Driving forces of natural gas perspec ti ves in general and the four storylines in parri cular are many. They are captured in phrase )i ~e 
'natural gas is the fuel of choice', 'natural gas is the transiti on fu el of the 2 1st century' and 'natural g s i a uel f nQ regret~These 
were some o f the many characteri zations of the oppo rtunities and challenges for the gas industry expressed at th 2-nd World Gas 
Conference held in Tokyo, 1-5 June 2003, attended by more than 5,000 parti cipants (ICU, 2003). Overall the conference captured 
some o f the salien t driving forces leading towards the larger role o f natural gas and the poss ible emergence of the 'methane age'. Some 
o f the driving forces for the emergence of the methane age are discussed below and embedded in the sro rylines with large r ro le of 
natural gas in the future such as the Ti·an sitio n Sroryline (presented in C hapter 3) . 
111e theme o f the 23 rd World Gas Congress in Amsterd am, 5-9 June 2006 , Gas; powers the people and preserves rhe wo rld , amplifies 
again rhe need to better capture some of the driving forces that may enable or could hinder a large r ro le for natural gas in the future. 
Central to this strategic visio n o f the industry's future is an enviro nmen t in which partnerships and alliances must be built with oth er 
priva te and public stakeholders "to mitiga te the ri sks of climate change and to achieve sustainable development" (Urano, 2003), to 
arrract furth er investment in natural gas industry and rechn ologies including end use, ro provide clea n and affo rd able energy se rvices 
to billions still with out access and to future generatio ns. Two o f the storylines, notably the Coal , O il and Nuclear Storyline (presented 
in C hapter 5) and th e Underin vestment Storyline (presented in C hapter 6), illustrate how o ther futures might un fo ld where gas does 
not fulfill the promise of becoming the fuel of cho ice and the bridge towa rd future energy transitions. 
In che previous section we argued th at during the last two centu ries, global energy systems have transformed fro m a reliance o n carbon 
intensive sources of energy such as coal to oil and more recently ro natural gas. 111is has resulted in substantial decarbo nizatio n. 111 e 
gas industry scarred from synrh ecic, manu fac tured gases, but explo ration and product io n ac ti vities of the upstream industry during the 
20th century has enabled natural gas to beco me frequently the fuel of cho ice in electri city production (there where access ro gas exists), 
industry and households and thus contribute to the deca rbo nizac io n of energy. Enh anced deca rbo nization is indeed an important 
driving force for the emergence of the larger role of methane in che future. A larger role of natural gas would be consisrent with this 
!Tend as well as wi th the need to reduce the emiss ions o f greenhouse gases that are associated with anrhro pogenic sources o f clim ate 
change. "Expand ing the use of gas is the bes t medium-term response to rhe threa t of climate change" (Wans, 2003). 
Another driving fo rce is the need fo r clea n and affordable energy se rvices . Access to afford able energy se rvices is crucial fo r econo mic 
development with mo re than 1.3 billion people li ving in poverty (with less than $ I per day) and with some two billion without ac-
cess ro modern energy se rvices. In general , a large r role of natural gas, enhanced wirh modern biogas, in developing countries would 
help towards meeting their needs fo r energy se rvices and towards reducing adve rse enviro nmental impacts from indoor air pollution 
to regio nal acidification. Asia, in parti cular, where the emerging markets of C hina and Indi a between them accounr fo r a third o f 
rhe wo rld 's population , is expected to ex perience a surging need fo r clean and affo rdable energy services that ca n be provided by 
natural gas. Natural gas principally oilers rhe poss ibility of environmentally fri endly energy from vigorously growing Asian economies . 
However, such a future requires development of large infras tructures incl uding namral gas and electri city grids, LN G and pipeline 
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transport sys tems as well as availabiliry of geopolitica ll y srable and ample gas resources. Agai n, we have ca ptured the unfolding of these 
development-related driving forces across the four sto rylines. 
1l1e perceptions abour natural gas resources have changed during rhe lasr decades. Current es timates of gas resources presenr a perspec-
tive of abundance co mpared to oi l that appears to be much more limited (see previous section, C hapter I) . Unconventi onal resources 
wou ld extend cenruries in the future wh ile rhe more speculative deposits of methane hydrates are truly gigant ic. 1l1e gradual growth 
of natural gas production, declining costs and technological change have already led to rhe development of part of the unconventional 
gas resources, sometimes wirh previously co nsidered unconventional resources (e .g. gas from very deep structures or very low permea-
bility rock) now being proven rese rves thar are in production). Thar is, what were once class ified as unconventional resources are now 
proven gas reserves rhar are in production. Development of such un conventional gas so urces as natural gas hydrates; dense gas-bearing 
reservoirs and coal bed methane, co uld provide humanity wi rh vast rese rves of clean and environmentally fri endly energy for cenmries. 
Unconventional narnral gas sources are a very important topic for future studies within IGU (2003). For exa mple, methane hydrates 
are so vast rhar rhey would render natural gas into a virtually inex hausrible source of energy (see hydrate resource estimate given in 
Table 1.1 above) . 
Ir is fair to say rhar rhe rnrrent energy situation in rhe world is a bir 'gloomy' and could be characterized as one of chronic deficit 
in energy in vestments from R& D to infrastructures, exclusion from access to energy services by many o r as one of supply security 
treats and exceedingly vo latile prices. -n1e conti nuous degradatio n of energy inves tments is illustrated in Underinvesrmenr Sto ryline 
(Chapter 6) . In comrast, some of the perceived natural gas perspectives are opti mistic indeed , such as the Transition Storyline (Chapter 
3). 1l1ey ca n be characte ri zed as an evolving vision that we may be on the brink of rhe methane age and a new kind of respons ibility 
for the world rh at poses new cha llenges and offers new o pportunities to rhe energy business. 
Another aspect of this evolving vision is rhe recognitio n rhat a longer-term perspecti ve needs to be taken in the future, a perspecti ve 
rhar 'encompasses rhe whole cemury' (as called fo r by rhe Japanese C rown Prince in his Opening Address, IGU, 2003). 1l1e main 
driving forces of this rransition towa rds a larger role of natural gas in rhe future is rhe perception of more abundant methane resources, 
including hyd rates, technologica l innovation, prorecrion of the environment, e.g. climate change, and sustainability rransirion in 
general. 1l1ese driving forces are played our in all four srorylines but to va rying degrees unfolding into four distinct futures. 
1l1e methane age ca n serve as bridge towards rh e hydrogen and elec tri city (hydrici ty) era. (Fo r thi s to become a rea li ty a whole host 
of new technologies needs to be developed and deployed ar affordab le prices. They would also need to be socially acceptable and safe. 
Fina ll y, the vision of a methane age provides a perspective towards future zero em iss ions energy systems with universal access to energy 
se rvices by all. 
In addition to these more qualirarive dri ve rs rhar arc to an exrem associated with a whole paradigm change toward future energy de-
velopments and perspectives, there are also dri ving forces that can be quantified and thus offe r some hints how large the future energy 
demands could be and how large rh e role of natural gas might be in these perspectives. In rhe following four chapters, we will tackle in 
derail both th e qualitative and quantitative aspects of fou r altern ative natural gas futures captured by our sto rylines. In the fo llowing 
we focus both on the quantitative and so me qualitati ve dri ving forces. We start thi s assessment with population and economic deve-
lopmen t. 1l1ey are indeed some of rhe most fund amental drivers of d emand for energy se rvices and rhus for future tra nsformations of 
rhe whole energy sys tem including thar natural gas industry. 
A simple scheme caprured by rhe so-ca ll ed Kaya idenrity ca n serve to illuminate rhe linkages of quantitative drivers such as po pulation 
and econom ic deve lopment. ll1is hyporherical idenriry represents rhe main emiss ions o r energy driving forces as multiplicative facto rs. 
It es tablishes a relationship between population growth , per capita va lue added (i. e., per capita world product, rhe sum of all regio nal 
gross domesti c products, GDP), energy consumption per unit va lue added, and emiss ions per unit energy on one sid e of rhe idenriry, 
and roral C02 emi ss ions on th e orhcr side (Yamaj i er al. , 1991 )4 . Alrernarively, th e last two terms can be dropped and rhc id entity 
wou ld show on th e orher side rhe tota l primary energy requirements. The basic idea stems from rhe broader literature o n so-ca ll ed 
I PAT ana lys is (see Holdren, 2000; Ehrlich and Holdren , 197 1) where environmental im pacts ('!' such as the C02 emiss ions) are 
assu med ro correspond to rhe product of population (' P') , 'activ ity levels' ('A') usually measured by some per capita indicator such as 
income and technology ('T') that represents unit emi ss ions per unir activity. In thi s form, the Kaya identity is virtually identi ca l to 
rh e !PAT ana lysis . 
The advantage of analys is employing the Kaya idenriry is rhar iris simple and facilitates ar leas t some srandardiza rion in the comparison 
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C02=(C02/E)x(E/GDP)x(G DP/ P)x l~ where E represenrs energy co nsumption, GD P rhe gross world produc1 (o r global va lue added) and P popul :uion. 
C: han ges in C02 em issions ca n be described by clunges in 1hcSl' four focrnrs or driving forces. Altcrn:nively, rhe i<lcnri ry ca n be shorrcncd by dropping rhc 
emi ssions inrn: E=(l·'./G DP)x(G Dl'/P)xl' 
and assessmenr of many di ve rse emiss ions scenari os. An important cavea t is that rhese driving forces a re not independent of each 
other. In facr, in many scenari os they exp li c itly depend on each other. For example, scenario builders often assume that high rares of 
economic growth lead ro high ca pital turnove r. ll1is favors more advanced and more effici enr technologies resulting in lower energy 
intensities. Often a weak inverse relationship is assumed between population and econom ic growth. llrns, rhe reader should note that 
the scenari o ranges for these main driving forces are not necessa rily independent of each othe r. -n1is is an impor tant caveat also raised 
in the previous assessment of emiss ions scenarios in the li terature (Nakicenovic et al., I 998b and 200 5) . 
In the following we present the scenari o ranges for each of the fa cro rs in the Kaya identity representing the main (energy-related) 
dri ving forces of emiss ions: population , GD P and ca rbon intensity of energy. Table 2. 1 g ives all driving forces from the Kaya identity 
including abso lute quantities and growth factors. We chose this sequence ro present the main scenario driving forces because it co r-
responds to the way rhey are represented in the Kaya identi ty without implying a prio ri any causal relationsh ips among the dri ving 
forces themselves and between the driving forces and energy or C02 emiss ions. 
Table 2 .1 illust:rates poss ibl e future developments of these main dri ving forces. Ir shows the future ranges across l IASA SRES (Na kice-
novic er al. , 2000 and Morita et al. , 200 I ) baseline and mitigation scenari os and presents those in the hisrorical context. -n1e develop-
menr of population, economic output (GD P m easured at purchasing power pariti es, see below), pr imary energy and carbon emiss io ns 
indica te enormous rares o f growth since the beginning of the indusrrial revolution rwo cenruries ago. G lobal population has increased 
from I billion ro 6.5 billion people in 2006 (6 billion in 2000) and is likely to increase ro between 7 and 15 billion by the end of 
the century. Factors of growth g iven in rhe table sugges t a charac te ri sti c S-shaped panern of growth w ith level ling off of the growth 
rares during th e next decades. Econom ic output portrays similar hi sro rical and future paths, bur with much more pronounced ra tes 
of growth . It has increased some 18 rimes during the last century which translates inro average annual growth rate of about 3 percent. 
Prim ary energy requirements have increased at a love r rate and this same is expected in the future indica ting large hi srori ca l and even 
larger future rates of energy intensity improvements. The same is th e case with carbon emissions. In both cases of primary energy and 
carbon emiss ions, have and are expected ro increase at substantially lower rates than economi c ourpur indicating substant ial energy 
and ca rbon intensity improvements. These indica ti ve quantifications illustrate poss ible ranges of main scenario charac teristics that 
would correspond to rhe ranges of rhe fou r natural gas srorylines. 
Table 2.1. Historical increases of global population, economic output, primary energy and carbon dioxide emissions compared to their future ranges 
across I/ASA SRES scenarios 
1800 Factor 1900 Facto r 2000 Fa ctor 2100 
Popula tion 1 x1 .6 1 .6 x3.8 6 x1 .2 7-
(billion) x2.5 15 
GDP PPP 0.5 x4 2 x18 36 <x3 85-
(trillion 1990$) x18 530 
Primary Energy 13 x3 .3 40 x11 440 x 1 .1 500-
(EJ) X5 .6 2500 
C0 2 Emissions 0- x3 .0 0.5- x6- 6.4 <0.5 3-
(GtC) 0.3 1 .0 x12 x5 33 
Source: Nakicenovic et al., 2000 and Morita et al. , 200 I . 
Recent demographic trends and future perspectives 
Population is one of the fundamental dri ving forces of human developmenr. Today there are three main research groups tha t project 
g lobal population - United Nations (UN, 2003), World Bank (Bos and Vu, 1994) and !!ASA (Lurz er al. , 200 I). Most of the centra l 
population projections (commo n ro demographic developments in scenarios of all three resea rch groups) during the ea rl y 1990s led 
ro a doubling of global population by 2100 ro more than ten billion peo ple compared ro 5.3 billion in 1990. The cu rrent global 
popul at ion is larger by a billion people (6.5 billion in April 2006), indicating rhe tremendous momentum behind global population 
growth. Toward the end of the last decade (the 1990s), centra l population projections for th e yea r 2 100 have declined somewha t but 
still we re not roo far from a doubling by 2 100. For example, the Un ited Nat ions (1998) medium-low and med ium-h igh projections 
indica te a range of between 7.2 and 14 .6 billion people by 2 100, with the medium scena rio ar I 0.4 billion. The I !ASA cemral estimate 
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for 2 100 is also I 0 .4 billion wi[h 95 percem probabili ty [ha[ world popula tio n would exceed six and be lower than 17 billi on (Lurz 
e t al. , 1997). 
Figure 2. 1 Global population: Historical development and scenarios. 
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Figure 2.1 illus!Tares global popula tion projec[io ns fo r a wide range o f scenarios in the li te ra[ure. The range is from 6 rn 19 billion 
with a median of abou[ 10 billio n peo ple by 2 100 co mpared rn some six billio n in 2000 (6.5 billio n in Ap ril 2006). It is in[cres ting 
rn no[e [hat more recem scenarios in the literature po rtray qui [e di ffe rent developmem paths from [he o lder o nes. TI1e mos[ striking 
fea ture is th at popula ti on projecti ons published since 2000 envisage at leas t two billio n less people by the end of [he century compared 
to [he ea rli er li terawre. The highest of these newer p rojec tions leads rn some 15 billio n (compared w 19 in pre-2000 scenari os). This 
represents a very signifi cant change in our percepti ons of the future of global. Another impo rtant aspect is that scenarios with lower 
population lead to higher ra tes o f econom ic growth beca use, genera ll y, the population t ransitio n occurs during the nex t decades even 
in rhe world regio ns with still high populatio n growth today. H owever, the very low globa l populatio ns of fo ur billio n by the end of the 
cenwry, two less than today, pose new challenges concerning aging, as many services [radi [io nally have been provided by [he younger 
people and also co ncerning [he need fo r considerably lo nger working li fe. Some of the currem low populatio n projecti ons in [he range 
of four or so billio n by 2100 will no do ub t lead to fu ndamentally new perspectives o n fu ture energy se rvices and other human needs 
w assure the wel l being o f future generat ions. 
Finall y, it should be no ted that the ra nge of population projections is my narrower by the mi ddle o f the century, the main time horizon 
of thi s study, co mpared w the stro ng d ive rgence thereafter; fro m decl ining w still growing trends. Tirns, the dem ographi c d iffe rences 
amo ng [he fo ur sto rylines are sm aller by rh e middle of [he cemury co mpared w the poss ibili [y of strongly di verging t rends thereafte r. 
H owever, this also mea ns that [he seeds o f the pos t-2050 developments are latent in the more sho rt- term sto ryline tendencies. 
Even [hough the ra nge of global popula tio n projectio ns in Figure 2. 1 reAects the scena rio assu mptio ns in the u nderlying li teratu re, it 
is interesting to note tha[ [h e popula[io n projectio ns used in scenarios are no[ evenly dist ribu[ed across the whole range. Instead , they 
are grouped in to three clusters. The middle cluster is representative of the central projectio ns with the range of about 9 to fewer than 
12 billion people by 2 100. The o ther two clusters ma rk the highest and [he lowest popul a[i on proj ec[ions ava ilable in [he li [e ra[ure 
wi th about six billi on on the low end and between J 4 and 19 billion ar the high end. This fea ture o f th e popul ation projections has 
S[ayed inva ri ant during the las t yea rs. 
An interes ting quesrio n is how these populatio n p rojectio ns in the li te rature co rrespo nd to the (implicir) assumprio ns behin d the fo ur 
na tu ra l gas sto rylines. We postulate rhat the Transitio n Sto ryline is consistent with the lowes t population projections represen ted by 
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rhe rh ird clusrer of scenarios shown in Table 2.1 rhar range from say 6 to 8 billio n people by 2 100. 111e main reaso n is rhat lower popu-
lations levels and even declining o nes (afte r the population transition is achieved) are generally associated with high levels of afAuence 
and high rates of capital turnover. 111is is co nsistenr with the Transition Storylines with its economic growth rates in the median regio n 
in absolute terms but ve ry high o n per capita basis. In co ntrast, Security of Supply Storyl ines is consistent with th e highest levels of 
future popularions; say between 12 and 15 billion people by 2 100. This is so because this storyline implies relatively low economic 
base (levels of affluence) that in turn lead to high g rowth rates in general but relatively modes t ones on per capita bas is. 111e other two 
storylines are co nsistem with median population projectio ns; say in the regio n between 8 and 12 billion people by 2100. 111is is a lso 
so beca use for example economic development assumptions fall in the medi an range as well. 
Geopolitical, cultural and social driving forces 
Energy futures and prospects of natural gas are embedded in the larger question of how combined social , economic and environmental 
systems inreract and shape one another over many decades. 111ere are multiple links. For example, economic developmenr depends 
on maintenance of ecosys tem res ilience; poverty ca n be both a result and a ca use of environmental degradation ; ma te rial -inten sive 
life styles conA ict with environmental and equity va lues; and ex treme socio-economic inequality within societies and between nations 
undermines the social cohes ion required for effective policy responses (Morita e t a l. , 2001 ). 
It is clear that energy policy, and its impacrs on hum an well being, will have significant implicat ions for future development patterns at 
both the global and sub-global sca les . Affo rdab le and adequate access to energy services is essential for the sustainability transition and 
it is also essent ial for the eradica tion of poverty and furth er development. In addition, policy and behavioral responses to sustainable 
development issues may affect both our ability ro develop and successfully implemenr energy polic ies, and ou r abi lity ro respond 
effectively to energy chall enges the human ity is facing. 
-n1e issues rai sed by a consideration of development, equity and sustainab ili ty are of particular relevance ro the natural gas storylines 
discussed in this report. Because they are necessa ril y based upon assumptions about the socio-economic, geopolitica l and cultural 
conditions (that give ri se to future developments), the four storylines implic itly o r explic itly contain information about cu lture, 
development, equity and sustainability. 
Som e of these assumpt ions are documented within the 13 sa lient assumptions specified (p lay ing cards) for each of the natural gas 
sroryl ines in th e fo llowing four chapters. In principle, each storyline or scenario describes a particular future world , with particular 
cultural, econo mic, soc ial and environmental characteristics . Because of th eir integrati ve nature, sro rylines provide a framework for 
exploring these links, the dynamics of the whole socio-cu ltural systems and the possibilities for abrupt transirions at cr itica l branch 
points. Beyond this ana ly tic fun ction , normative scenarios ca n posit development visions characte rized, for example, by the achieve-
ment of goa ls for equity and environmental susta inability. Then, the appropr iate polic ies, actions and choices for approaching such a 
mul ti-objective future ca n be co nsidered. G iven rhe strong interactions between development, environm ent and equity as aspects of a 
unified socio-cultural sys tem and the inrerplay be tween provisioning of energy services and development, eq uity and sustainability and 
policies, in thi s report sro rylines are formulated as an aspec t of broader process of human development and improvement of hu111 an 
well being. The four natural gas sto rylines do not explore ex tensive ly the poss ibili ty of achieving broader goa ls of susrainabi li ty o r 
equity. This is neither the purpose of this study no r is thi s likely to be achieved even in the most of the optimistic transit ion scena ri os 
over the nexr few decades, the main time horizon of this study. 
Srorylines assess and simulate poss ible pathways o f long-range globa l develo pment that meet specified targets for aggregate energy 
needs and the ir environm ental and other consequences. In general , based on given demographic and economic g rowth assumptions, 
scenarios can be used ro explore the technologica l and environmental management changes that a re requ ired for meeting energy 
patte rns that maintain atmospheric concentrat io ns of greenhouse gases below specified thresholds and rhat provide affordable energy 
services and thereby support improvement of human well being. 
111e provisioning of human needs should be ta ilored precisely to the unique characteri st ics of each particular location and environment. 
111e high quali t ies of natural gas as a source of energy wou ld be compatible w ith these g rowing needs for sustainable energy services. 
Therefo re, the many important economic, environm enta l and socie tal dimensions of sustainability together with its global context 
provide a huge opportunity for natural gas industry robe positioned as a 111odern and forward thinking industry (IGU, 2003). 
Economic growth and development 
Econom ic growth and developmenr are fundamental dri ving forces of any emissions scena ri os. Energy requirements a re direc tl y 
linked to the nature and structure of economic activ ities so that the assumptions about the eco nom ic developm ent const itute among 
th e most important determinanrs of scenarios in general and their energy se rvices in particular. llrns, population and economic 
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developmenr assumptions are cemral ro any scenario. Ar rhe sa me rime, rhe economic growth prospects are among rhe most uncertain 
dererminanrs of furure perspectives. As shown above, popularion rrajecrories range by about a facror of three. In contrasr, Figure 2.2 
shows a very wide range of economic developm ent paths assumed in rhe scenarios. 
111e hisro ri ca l G DP (gross domesr ic producr, in rhi s case rhe global eco nomic producr) growrh rare has been about three percem per 
year since rhe 1950s; in rhe scenar ios rhe ave rage growrh rares ro 2 100 range from I . I percenr per year to 3 .2 perceJH per year, wirh 
rhe med ian va lue of2.3 percent per yea r. This rranslares into a GDP level in 2100 rh ar varies from 2.6 ro more than 25 rim es rhe 
2000 levels. 111 e 2000 GDP was about US$35 rrilli on , which rranslares inro rhe range of about US$65 ro mo re rhan US $700 trillion 
by 2 100. 
Figure 2.2 Global economic development across scenarios in the literature 
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Figure 2.2 clea rl y indicates some clusrering of scenarios inro rhree ranges, a low one around abour $ 100 trillio n, a medi an one around 
$3 00 (wirh a wide range from about $200 ro abour 400) t rillion and rhe high on e aro und about $500 trillion by 2 100. If, on the 
basis of rhese GD P proj ecrions, rhe per cap ira GD P range would be spec ified, rhen rhi s wou ld show a similar parrern , i. e. rhar rhe 
upper bound has shifred downwards from about US$80 rhousand ro US$5 0 thousand , and thar rhe median has been moving from 
US$46 down ro US$23 rhousa nd rcspecri vely. This correspo nds ro annual G DP growrh rares of about 0.6 percent per yea r in rhe lower 
case, about I percent per year in rhe med ian case and abo ut 2.7 percenr per yea r in rhe high case. The Securi ty of Supply Storyline 
is assumed ro fa ll in rhe highest growth range (medium in rhe North and high in rhe So urh). However, th is sroryline also has high 
population levels so rhar per capita growth rates and sta ndards of li vin g wou ld be simil ar compared ro the other two more median 
economic-growrh sro rylines (Ti·ansirion and Coa l, O il and N uclear Srorylines), except for the Underin ves rment Sroryl ines that is 
assumed to be characterized w ith subsranrial vo latilities making its economic growth rates rather indeterm inate o r in the wo rst case 
rather low. 111e average global srandards of li ving by rhe end of rhe cenrury would be comparabl e ro those of rhe most affl uen t parts of 
the world roday wirh abut $30 tho usa nd per capita co mpared wirh rhe current globa l average of less than $6 thousand. 
O ne of the co ntended issues is whether rhe econo mies should be measured in terms of marker exchange rares or purchas ing power 
parities. Marker exchange rates are to used for rradable co mmodities such as oi l o r coa l. 111ese are impor ta nt in energy scenarios. Fi-
nall y, data fo r energy technologies , inputs and ourpurs and other impo rtant model para meters are readily ava ilable measured at market 
exchange rares. On the o ther side, there is rhe argument that purchas ing power parties are rhe appropri ate metri c for comparison of 
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incomes and affluence across countries and regions. The larger the informal economy the larger will tend to be the underes timate of 
economic acriviries if market exchange rates are used instead of purchas ing power pariti es. We wi ll nor venture here in rhe intricate 
argum ents concerning these issues o r what is rhe prefe rred way of measuring econo mic activ ities except to sta te that the current li ving 
standards in rhe developing parts of the wo rld would appear to be about G times higher when measured at purchasing power parities 
co mpared to the market exchange rates. All to ld , the eco nomic growth rares across scenarios and in the four sto rylines wou ld appear 
to be significa ntly lower in terms of purchasing power parities. However, an in teresting findin g is rhar the upper range of GDP va lues 
is quire simil ar go ing to about US $700 trilli on, as shown in Figure 2.2 . 
Technological change, innovation diffusion and new energy paradigms 
We have shown (see C hapter l) that in a large number of energy scena rios, natural gas demand could double by 2030 driven primarily 
by increas ing energy demands in all parts of the world. Genera ll y, natural gas is the foe! of choice for power generation wherever access 
to gas is ava ilable and this is likely to co ntinue to be the most important growth segment, alth ough today the high o il and gas prices are 
translating in substa ntiall y higher electricity prices. Neverrheless, namral gas is the right fu el to meet electricity generat ion and other 
demands because of its environmental benefits, the increasing efficiency of gas- fired technology, and the shorter lead times to build 
plants and the lower life cycle costs (JGU , 2003). ll1e impo rtance of approp ri ate regulato ry frameworks was emphasized for building 
new generation capacities and maintaining ex isting production and use levels. 
Stationary uses of methane or biogas for cooking or in small-scale el ec tri city generation are important for many developing countries 
that do nor have universal access to electri city today. Higher shares of natural gas as (public) transport fuel wou ld be another priority 
as it ca n result in a substa ntial red uct io n of urban air pollution. Fulfillment of these large technology needs would require closer 
collaboration among many countr ies and close industry and public partnerships especially ro develop energy infras tructures such as 
pipeline grids and to develop and deploy new energy technologies. Governments have the primary role in creat ing rhe necessary legal 
and regulato ry co nditions in the development o f gas markers, especially in smaller custo mer markers, as well as fo r rhe quality and 
effi ciency of rhe service rhat should be guaranteed (!GU , 2003) . 
Loo king into rhe lo nger future perspecrives, fuel cell technologies are considered to be an important and essenti al component of 
fumre energy systems and wou ld play an essen tial ro le in rhe ' Methane Age' and beyond in co njunction with hydrogen. Fuel ce lls are 
a generi c technology as there are many types, fro m low to high remperaru re, from mobile to stationary. W hat they have in common 
is modul ari ty and the poss ibility of small -sca le di srr ibured generation of electri city and cogenerarion of heat. 1l1is is a decisive advan-
tage as it may lead to substantial cost buy-downs along learning curves and rend er thi s technology economical in co rnin g yea rs and 
decades. 111 e challenge today is the high cos t comp;1red ro o ther alternatives, such as rhe intern al combustion engine for automobiles. 
Fo r exa mple, including fuel ce ll s in newly built houses could meet the environm ental objectives of reduced energy use and emiss ions, 
wh ile providing an early marker for a high cost product. However, it appears rhat no major technical breakthroughs are required before 
fuel cel ls ca n be inrroduced into rhe srationary energy sector - air hough a !or of engineering development and especially cost reduction 
wi ll be necessa ry. In the automotive secto r rhe challenges are perhaps greate r, as rransporr is much more homogeneous than power 
o r hear generation in terms of both fu el use (only gaso line or diesel in signifi ca nr quanriries) and rhe ubiquitous internal combustion 
engine. So rhe introduction of the fuel ce ll to meer enviro nmental goals also requires changes in fuel provision , and the simulraneous 
develop ment of both fuel cell s and infrasrrucrure. Fuel cells are expected to be one of the core techno logies for motor veh icles in the 
2 1st century as an inregral component of rhe Methane Age (!G U, 2003). 
In the mea ntime, the so-called bridge techno logies, such as compressed narural gas, bio- fuel, GTL and DME vehicles would diversify 
the Fl eet, help reduce emiss ions and provide enabling infrastructures for fuel cell veh icl es wirh hydrogen propulsion in the very long 
term. Emiss io ns free or close to em issions free veh icles wi ll be required as mobility continues to increase during rh e century. 
A larger role of natural gas would also result in an even higher share of global emiss io ns of greenhouse gases and especially ca rbon 
dioxide. Th is mea ns that some of the technologies for carbon capture and storage would need to be developed and deployed. 'G lobal 
Energy Scenar ios', rhe third Special Projec t of rhis IGU triennium , has shown that moderate ca rbon mitiga tion measures and policies 
rend to fa vo r namral gas in conjunction with ca rbon cap ture and sto rage (IGU , 2003) . Already today, carbo n dioxide is separated and 
sto red in a sub seabed aquifer below rh e North Sea (S leipner an d Snowhi r gas field s) and ca rbon dioxide se rves as an agenr for en-
hanced hydroca rbon recovery. However, ve ry high levels of carbon taxes wou ld also make ca rbon caprure from coa l more eco nomical 
as well as rhe introduction of nuclea r and renewable energy sources. "n1is is one of rhe central features of the Coa l, O il and Nuclear 
Storyline and also a major alternative to the Merhane Age if the opportunities are exploited in a timely and approp ri ate mann er by 
the industry. 
In either case (Trans irion or Coal, Oil and Nuclear Storylines), rhe amounts of ca rbo n d ioxide to be sto red wo uld be truly eno rm ous, 
ranging from a few ro perhaps even more rhan 500 G rC (billion tons o f elemenral carbon) cumulated by the end of the cen tury 
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(Morita et al., 2001 ). The potential storage capacity in underground aquifers, depleted oil and gas fields and underground coal mine 
seams are all large and would suffice for storing caprnred carbon. The exhausted oil and gas fields represent a particularly good medium 
for carbon dioxide burial and storage. At the same time, injection of C02 can enable enhanced production of residual oil, gas and 
gas condensate. Oceans are today one of the largest carbon reservoirs and could potentially store vast amounts in the future, but this 
option is very controversial because of the uncertain environmental and ecological impacts. Humanity has changed global climate 
during the last two centuries so that we are already beyond the point where a new energy regime and transition is required. Carbon 
capture and storage in conjunction with renewables and possibly also nuclear energy could in principle reduce global carbon emissions 
to virrnally zero. Hydrogen and electricity could become pollution-free and renewable energy carriers. Achieving a hydrogen and 
elecrricity age has never been more urgent. 
Today, the economics of hydrogen as an energy carrier are unfavorable, primarily because the external costs associated with the impacts 
of climate change are not considered in the cost calculations. However, once these external costs are included, the sirnation might 
change significantly. This is an argument for why governments should play a greater role in providing the necessary frameworks and 
incentives. -fhere has already been a move towards the use of hydrogen in some countries, notably Japan, where narnral gas is a source 
of hydrogen, and in Iceland where geothermal and hydropower are used to produce hydrogen. 
Today, methane steam reforming is the most economical route for hydrogen production. Industry has considerable experience with 
hydrogen production by methane reforming, which can be seen as the transition route to the Hydrogen Age. Unforrnnately, the 
economic opportunities for carbon caprnre and storage are only possible on a large scale. Another challenge is how to make small-scale 
reforming technology cheap and reliable, especially for use on board vehicles. First steps in this direction already exist and during 
the International Exhibition that accompanied the conference, hydrogen vehicles were demonstrated along with refueling stations. 
Another possibility during the transition toward the Methane and Hydrogen Ages would be to mix hydrogen and methane (hythane), 
which would reduce carbon emissions to the atmosphere and would not require new pipeline and distribution grids. In the medium 
term, there would be an opportunity to develop small hydrogen distribution networks for stationary fuel cells producing heat and 
power, and refueling stations for hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. 
Central hydrogen production with steam reforming of methane in conjunction with carbon caprnre and storage and from intermittent 
renewable sources, such as wind and hydropower, and the development of hydrogen transmission and storage are expected only in 
the much longer term. llrns, there are many possible technological synergies between natural gas and renewables as complementary 
sources of electricity and hydrogen. 111e gas industry should participate in the development of such perspectives in order ro better 
understand what this could mean in the future, and what the role of natural gas, and of the gas system, could be beyond the next 
decade or two. The li·ansition Storyline explores such futures where these opportunities are translated into a larger role of natural gas 
as the transition energy source. Other three storylines explore to a varying degree Future worlds where these opportunities are not taken 
leading to emergence of barriers that block natural gas from many markets and future uses. 
Investment needs in energy systems and infrastructures 
All of the infrastructure and technology requirements imply high R&D needs. Some of these are not necessarily the highest priority 
for the more developed regions of the world, e.g., technologies for efficient conversion of biomass cellulose into energy gases. Public 
and private partnerships are essential for achieving these challenging development needs. 
The namral gas industry is entering a fundamental transition that is characterized by liberalization of markets, an increasing need for 
safety and energy security, and concerns about climate change. At the same time, the demand for narnral gas is likely to double by 
mid-century. The difh1sion of new and advanced technologies is a corner stone of this transition. The highest technological priorities 
facing the industry are concerned with the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions through carbon capture and storage, the production 
of hydrogen as an emissions-free energy carrier and the development of vast methane hydrate deposits. In contrast to these large 
technology and methane resource development needs are the declining public R&D efforts throughout the OECD countries and the 
ever increasing competitive pressures facing the natural gas indusrry that Further reduce the availability of R&D efforts. Public and 
private natural-gas partnerships for technology innovation are essential for paving the road toward the Methane Age and fulfillment 
of the Transition Storyline. 
In general, governments should provide strong support for research and development (in technology but also in socio-economic 
disciplines), with fiscal and policy incentives for demonstration projects. Governments should not try to pick the 'winners'. However, 
very clear policy objectives must be articulated so that appropriate technologies are chosen in competitive environments and within a 
'level playing field'. This will require a vision of the future. Facilitating transboundary transportation of methane and promoting R&D 
are two of the major challenges on the road towards the Transition Storyline. 
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propriate, also nuclear power will not become commercially viab le and attract ive unless there is a great improvement in their technical 
and environmental performance, universal ava ilab ili ty and perhaps foremosr a sign ificant reduction of costs. The current advantage 
of natural gas is that the combined-cycle gas turbine is such a technology. However, development is underway that might change this 
current advantage of natural gas in electricity generatio n markets, for example, by radically reducing the costs of renewables or adverse 
environm enta l impacts of coal. This further indicates the need to develop new methane technologies. Again, the four storylines explore 
these alternative future poss ibili ties, from decarbonization with more gas and with substantiall y less gas to re-carbonization of the 
global energy system. 
Figure 2.4 Decarbonization of energy as the ratio of carbon over global primary energy, from 1980 to 2100 
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Source: updated from Nakicenovic, 1996. 
Methane resources such as hydrates are potentially so abundant that they could provide a lasting source of hydrogen and electricity 
thereby ach ieving decarbonization of energy with carbon sequestration and permanent storage. 11rns, narural gas cou ld be the bridge 
to carbon-free energy sources, such as so lar or fusion energy, or even hydrogen extracted from the vast clarhrate resources. Decarboni-
zation of methane from clathrates, and other gas sources in general, will require the development of new technologies and innovative 
schemes for carbon sequestration and storage in the future to produce carbon-free energy gases such as hydrogen and other carriers 
such as electricity. 
In the meantime, the natural gas share in tota l primary energy should cont inue to grow at the expense of dirtier energy sources - coal 
and oi l. This transition to the methane age and beyond to carbon-free energy systems represents a minimum-regret option because 
it would also enhance the reduction of other adverse impacts of energy-use on environment in addition to substantia l reductions of 
carbon dioxide emissions. 
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Chapter 3 
Transition Storyline 
3.1 General description 
111e transition story li ne describes a future world in which: world po pulatio n grows at a relati vely low rate; eco nom ic growth slows 
down ro rares varying from 2 per cenr o n average in the industrialized wo rld , ro 4 per cent on ave rage in the developing world; 
worldwide energy effici ency increases by 2 per cent per annum; and life styles are adjusted worldwide ro a greener and more susrainable 
economic system. After a series of disasters, which are attr ibuted ro global climate change, parricularly in developing countries, the 
environmental issue is considered one of the key prioriries for globa l po licy action. 111erefore, a wide range of policies and measures 
ro address rhi s priority are readily accepted almost everywhere, including marker-based incentives for CHG mirigatio n. In rheir 
srrarcgies ro expand energy production, developing countries adopt 'Western straregies' ro reduce carbon emiss io ns through energy 
effi ciency improvements and via the inrroducri on of renewables at a surpri singly quick pace. Simultaneously, a large-sca le introduction 
of decenrrali zed energy systems rakes places. There is a common understanding rhar both loca l pollution , especially in urbanized areas 
(where over GO per cent of world population is projected ro li ve by 2030, based on the 2004 UN World Populatio n Prospects medium 
va ri ant), and rhe emiss ions of greenhouse gases need robe reduced. Narural gas is seen as the transition fuel par excellence, which leads 
to grear optimism in the seccor, significam in vestment in all segments of the gas chai n, and an increasing marker share of narural gas 
in primary energy suppl y. 
3.2 Assumptions and rationale of the Transition Storyline 
Assumptio n 1 Future world production will be significantly lower. 
This sro ryline assumes that the world will face a serious risk in that supply of oi l wi ll be insufficient to meer demand. Due ro o il reserve 
depletion, o il pri ces remain rarher vo la rile and o n average show a rising rrend in rea l terms during the next few decades. Th is leads ro 
se rious worldwide demand-side responses and evenrually a slowdown of rhe global economy. The high average o il price also explains 
why o il remains rhe larges r internatio nally traded product, both in vo lume and va lue terms. Since th e prices of orher fuels remain 
broad ly lin ked ro rhe oil price, directly o r indirec tly, (abrupt) changes in the price of oi l affect all energy prices and thus have wide-
ranging ramificarions for borh oil-producing and importing countries. The larrer may regu larly be pushed into substantial economic 
slowdown due ro surging and vo lat ile o il prices. "l11is would also adversely affect the considerable economic growth mo mentum of 
industri alizing countries, which eco nomi c growrh rrends would slow down. The potentia lly powerful impact of o il price hikes on 
economi c growth ca n be illustrated by the fact rhar some projections indicate rhar th e 2004/05 oi l price doubling has already slowed 
down global output in 2005 by abour o ne percentage point. 
Next ro the adverse impact of energy price hikes o n economic growth, a more general lack of basic materials w ill increas ingly manifest 
irself and slow down economic progress. Moreover, in thi s sto ryline, environmen ta l problems, both globally (e.g. climate change, 
deserrificarion , abundant fi shing, erosion, deforestation) and locally (loca l air, warer and so il pollurion), give ri se ro majo r concerns 
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a slower pace. 
Assumption 2 Energy efficiency rates will show a rising trend towards levels clearly beyond those seen in the past. 
In lin e with a trend of high and ri sing energy prices, the obvious ad va n tages of energy effi ciency improvemem s are increasingly being 
recognized and com merciall y applied o n a worldwide sca le. It is likely that a large num ber of breakth ro ughs in energy effi ciency im-
provemen t will be reached. A few exam ples illustrate the im pact of such improvements already in the sho rt run : calcul ations show that 
replacing all light bulbs in the USA with the presently mos t effi cient ones could already close 40 large coa l-fired power plants and save 
the nation $ 10 billio n a yea r. A similar ca lculatio n for the construction of new office bu ildings shows that the most energy-effic ient 
constructions wo uld save capacity eq ui va len t to 85 power plants and two Alaska o il pipel ines, at no increased cos t (Susta inabili ty 
Institute, 2005) . 
Tremendo us scope fo r energy efficiency improvemen t ex ists as well withi n the electricity secto r. M uch progress has already been 
achieved in co nverting methane o r li q uid and so lid carbo naceo us mate ri als in to elec tricity and o rher energy carri ers. 1l1e lates t des igns 
ofCCGTs5, fo r insta nce, ca n achieve efficiency levels of over 60 percenr (Naki cenovic et al. , 2000 : 37). Fu rthermore, as this figure has 
been ri sing by over one percent per yea r fo r over a decade, it seems unlikely that ir would slow down in the fo reseeable future. Large-
scale implementation of such highly efficien t power productio n uni ts would sign ifica ntly increase energy efficiency worldwide. This 
process may be enhanced by the high gas pri ces projected in rhi s storyli ne. Furthermo re, the low capi ra l costs and high ava ilabili ty of 
co mbined cycle tu rbines may also speed up rheir rapid in trod uctio n by power statio n operators. Figu re 3. 1 shows projectio ns by the 
I EA of the 'business as usual' efficiency improvement poten tial o f a number of technologies. Ir seems fa ir to assum e that substa ntially 
higher energy p rices co mbined with sizeable emiss ion penalties will speed up the evolvemenr of energy effic iency and the implemen-
rar io n of CCGTs in rhe course of rime. 
Figure 3.1 Commercial availability and efficiency improvements of key technologies (2 002-2030) 
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If such efficient power production capacity were in troduced at a large scale worldwide, this would add ro the growing importance of 
natu ral gas as a fuel in general, and as a fue l fo r power production in parti cular. Afte r all , recent develo pmen ts in energy effi ciency of 
electricity generatio n ca pacity favo r naru ral gas rurb ines and com bined-cycle power p lan rs as rh e rechno logy o f choice throughout 
the wo rld because of rheir cost and environmental adva n tages and their ve ry high effi ciencies and modulari ry. In conjunctio n wi th 
the high hyd rogen-ro-ca rbo n ratio of narural gas, high efficiencies lead ro low emissions of all pollman ts (see Figure 4 .9, incl uding 
C02, while high modulari ty is compatible with the Aex ibil ity required in com peti ti ve, pr ivat ized energy markers. Combined-cycle 
techno logy is therefore seen as a hedge aga inst rhe uncerra in ty about furure enviro nmen ta l po licy prio riti es. 
5 A technology whi ch combines gas rurb ines ::ind sre:1111 rurbines, connected ro one or mo re clecrrical genera1o rs ar rhe same planr. 'll1 e gas rurbi ne {usu:11ly fuelled 
by naru ral gas or oil) prod uces mecahn ica l powl'r, which drives the gene rator, and hear in rhe form ofhor cxh:1us1 gases. These g:1scs arc fl'd to a boi ler, where srea m 
is raised ar p ressu re ro drive a convenriona l srca m rurb ine, wh ich is also con nec1ed roan decnica l generaro r. ' !his has rhe eR-Ccr of prod uc ing add ir io nal clecn iciry 
from rhe same fuel comp;ired to an open cycle rurbine. 
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An increasing share of decentralized energy (DE) systems in the production of power and heat spurs energy efficiency improvements as 
well. Figure 3.2 illustrates the scope for efficiency improvemenrs ch rough cogeneration strategies. Future market prospects all around 
the world critically depend on the removal of electricity market regulatory barriers and long-standing incentives/subsidies for central 
generation. This storyline assumes considerably stronger incentives for DE systems than nowadays in many regions (for incentives, see 
also Table 3.4 on countries' cogeneration strategies). 
Figure 3.2 Efficiency rates of separate and cogenerated production of electricity and heat 
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For a more thorough overview of cogeneration and its implications for the gas industry see assumption 3.6 and 3.9. 
Assumption 3 Awareness of climate change risks increases, based on an increasing number of climate change disasters; abrupt 
climate change is no longer ruled out. So, in the course of time, the 550 ppmv stabilization target is no longer 
considered acceptable. Instead, the target is to stabilize at lower levels to prevent temperatures from rising by 
more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. 
The past few decades have shown chat awareness of and action on big environmental issues, such as climate change or ozone layer 
deplerion, can develop rapidly. During approximately one generation time, roughly the period 1985-2005, the world community, 
based on information from the research community, notably IPCC, not only became convinced that climate change poses a serious 
threat to mankind, parrly due to the effect of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (CHG) emissions, but also established a widely accepted 
international climate change policy regime (the 1992 UNFCCC/ 1997 Kyoto Protocol (KP)/ 200 I Marrakech Agreement) based on 
an absolute ceiling of CHG emissions for at least the com mined industrialized world. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 
February 2005 after it was ratified by the Russian Federation in 2004. 1l1e committed Parties will have to cake new climate policy 
initiatives in order to comply. It is well conceivable that the next few decades will show a similarly strong development, in which the 
first seeps of the present will turn fairly quickly into a much srricter regime with a broader coverage and more active participation. 
There is a common understanding chat the Kyoto Protocol regime is only a small first step in the direction of a decades-long tradition 
of a clear, well-focused and increasingly stricter regime chat successfully deals with the problem. "Jl1is perception and sense of direction 
may be supported by popular action based on private and/or voluntary initiatives (for an example see Box 3.1) and will be helpful 
in further shaping an international climare policy framework. In facr, governments have already developed, or are in the process of 
devising, long-term suacegies to limit CHG emissions even after 2012. 
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Box 3.1 Green Goal concept 
This year's soccer World Cup in Germany is aiming to be the first-ever climate neutral event of its kind. Although the FIFA 
World Cup is expecred to generate additional GHG emissions of around 100,000 metric tons C02-eq., 80,000 of which are 
accountable co the transportation of che estimated 3 million spectarors, emissions are to be balanced by investing in climate 
protection schemes in other pans of the world. A call for projects has been issued in October 2005 for 60.000 so-called 
'Gold Standard' Certified Emission Reductions (CERs).The organizing comminee is reviewing possible projects particularly 
originating from Sou ch Africa; hose of the 201 0 World Cup. 
Such iniriarives are a.o . encouraged by recenr scienrific insights countering criticism on Michael Mann's hockeys ti ck shaped figure 
represen ting the wa rming up of the ea rth from a hi storical perspecrive (1000-2000). Now, insread of four studies as co nveyed in rhe 
200 I IPCC report, rwelve independen t cl im ate reconstructions are ava ilable all showing the anom alous tempera ture development of 
the 20rh cen tury. At a sess ion convened by the UN Comm ission on Susrainab le Development (May 2006), rhe C hair of the IPCC 
- Mr. Pachauri - emphas ized that the ear th's atmosphere ca n hea t up from I .4-5.8°C by the end of this cenrury. Moreover, sea levels 
can ri se from 9 to as much as 88 cm over the same period and the frequency, intensity and loca ti on of extreme weather events is 
expected to change. The last rwo yea rs were illustrative with respect hereto. 
TI1is sto ryline also assumes that the USA will become se riousl y involved in the internatio nal climate policy framework, thereby ac-
cepting the need fo r strict targets. First, actual di saste rs with a perceived link to climate change may add to the public understa nding 
and acceptance of the need for de termined action; recent exa mples are hurricanes in Flo rida and ex treme precipitatio n in California, 
most likely to be followed by additi onal disasters (droughts, sto rms, forest fires, erosion , Roods, etc.) in the fo reseeable future. Pu-
blications such as the Millennium Ecosys tem Assessment (2005) may further ra ise rhe public's concerns that witho ut se ri ous climate 
policy action , things can go seriously wrong for future generations. Second , US awareness of the need for climate policy action is 
already growing, illustra ted by the la rge number of concrete initiatives taken ar stare and loca l level. To mention just a few recent 
ones: 192 American mayo rs (representing 40 m Americans) have promised to com ply with eventual req uirements under the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2005 through a so-ca lled 'Clim ate Protection Agreement' and are acwally pressing to go beyond the federal government's 
effo rts in addressing global climate change; California and New Mexico, amo ng other states, have set ambitious state- level emiss ion 
reduction ta rgets; in 2005 New York is to inrroduce the same legislation o n GHGs from vehicles as California did in 200 2 (see Box 
3.8); mo reover, a so-called Regional G reenh ouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is in the process of development planning a regional emiss ions 
trading scheme covering seven north -easte rn states in the US; 6 the C hicago C limate Exchange (CCX, a private initia tive serving the 
voluntary m arker for emission allowances) has announced that it will exrend and expa nd the program for an additional four yea rs, 
from 2007 rhrough 2010, etc. 
In this sto ryline there is also a rapidly growing awa reness that the most serious climate change risks are probably rel a red ro the chances 
of ab rupt climate change (ACC). Public and po licy makers' attention for the issue have thus for remained limired (e.g. the movie 'The 
Day after Tomo rrow'). This could, however, quickly change, even quicker than the fear for a rapid depletion of the ozone layer during 
the 1980s. As for as the risk of ACC is concerned, recenr sc ienrifi c insights suggesr rhat there is a ri sk of reversion to the po tentially 
catastrophic unstable regime of intermitrenr ACC, com parable to what preceded climate stabilization about 12,000 yea rs ago. Whi le 
the drivers and thresholds are not ye t fully understood , it is clea r that non -linea ri ties, e.g. triggered by oceanic warming, may ca use 
large changes in temperature and precipitat io n in just a few decades. Such processes may be related to a shutdown of the rhermohaline 
circulation (the 'G ulf Stream'), which, once activated , may turn our to be irreversible. 1l1e possible implications of such developments 
can be so far-reaching that also in the po licy a rena there will be an increasi ng perception that a rapid development towards much lower, 
or even ze ro-emission energy systems should be initi ated within a few decades. 
Assumprion 4 A global climate change policy regime is accepted worldwide. 
First, one o f the lesso ns lea rned from designing the KP regime has been that rigiditi es in the sys tem, such as the use of absolute ce ilings 
and only natio nall y ass igned amounts as ya rdst ick for co mpliance, may be counrerproducti ve in trying to dea l with the free-rider 
problem. 1l1is sro ryline assumes that developing countries start ro accept some weak commitments because of the introduction of 
more Aex ibiliry in the KP regime targers and ways of achieving rhose. 1l1is will trigger the US and so me orher co untri es (such as 
Australia) that have not ratified the KP, to jo in rhe global coalition. The Vision Statement for an Asia-Pacific Partn ership on C lean 
D evelopment, issued in July 2005 by irs initiato rs: Ausrralia, China, India, Japan , South Korea and the US, may be a precursor of a 
broader accepta nce of worldwide climate policy acrion . 
Second , ano ther reason why support for climate policy action may gradually grow to wo rld wide acceptance is rhat one of rhe ma in 
approaches to raise or even optimize the cosr-effecriveness of climate policy actio n, the possibility of inrernarional trading of G H G 
emiss ion red uctions or carbon sequestrarion actio n - an option typica lly propaga ted by the US administratio n during the Kyoro 
negotiat ions - not only seems to have been broadl y accepted , bur also increas ingly implemented worldwide. All kinds of frictions and 
problems associated with the inrroducrion of such trading schemes are presenrly being dealt with, which makes furth er introduction 
6 
Parri ciparing states arc: Connecticut, Delaw:uc, M:linc, New 1-bmpshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont. Legis lati on signed in Apri l 2006, requires 1\!brybn d 
10 become a full panicipanr in rhe process by June 30, 2007. In addition, the Disrricr of Columbia , Massachusens, Pennsylva nia, Rhode Isla nd, rhc Eastern 
Ca nadian Provinces, and New Bru nswick arc observers in rhe process. 
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and wider app li ca rion probably much eas ier. This may add to a further accepta nce in che future of climate po licy iniciarives, because 
under che assumption of large-sca le international t rading, the overa ll mitigation costs will , according to IPCC (200 le), be anywhere 
between 25-75 per cent lower than without trading. 
Em issions t rading is already a se ri ous bus iness indeed , especially with the coming into effect of che largest scheme worldwide so far, 
che EU Emiss ions Tradi ng Scheme (EU ETS) as of January 2005, which includes nea rl y I 1,500 installations throughout che EU and 
covers about 45 per cent of rora l EU G H G emiss io ns. Under the scheme, coun tri es are committed to translate mitiga ri o n rargers imo 
allocations to individual insca ll a ri ons o n an annual basis. Over 2005 an estimaced 362 million rC02 has been traded at a financia l 
va lue of €7.2 billion (Point Carbon, 2006a). Although prices have halved to about€ 14 per tC02 after publica tion of a number of 
coun tries' ve rified emiss ion reports at che end of April/beginn ing of May 2006, showing rhe sci II immacu re scage of che European 
credit marker, rhe marker is expec ted to beco me more liquid and macure as o ne approaches che KP co mmitm ent period . 1l1e trad ing 
scheme may wel l become righter as allocatio ns wi ll be less lenient with a likely future t ightening of allowance allocat ions for rhe second 
commirmenr period. Compliance is enforced by fines ranging from €40/rC02 during rhe first comm itmenc period (2005-2007) to 
€ I OO/rC02 applicable during che second commitment period (a period which coincides wich rhe 2008-12 KP com mitmen t period). 
111ese fines have to be paid per excess cC02 over and above compliance. So me advocate char che EU ETS could in rime be linked 
wich schemes in ocher regions, mosc likely based on cred ic conversion schemes o r mu cual recognition, bur thi s is still uncertain. Ar rhe 
moment, difle renc trad ing sys tems co-ex ist. Furure projecrions po in t ar an ever- increas ing trend of various forms of emissions trading 
reaching some €40 billion in 2010 according to some sources. 
Projecr-based emiss ions crading, parricularly through che KP C lean Develop menr Mechanism (COM) that allows countri es with an 
emissions limi tarion o r reducrion commirment under rhe KP to ser up G H G reductio n projects in non-An nex I countries (o r develo-
ping countries), cruly rook off as wel l in 2005. -111e so-ca lled C O M projecc pipeline 7 concains as of May 2006 so me 740 projects char 
may abate abour l billion C02-eq. Co nsidering rhe fact rhac Annex l countries to the KP need to abare ar lease 3000 Mt ofC02-eq. 
over rhe firsr commirmenr period , rhe marke r seems wel l on irs way co accom moda re here for. Ouc of these 740 projecrs, l 72 are al-
ready registered wich rhe C OM EB.8 111ose registered projecrs are projected to abare about 340 Mc C02-eq. up to che end of 2012. 
Third, it seems likely char one wi ll gradually accept more effective means co deal wich the free- rider problem of inrernacional envi-
ron men ml treaty initi atives, such as incernacio nal cl ima te policy regi mes. 111is could im ply thac trade policy measures are increas ingly 
accepted as a way to discipline such free riders in broadly accepted multilateral environmental agreements. If effect ive, such ag1·eements 
eventually could practically have a globa l coverage, e.g. obliging all countries to accept commicmencs at th e risk o f facing crade sancti-
o ns. In the so-called 1998 shrimp- turtle WTO case, a firsc seep was taken: the WTO Appellate Body overruled the WTO Panel's view 
by im plicitly indicat ing char ir does no r catego ri ca lly di sa llow using extra-j urisd ictional processes and producti on methods (PP Ms) as 
an argumen t in WTO-appeals. Although che ruling did noc refer ro im porranr questions, which could be relevant to rhe interaction 
between WTO and UNFCCC/KP, several analyses sugges t rhac it would im ply rhat PPMs no longer violate the WTO by their very 
nature. "lnis could open the door to anti free- rid ing measures based o n G H G emissions from production . 
Finall y, although cautiously avo iding any reference towa rds the opti on of co mmitments under a post-Kyoto regime, high-growth de-
veloping coun tries in As ia are se rio usly reconsider ing cheir development strategies. In creas ingly, environmenta ll y susta inab le economic 
growth o r 'g reen growch' is promoted as illustrated by th e interest ofcoun cr ies like India, C hina and South Korea co parti cipate in che 
Asia- Pac ific Parm ership on C lean Development as referred co above. 1l1is may mark first seeps in the process co embark on multilateral 
environmenral t reaties based on crue co mmitments. 
Assumption 5 The prices of carbon credits (per tC02-eq .) or equivalent mitigation incentives increase rapidly. 
A large num ber of model simulations have been carri ed ouc preceding the Sta rr of acrual emiss ions trad ing under rhe Kyoto Protocol 
and other rrading schemes (e.g. S02-based) in o rder to rry to project the mosc likely furure credit prices. Although all scudies clearl y 
indica te char projections are racher sensit ive to trading conditions (e.g., alloc.ltions, rrade rescriccions, compliance regimes, councry 
coverage, etc.), most model projections with regard to the KP regime suggested cred it prices substantially higher rhan rhose seen in 
che rea l market so fa r (< € lO/cC02 for non-Gold sra ndard JI and COM-based credits at least unril 2006): masc simul at ions projected 
pri ces to range between € I 0 and €30 per rC02 fo r a full crading regim e, and much higher if on ly regional trading were poss ible (see 
Figure 3 .3) . 
' lhe CDM projec1 p ipeline is defi ned on 1he basis of projecrs unde r val idarion by a Designared Operario n Enriry (DOE). 
As of 1he beginning of May, 2006. 
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This raises rhe quesri on why rhe simul ations have been so w ro ng so far. O ne explanation may well be thar in facr rhe Kyoto mecha-
n isms are still under developmenr, so that a clea r perspect ive o n the moda li ties thar need robe sa risfied for fo rmal acceptance of credits 
is still lack ing. The operationalizatio n of the COM, fo r insta nce, was particularl y delayed partly because o f rhe sudden introduction of 
a project additionaliry test and only slowly developing acceptance of the required baseline merhodologies. The future looks, however, 
bright as a sudden mass ive 'outbreak' of accepted and approved COM-projects was seen at the end of 2005 and 2006. As far as JI 
is concerned, cred its wi ll on ly be accepted for mitigatio n afte r 2008, so that also a full-blown JI credit marker has not yet come to 
ex istence either. Here also progress could be unexpected ly fast, however, with the insta llatio n of rhe JI Supervisory Committee (JI SC). 
Fina lly, in the absence of any clear sign as ro how the expected major suppliers of ass igned amount u nits (AA Us), Russ ia and Ukraine, 
will behave on the credit market, it is also unclear how such behav ior would affect credit p ri ces. So, by the beginn ing o f 2006, the 
Kyoto Proroco l fl ex ibili ty mechani sms can be perceived of as still being in an embryonic stage of implementation, which may explain 
why perceived credit ri sks are still (ve ry) high and KP credi t prices therefore low. Th ings can, however, change rapidly. 
Figure 3.3 Estimated prices per metric ton of C02 based on different models 
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1l1e EU ETS could probably del iver better in formatio n about how credit prices can surge, (a lthough it must be rea lized that credi ts 
are generall y scheme-specific uni ts that cannot easily be exchanged between schemes). Bearing rhat in mind , Figure 3.4 illusrrares rhe 
price development of the credits in the EU ETS, being the largest allowa nce market worldwide,9 partly based on fo rward t rad ing in 
an emerging marker. Because, based on an EC directive, the Kyoto cred it marker is linked (at leas t under specific but nor ve ry strict 
restrictio ns per individual installa tion) to rhe EU ETS allowa nces marker, prices o n both markers should, in theory, re nd ro converge. 
1l1e fact that thi s has nor yet happened by th e beginning of 2006, is another illust ration of the sti ll immature sra rus of the KP credit 
markets in which even the software to link the KP fl ex ib ili ty mechan isms with the EU ETS credi t marker has nor yet been full y 
developed. I 0 
The Figure illuscrates that the EU ETS allowance prices have flucrnared heav ily since rhe marker scarred. 1l1 is was a.o. caused by rhe 
launching of Nationa l Allocation Plans (NAPs) by EU member stares during thi s per iod, wh ich were submirred for approval to the 
Eu ropea n Commissio n. The information about the indi vidual NAPs turned our ro have a strong impac r o n the credi1 marker prices. 
The expe ri ences so far have show n that small changes in individual NAPs could already trigger a fairly st rong marke1 response. -ll1is 
experience supports the theory which suggests tha t with marginal cost fun ctio ns of virtuall y all abatement technologies ris ing with 
their sca le of app licat io n, and with fai rl y low average energy demand elasticities , credit prices may rise fa irly soon as the cl imate po licy 
regime increas ingly becomes stri c ter. In July 2005 a hisro ri cally high pr ice level of almost €30 ,- per metric ton of C02 was reached. 
With mo re national regist ries o nline and a stil l increas ing supply from industr ies w ith excess allowances (e.g. the cement and steel 
industry), pressure on the sys tem may temporari ly be somewhat red uced , bur the overall price hike has nevertheless been impress ive, 
with furth er hikes probably nor unlikely. Moreover, a ceiling of €40/rC02 based on a penalty-fee level o nly app lies until 2008. After 
2008, a penalty fee of €100 per tC02 wi ll app ly, so that a llowa nce prices could rhen also technically increase beyo nd €4 0 levels. 
Ill 
There are five active nurkcrs for CHG allowances as of May 2006: 1hc EU ETS, rhc UK Emissions Tr:1ding sysrcm, the Norway em iss ions tr:i.d ing system, rhc New 
Sourh Wales trading sysrcm and rhe Chic1go Climate Exchange (CCX); a private inir ia rivc servi ng 1he volu nrnry market for emission allow:rnt.:cs between firms. 
However, now rhar pri ces on rhc EU ETS col lapsed and more rh;m h:ilvcd ar rh e end of April 2006, prices may have starred a convt:rsion process. 
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Figure 3.4 EUA 2006 prices 
So urce: Po int Carbo n, 200 5c. 
Assumption 6 ll1e energy secror is convinced that, although so me applica tions of narural gas will be replaced by renewables, thi s 
developmenr will be overshadowed by the increas ing role o f natural gas d ue ro a fuel switch (i.e. substituti on amo ng 
foss il fuels rowards narural gas) . The res ulting increase o f the marker share of natu ra l gas in energy consumptio n 
rriggers sel f-co nfidence, inves tmen t and innova tio n in the secror, which smoothens the po tential of the sector to 
adjust ro new market circumsta nces and poli cy regimes. 
So me observers no ti ce chat compared ro the o il secto r, the gas secro r still shows some lack of self-confidence abo ut its potenti al role 
in a furure world . -n1is may dace back to the times in which gas was p rim aril y seen as a by-product of o il productio n, o r ro quo te 
Vivienne Cox, C hief Executive (Gas, Power & Renewables) of BP " .. . we appea r to be somewhat ' behind the curve' o n gas supply in 
competi t ion with other fuel s .. . despire its apparent m aturi ty, thi s industry is really barely ou r of its teenage yea rs compared ro oil." 
Indeed , most experrs expect natural gas ro gain an ex panding share of do mes ti c energy productio n at leas t: rhrough 2020 (e.g., !EA, 
2004a; M cGa rvey, 2002) . 
In additio n, in line with the expecta tio n that there will be se rio us pos t-Kyoro initia ti ves with worldwide coverage, a w ide va riety of 
furth er and /o r more fa r reaching policies and measures ca n be expected ro be introduced o r rein fo rced , mos t of whi ch will have in 
commo n a direcr o r indirec t in troductio n o r increase of levies on the use o f foss il energy and/o r C H G emiss ions. In sofa r as C02 
emiss ions will be co nfronred wirh higher charges, o ne may expect a change in the fuel mix based on substitution. Assuming th at 
substimtio n among foss il fuels will do minate substitutio n between foss il fu els and no n-foss il -based prim ary energy, the role o f gas as a 
source of energy will be suppo rted , as its associated emiss io ns (in tC/roe) are less (0.64) rhan those of o il (0 .84), coal (1.08), o r timber 
( 1.25). 111is would stro ngly suppo rr the o ngoing long- rerm deca rboniza ti on trend of the last 150 yea rs (see Figure 3.5). 
11 
"lhe grJ ph shows week ly b id-oAer close EUA 2005 and 2006 prices from July 2003 in rhe ovcr-rhc-coumer (OTC) market (sec www. poinrcarbon.co m for the 
OTC methodology). 
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Figure 3.5 Global decarbonization of energy, historical development from 1860 to 1990, as a ratio of carbon to primary energy (tC/M). 
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An assess m ent o f th e fu ture rol e of natural gas in a fuel switc h-based sto ryline w ill pro bably ga in subsra nti ally fro m a sec tor-specific 
approach , sin ce the scope and potenti al for fuel switch diffe rs from secto r to secto r. Figure 3.6 clea rl y illustrates that over 6 0 per cent o f 
all energy- rela ted C02-emiss io ns can be attri bu ted to the power and rranspo n secto r. A n ana lys is of the poss ible scope for fuel switch 
in these rwo sec tors ca n thus be vira l. The po tenti al ro le of gas in the t ransport secto r w ill be d iscussed under assumptio n 3 .1 2. Below, 
some issues with rega rd to the power sector w ill be raised. 
Figure 3.6 Energy related C02 emissions, 2002 (million tonnes) 
Source: !EA, 2004a . 
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-111e re a re a number of reaso ns w hy it seem s sensible to ass ume a substanti all y m ore s ignifi ca nt ro le o f natu ra l gas in power generatio n : 
gas to power, as also projected by I EA (2004; see Figure 3.7). 
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Figure 3. 7 World natural gas demand (in power generation) 
1980 1990 2002 20 10 2020 2030 
Source: !EA, 2004. 0 Non power generation l:J Power generation 
First , as menti oned above, CCGTs reach efficiency levels that are superio r ro virtuall y all other power generatio n technologies. More-
over, such efficiencies are projected ro ri se even fur the r (see Figure 3 .1 ), wh ich makes a wide r CCGT app licatio n an attract ive option 
fo r many power producers, raising demand for natural gas. 
Second, climate change policy regimes wi ll also support the use of natural gas for power productio n where it can replace o il and 
particularly coa l. An exa mple of this is the EU where a C02 emi ssions rrading schem e is operational since January 2005. A number of 
ca lculations have tTied ro estimate th e co mmercial feasibility of switching from o il /coa l ro natural gas, depending o n allowance prices. 
O bviously, there is no si ngle, unique shift level; shifts wi ll ocrnr at different levels depending on all param eters invo lved, such as, next 
ro a llowance prices: efficiencies of rhe actua l power srar ions and gas, and prices of o il and coal. Assuming a 53 per cent plant efficiency 
and prices of arou nd 27p/rherm for gas and $66/ro nne fo r coa l (actual levels by mid-Ma rch 2005), th e allowa nce price level at which 
a switch from coa l ro gas becomes benefi cial has been calculated at EI I /rC02 (Po int Carbon, 2005a). It sho uld be menti oned in this 
regard that such effic iency levels arc nor (yet) represenrative for rhe gas plant arsenal within the EU. ll1is explains why another so urce 
suggests that: " ... only an EUA price of € l 6/tC02 or more would induce a switch from o il to gas in co ntinental power generation ... " 
(Po im Ca rbo n , 2005b). W hateve r the ca lculated price levels, 2005-ea rl y 2006 al lowa nce prices have co nsistently surpassed the higher 
E 16 per rC02, level (see Figure 3.4), at which gas is an economically more att ractive fu el. ll1is reinforces the projected growth of gas 
to power. 
An important additional facro r fo r actua l fuel switch in power production is, next ro the development in t ime of new power generating 
ca pacity, including gas-fi red cogeneration capacity, how plant-building activity will develop in the co urse of time, given the expiratio n 
of life times of ex ist ing plants. According the th e I EA, in Europe alone arou nd 700 CW of electricity generation (eq ui va len t ro the 
currently insta ll ed capacity and of which 50 per cent co nstitutes the replacement of old plams) needs ro be insta lled by 2030. Fo r 
example, more than half of all o perating coa l-fi red power plants in th e EU are older than 20 years (see Figure 3.8); assuming an ap-
proximately thirty-yea r lifeti me, a large number of such power plants wi ll have ro be replaced within the nex t 5- 10 years . ll1e scope 
for switching ro gas-fuel led power production in the foreseeab le future is therefore substa ntial (as graphica lly illustra ted in Figure 3.7), 
which may furth er boost the future demand for gas ro power generation. 
Figure 3.8 European Coal Fired Power Plant building activity ( 1920-2000) 
Source: UDI, 2003 . 
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Another adva ntage of natu ral gas for power producrion is its Aexibility in use, which may explain why some authorities show an 
increasing interest in natural gas for power production ro meet sudden shorrages of power supply. Box 3.2 gives some recem exa mples 
from Asia 
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introduction o f renewable energy would furth er increase, there could be stronger and more b roadly applicabl e incenri ves, as compared 
w the presem situati on . Also, several countries (both develo ping and developed) have explicitly ado pted re newable energy pron10 i-i o n 
policies and/o r targe ts in terms of the market share of renewables in energy productio n, eith er in general , o r fo r parti cular sectors (e .g., 
transport o r power production) (see Table 3.3 for an overview). Such ta rge ts could al so become more widespread and based on hi gher 
ambition levels in a wo rld that is stro ngly in fa vor of an energy transitio n. For example, C hina's Renewable Energy Law adopted in 
February 2005, required renewables to supply 10 per cenr of to ta l energy supply by 2020. In November of th at same yea r, thi s fi gure 
was already adjusted upwa rds to 15 per cent. 
Table 3.3 Renewable Strategies 
Directive/Policy Target* Means 
EU 
USA 
Japa n 
Chi na 
(see as wel l Box 3.4) 
Elccrricity Di recrivc 
2001 /77/EC 
Biofucls Di rective 
2003/30/EC of 8 May 2003 
Clean Air Acr Amcndmenrs 
(CAAA. 1990) 
Energy Policy Act 
(F PACT, 1992) 
I ncreascd use of 13ioenergy 
(executi ve o rder 13 134) 
Climate Change Acrion 
Plan (CCA P) 
New Energy lndica ror 
Renewable Energy Law 
(adopted February 2005; 
to be effective from January 2006) 
12% by 2010 
(share of biofuels: 5.75%) 
2 1 % of elecrriciry prod11 crion 
by 20 10 
Share ofal rern.1rive fuels 
co nsumed by lighi- dury 
veh icles in 2010 : 30% 
Tripli ng of the use orb ioene rgy 
and bioprod ucts in 2010, 
co mpared ro 1999 (corn ing inro 
effects of the law) 
YY<1 (cxcl . hydroeltc1ric and 
georhermal energy) 
I 0°/o of elecrriciry production by 20 I 0'. 
15% of primary energy by 2020 
Member Srares arc 
responsible for rhe fu rrhcr 
implementa tion. I .i 
Fuel rax exempri ons; bio fuel s 
ob ligzirions; promot iona l rariftS 
for RES and 01 her pro moriona l 
Glmpaigns; f{:cd- in rar iA-S; ere. 
Co uncil Direct ive 2003/96/EC 
or27 O ctober 2003 remucturing 
the Com rn uniry framework for rh c 
raxarion or energy producrs 
;:i nd elecrricity 
Tax deduc1ions (invcsrmenr rax 
crcdirs/product ion r:i.x 
credits/excise 1a x cxemprions) 
R& D 
Mand ::i rory rargcrs 
Promo1ional campa igns I 
public aw:i.rcncss e;1mpaigns 
Guara nrccd prices 
(feed-in rariHs a1 stare level) 
Vol un1ary progra ms 
Renawable porrfolio s1;111dards, 
c1pi r:1 l subsi dies, gr:in rs/rch:i.tcs, 
rradablc renewa ble energy 
ce rrificircs, net metering, R&D 
Renewable energy developrnen r f"u11d 
Low imeresr loa ns 
Spcci:i.I rax rre:11 rncnr 
M:rncb rory pu rd1 :1sc regi me (reed-in tar iffs) 
India 
** 
2003 Elcctriciry Act 
Plan ning/indicative u rger; nor backed 
by specific legisbt ion 
I Oo/o of added electric power cap:Kiry 
during 2003-20 12 (ex pected 10 G\V) 
Unless otherwise indi ca ted as percentage o f to ral prim ary energy. 
Excluding large hydropowe r. 
Feed-i n rarills (s tare level) 
Capiral subsi<lies, gr:1nrs/reba tes, t:tx 
credirs/ red uet io11s 
No te: ll1is enumera tio n is not ex hausri ve; ra ther it prov ides an illusr ration of so me o f the mosr proclaimed commitments, showing 
current inreresr in the further development and appli cation of renewables. 
Source: EC , 1997; I EA G lobal Renewabl e Energy Po licies and Measures Database [accessed 17 November 2005]; Marrin ot, 2005. 
13 
Un der curren t condi rions in EU Mem ber St:lrcs, ra rgers are unlikely robe mer. -lhe 2°/o rn:irker slure ofbiof'ucls in 2005 was, fo r exa mple, nor achieved. 
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Besides poli cy targets, other policies and measures are increasingly embraced. By 2005 , at leas t 32 countries and 5 sta tes/provinces had 
adopted feed-in policies, more than half of which have been enacted since 2002 (Ma rti not, 2005: 4). Although their effecti veness has 
to be proven over a longer time frame, feed-in tariffs did increase interest amo ng the business community and spurred investments 
accordingly. In Germany, having implemented feed-in policies in 1990, power from eligible forms of renewable generat ion more 
than doubled between 2000 and 2004 . Other policies and measures include ' renewable portfolio standards' (R PS), rax incentives 
and credits for renewable energy. Adoption of the former shows a country's com mitment towards renewables for energy production 
as these are legal mandates. Sweden, for exa mpl e, sets penalties for non-co mpliance at 150 per cent of the average certificate price of 
the prior period (Marti not, 2005: 23). 
Although so me initiatives rry to generi ca lly promote the furth er development of renewables, such as the 'Bon n Action Iii Programme' 
and a ye t to be established 'G lobal Renewable Energy Fund ofFunds', 1'i mosr of the initiatives taken are country-specific. ll1is is why 
so me of the information in the illustrati ve boxes below concerning a few of such initia t ives has been broadly summarized for a number 
of individual countries . 
Box 3.3 China's law on renewables 
China is expected by some to become leading in renewable energy having passed the first Renewable Energy Law in 
February 2005. The Law, effective as of January 2006, guarantees grid access for renewable energy producers as well as 
spreading the costs of new technologies across the sector. Moreover, the law offers financial incentives, such as a national 
fund to foster renewable energy development, and discounted lending and tax preferences for renewable energy projects, 
thus substantially improving che co nditions for renewables to be considered from a commercial po int of view. Being the 
world's second larges t emitter of C02 without binding obligations under the Kyoto Protocol , chis law provides a positive 
signal. The projected potential of renewables is enormous; even without the new law, the market for wind energy in 
C hina grew by 35%. Enactment of the law is a signal of China's commitment to cleaner air and energy securi ty. Thus, 
it helps the country meet its ambitious targets for che uptake of renewable energy; culminating in a des ired 15 per 
cent share by the year 2020, compared to a mere 3 per cent in 2003. According to the law, renewable energy includes 
hydroelectricity, wind power, so lar energy, geo thermal energy and marine energy, all of which should be taken into 
consideration in state and local development plans. Fulfillment is ensured through the inclusion of specific penalties for 
non-compliance with the law. 
Iii Adopt"cd ar rhc 2004 Rcnewables conference in Bonn , G erman y, by 170 counrrics. !rs go:i.I is ro add 163 CW of renewable clccrriciry Gtpaciry (compared to 
tocb y's wr:ll of JGO CW, excluding Luge hydro), wich requ ires tora l invcs1111cnrs of $326 billion. 
15 
' J he EU, together wirh rhe Johannesburg Renewabl e Energy Coal irion (J REC) pledged approximalery C75 million fo r rhe esrab lishmem of such a fund. 
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Box 3.4 The UK's energy future 
In its white paper on energy "Our Energy Future - C reating a Low Ca rbon Economy" (2003), the UK government expres-
ses the need for new domestic energy policy in light of changes observed . 1l1ese include climate change, reduced domestic 
energy resources, and the need to update or replace much of rhe energy infrasrrucrure. Four goals have been es tablished ro 
enable the UK to meet these challenges: 
Reducing C02 emissions with 60% from current levels by about 2050; 
Maintenance of reliability of energy supply; 
Promotion of competitive markets in the UK and beyond , helping to raise the rate of sustainable economic 
growth and to improve productivity; and 
Adequate and affordable heating of every home. 
In order to reach the targets set, the UK prefers to create a market framework, reinforced by long-term policy measures, 
which will give investors, business and consumers the right incentives to find the balance (and thus the fuel mix) that 
will most effectively meet rhe overall goals. Also, diversi fication of energy needs is considered important to secure energy 
reliability. Furthermore, the UK energy policy will be based on energy efficiency and renewables (see Figure below) and 
does not make any commitments to nuclear power. However, the possibility rhar at some point in rhe furure new nuclear 
plants might be necessary to meet the ca rbon targets set is not ruled our and in fact has become a reality by 2005. 
2000 2005 
2002: 
Renew ables supply 
1.5% of UK electricity 
(excl. large hydro 
and mixed waste 
incineration). Onshore 
wind (500 MW) and 
Landfill Gas (400 MW) 
largest contributors. 
Source: DTl, 2003. 
2010 
2010 target: 
Renew ables supply 
10% of UK electricity. 
Onshore and offshore 
wind may be the largest 
con tributors to the 
renew ables generation 
mix in 2010. 
2015 2020 
2020: 
Renew ables supply 
around 20% of UK electricity. 
Onshore and offshore 
wind and biomass may be 
the largest contributors to 
the renew ables generation 
mix in 2020. 
With respect to coal-fired generation it is stared rhar this will have an important part to play in widening the diversity of 
the energy mix, provided ways can be found to reduce its carbon emissions. Although the UK seems committed ro reducing 
G HG emissions unilaterally, it emphasizes the need for an international approach, as it contributes abom 2% of total world 
C02 em issions. 
Box 3.5 Czech Republic renewables act 
1l1e Czech parliament has passed a renewables act in the end of March 2005, supporting rhe production ofelecrriciry from 
renewable energy sources. 111e Renewables Act will ensure an 8 per cent share of renewable energy in the Czech Republic's 
gross domestic electricity consumption by 20 I 0, a target agreed on with the European Commission upon access ion to rhe 
EU. In the short run (up to 2010), new investment in renewable capacity is expected to exceed €1.5 billion , while saving 
approximately 4 Mt C02-eq. annually. In order to provide a sound inves tment climate, a 15-year guarantee of solid feed-
in tariffs is provided. Besides, producers are presen ted with the option of switching to the so-called 'green boni" support 
system, where a bonus will be paid for green power on top of the marker-sold electricity. 
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Assumption 8 Fossil fuel use based on coal and oil levels off because of: carbon em1ss10ns, insufficient technological 
breakthroughs (including C02 capture and storage remaining too costly and perceived as unsustainable} and, 
as far as oil is concerned, insufficiently reliable access and relative prices. The nuclear option remains to be viewed 
as risky in most countries although its market share will slightly increase. 
1l1e combination of high energy and ca rbo n credits prices (or high carbo n emiss io n penalties), which characterizes this sto ryline, 
pro motes fu el switching (fo r an extensive discuss io n, see also assumption 3.5). ll1i s will probably be the most importa nt dri ver behind 
reducing the share of coa l and oil in favo r of natural gas. 
Second , a powerful impact may co me from an act ive policy engagemenr to phase our traditiona l subsidies o n the use of coal and to 
create d isincenrives instead. In fact, a signi ficant number of countries have already ruled out, or have at least sign ifica ntly reduced 
domes tic power production based on coa l, unless it uses CCS, because of concerns about C02 emiss ions, acidification and loca l air 
pollution. Japan, to just give an exa mple, introduced changes ro its energy cax regime in 2003, which included a rax on coal consump-
tion. Other co unrries have already announced similar plans fo r the nea r future 
Unlike sroryline 3 (chap ter 5), thi s sto ryline assumes that CCS will not develo p in ro a widely accepted techno logy ro introduce clean 
fossil energy systems. First, caprure, transport, and storage cos ts are too high ro make a large-sca le inrroducr io n feas ibl e. Seco nd as the 
scope for considerable cost reductio ns in the CCS chai n is limited, such costs will also remain too high to enab le a feas ible implemen-
tat ion even in the next few decades. -n1e explanation for this is that much of th e CCS technology has already been deve loped, so that 
the impact of lea rning o n cost reduction remains limi ted. As most of the cost est imates for CCS, if applicable at a ll given the preferred 
nea rby presence of srorage capacity, suggest costs to amounr ro at least€ 50- 1 OO/rC02 for most app licatio ns, even right post-Kyo to 
regimes may fail to successfull y activate the CCS option. If governments instead favor the support of renewables, a broad support for 
CCS docs no t seem obvious, at leas t not in most countries where serious exploration of coal is absent. 
A separate facto r that may slow down the development of CCS acti vities is the perception that the opt io n is no t safe and environ-
menrally unfriendly. This may feed rhe general public's resistance aga inst accepting CCS in nearby storage fac ilities, which makes it 
increas ingly diffi cult to se t up CCS projects, especially in densely populated areas. Acute, accidental releases of C02 at the well-head , 
toge ther with lea kage through failed ca p- rocks seem to be rhe main haza rds to be dealt with. Indeed, elevated atmospheri c co ncentra-
tions ofC02 can result in both acu te and chronic health effects in case meteorological co nditions do not disperse C02 released to the 
atmosphere. Then, high concentrations (at approx. 10 per cent) if released in sufficient quantities under particular condi tio ns will lead 
ro suffocation of humans due to a lack of oxygen (asphyx iation). An exa mple is provided by the 1986 Lake Nyos d isaster in Ca meroon. 
A large limnic eruption resulted in the death of approx imately 1,800 people in the surro unding area and up to 27 km away (C0 2 
FEP Database, 2004). Water acidifica tion and degradation of marine ecosys tems as a co nsequence of lea kage in ro fresh groundwater 
and in to deep ocea ns, respectively, are other sources for concern (for a comprehensive assessment of risks associated with the option 
of carbon seques tration and storage see the C02 FEP Database, 2004). 
ln this srorylin e, the nuclear option does no t come o ff the ground either. Bes ides being co nsidered risky, based o n li fe-cycle analys is, 
the public at large and policy makers increas ingly reali ze that if all as pects throughout the energy chain are co nsidered ca refully, the 
nuclear optio n wi ll not be ab le ro provide the C H G-neutral option that proponenrs claim ir to be. In fact, ca lculatio ns suggest that 
each dol lar invested in energy efficiency d isplaces approximately seven tim es as many C HG emiss ions than if it were inves ted in 
nuclea r power. 
In add itio n, nuclea r power's potential ro com bar global warming is considered limi ted because it on ly provides electri city, which ac-
counts fo r just one-third of foss il -fuel use. Mo reover, foss il fuel use accou ms fo r o nly about half of the C H G problem (the res t of the 
problem is caused by defo restatio n and no n-C02 G H Gs). 
1l1e most important facto r that may prevent a further rapid development of nuclear power production is probably the public's per-
ception of nuclea r energy being dangerous. For instance, an opinion survey o n energy revea led that nuclea r sa fety is the predominant 
concern in Europe and thus is still not considered by most Europeans an opt ion to be included in the future energy mix (EORG, 
2002). Indeed, nuclear sources involve a ri sk of radioactive releases in case of an acc idenr. In December 2005, an explos ion at a Rus-
sian nuclea r plant affirms such views, even though it was communicated that no increased radiation was measured. At the sa me time, 
highly radioactive wastes are accum ulating, fo r which no generall y acceptable disposal route has yet been establi shed (EEA, 2003; 
NEA/OEC D , 2000). Similar concerns ex ist worldwide, e.g. througho ut 2003 the Tokyo, Tohoku and C hubu electricity companies 
temporar ily shut down much of their nuclea r electri city generation capacity fo r safety inspections in order ro reduce co mmunity 
concerns over the safety of nuclear power in Japan (H es ter et al. , 2004). 
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Brazil) were mainraincd unril 2025 19, additional biomass supply should , depending on the scenario , range from 60 to 145 EJ (2050: 
between 95 -220 Ej ). Es timates indica te that in o rder to achieve som e imermedi are position by 2025 (about 150 EJ additional supply), 
an additional land area of about 150 million ha. Would be required for that purpose. Alth ough such an area is large, its avai labi li ty 
does not seem to pose a problem that cannot be overcome, especiall y when so me developing counrries can ga in a substa ntial welfare 
in crease from commercial energy crop production, which may allow them to increas ingly import food products from other countries, 
including those in the northern hemisphere. 
Box 3 .6 The Brazilian biofuel program 
Its increasing dependency on foss il fuel s originally triggered the Brazilian Government to support the use ofbio-ethanol for 
transportation in the 1970s, when oil prices were high and sugar prices low. Now, bio-ethanol is used on a large scale within 
Brazil 's transportation system and supported through its ProAlcool program. Jn 2004, there were more than 300 sugar mills/ 
distilleries producing ethanol and 39 new distillers were licensed in early 2005 making Brazil a majo r ethanol exporter. In 
that very same yea r, Brazil 's first refinery for biodiesel was opened, scheduled to produce 12 m liters (3 .2 m ga llons) annually. 
Biodiesel from this planr will be mixed with diesel at a 2 per cent ratio only to make technological adaptation of engines nor 
necessary. Moreover, it is hoped that bio-fuel production can benefit the country's farm ers. D ependent on the methods ap-
plied, the sector is es timated to be responsible for job creation in the range of 400,000-700,000. Based on li fe-cycle analysis, 
the abatement impact of the Brazilian bio-fuel production sector is estima ted at abour 20 per cent of the C02 emissions of 
irs petro leum industry (Negrfo and Urban, 2004). 
Because prices of biodiesel still surpass those of diesel, incenrives correcting for the externalities are necessary to support its 
use. In fact, in Brazil the use of biodiesel may beco me mandatory by the end of 2007. Byproducts of the process may be 
responsible for the further decrease of production costs, thus attracting additional interest from the industry. 
Assumption 11 Solar energy becomes increasingly popular. 
Photovolta ic (PY) cells directly convert th e light from rhe sun in to elec tricity and represent an ideal form of decenrralized power 
generation (see assumption 3.9 and 6.5) . Up to now, the high cosr o f PV cells is the main barri er preventing its widespread applica tion 
although cos ts have fa ll en 15 to 20-fold in less than 30 yea rs time and panels are now ava ilable at between € 4 ,500 and 6,000/kW (see 
Figure 3 . I I ). 'The costs of PY-based power generation have also considerably co me down and are in the o rder o f $0. 34-0.46/k W h (see 
also Figure 3.9) . Effi ciencies for co mmercial PY cells range from 7 to 17 per cenr (dependent on th e cype employed). 
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Nevertheless, PY has turned our robe am acri ve in certain circumstances, especiall y in the absence of a reliable fuel supply at affordable 
prices and a grid connection , and in rhe presence of stable and sufficient sunshine. In this co mex t, rhe development of dye-sensitized 
solar cell s is interesting as it presents a po tentially in expensive and more Aexible alternative ro present semiconductor technology. 
According to a projec tion by WAD E, PY applica tions are expected to become rruly competiti ve if capital costs for PV applica tions 
drop below $ 1,000/kW (2003). Impress ive price decreases (o f about 25 per cent over the period 2000-2004) are being registered in , 
fo r examp le, Germany, as a consequence of growing demand . 
19 This is in lin e wirh a num ber of" pro jeer ions, e.g. WEC, Shell , I !'CC, I EA 2004. 
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In va ri ous countries the use of solar energy is actively promoted in the sp irit of increasing the share of renewables in energy supply. Ty-
pical examples of implementation can be found in city design. Some notable exam ples in Europe are 'Nieuwland' in the Netherlands 
and 'Solarsied lung' in Freiburg, Germany. 111e former is one of the world's biggest townships powered by solar energy with an installed 
capacity of 1 MW, which is enough to meet 44 per cent of the community's electricity needs. In the latter exa mple, each house produ-
ces more energy than the inhabitants consume. PV on the roof:~ have turned each house into a mini power station with a capacity to 
generate between two and three kW of electricity, which is then fed into the grid . Moreover, the houses are faced southwards and have: 
large, triple-layer glass windows that soak up the heat; 40 cm-thick exterior wa lls providing extra insulation; and a refined venti lation 
system which cools the house during the summer and heats ir during rhe winter. 
Another example is the Suri a I 000 proj ec t in Malaysia, which is to be launched by the Malaysian Ministry of Energy, Water and Com-
munications. The program wi ll offer building-integrated PV (BIPV) systems at discounted prices to make the technology access ible 
and affordable for the public. Suria I 000 is part of the wider five-year Malaysia Bui lding Integrated Photovoltaic (MBIPV) project 
which is to develop the local so lar energy market launched in July 2005. The project wil l promote BIPV technology - which covers 
PV that can be incorporated into building structures such as roofs, fac;:ades, wa ll s, windows and shades instead of the traditionally 
mounted solar PV Solar energy can be used directly, and excess energy generated can be fed into the electricity grid. Presently (2005), 
PV instal lations in rural areas in Malaysia have a capacity of2.5 MW whi le urban installations connect 55 kW to the grid. The project 
aims to add a minimum of l.5 MW of solar energy to the grid. 
The further implementation of solar energy wil l be strongly supported if, in the spirit of this storyline, governments keep pursuing 
their lega l and regulatory measures in support of the introduction of solar energy. Because of their Aexible use, PV seems especia ll y 
attractive when governments will set clear energy efficiency targets in residential buildings and offices (i n Europe responsible for over 
a third of the total final energy consumption). 111e European Commission's 7th framework program fo r research and development 
priorities for the renewable energy sector states, for instance, that more ambitious R&D and related legislation wi ll help realize the 
following roadmap: 
• By 2010 new residential buildings in the EU wil l not need more than 60 kWh of exte rnal primary energy per year per square 
meter for heating, cooling, ligh ting and other building services. Office buildings will not need more than 
100 kWh/year/m2; 
• By 2020 40 per cent of all buildings in the EU will be below I OOkWh/year/m2, which also implies an ambit ious retrofitting 
rate for the existing building stock. The standard for new residential building in 2020 wi ll be 45 kWh/year/m2; 
• By 2050 new buildings in the EU will not use more than 30 kWh/year/m2. At the same time, 50 per cent of the existing 
building stock will reach va lues below 60 kWh/year/m 2. 
It is clear that PV will most likely play a role in the mix of measures to fulfill such targets; this may in fact support large-sca le PV 
implementation . Between 1999 and 2004, the installed solar thermal capacity in the EU already grew from 5,600 to 9,800 MWth ( 14 
million sq uare meters of co llector area). During the same period, the photovoltaic industry grew by about 45 per cent per annum, so 
that the va lue of insta ll ed capacity in Europe increased to approximately El billion in 2004. If the EU is serious in its aim to reach irs 
target, which by 2020 would amount to 20 per cent of the primary energy consumed in Europe and which wi ll come from renewable 
energy sources, the worldwide PV indusrry is believed to potentially represent a future value of €60 billion. 
Another example can be found in countries that do not dispose of any, or little, fossil fuel reserves but which have, instead, favorable 
climatic conditions. Several of these countries are increasingly supporring solar energy ini t iatives apart from an observed switch of oil 
and diesel-fired generators to natural gas. Israel, for instance, is a world leader in so lar technology and relies heavily on solar energy 
for water heating. 111e use of solar systems in the final demand is expected to grow by 0.05 Mtoe until 2010 and by 0.38 Mtoe in the 
decade 20 I 0-2020 (eq ui valent to a 760 per cent increase when compa red with the present decade). 
Assumption 12 The role of compressed natural gas (CNG) and gas to liquids (GTL) as fuel in transport systems becomes much 
more significant, particularly in (mega) cities throughout the world. 
In 1950 th ere were on ly 70 million vehicles (cars, rrucks, and buses) on the roads worldwide. In 2003 there were about ten times as 
many: 700 million vehicles (RR!, 2004). This explains rhe transport sector's sign ifica nt share in energy-related C02 em issions: 2 I per 
cent worldwide (see Figu re 3.5). 
In the USA transportation alone em its even more C02 than any other nation's total C02 emissions, except China (RR!, 2004). Road 
transport generates more than one fifth of all C02 emiss ions in the EU, with passenger ca rs being responsible for more than half of 
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these emissions. Since 1990 emiss ions from road transport have risen by 22%. !ts share in world total C 0 2 emissions is rising the 
fastest compared with other sources, most notably in th e developing world where urban popula tion is ex pec ted to double by 2030. 
According to the !EA, wo rldwide emiss io ns from transport ac ti vities will increase by almost 170 per cent during the period up to 
2030, which is the highes t figure among the sectors for which projections have been made.20 111is proj ec tion is, however, based on the 
assumption th at during this period the transportat ion sector will continue to rely on oil and that linle co mpetition from alternat ive 
fuel s is ro be expected . 
111e question is wheth er this is a rea li sric assumption . This storyline leads to the conclusion that it is not. First, rhe capacity ro increase 
fuel -efficiency of engine is nor unlimited , so thar orher so luti ons will need to be soughr for compliance with new environm enral policy 
regimes tackling the transport secto r. 
Second, loca l air quality concerns are beco ming stronger. D ue to an increasingly unacceptable local pollurion (NOx, SQz,, parri -
culates), particularly in mega-cities in rhe develo ping world , mandato ry in troduction of clean fu els (including CNG and GTL) in 
city-tra nsport is very likely to become a common rrend in Larin America, Africa and Asia. Starting with public transport, these trends 
will probably increas ingly be taken over in indusrrialized countries. In some mega-ci ti es, e.g. New Delhi and Buenos Aires, so me 
spec tacular po licy initiatives have been taken to make the loca l transpor t sys tem clea ner, in part by prescribing the use of CNG by the 
public transport sys tem (see also Box 3.7) . lr seems obvious that th e use ofCNG and GTL in public transport will increase their accep-
rabiliry in the course of time (if o nly beca use the number ofCNG/GTL-stations will ex pand , adding to the fuels' attractiveness), even 
in th e private transport sec tor. C urrently, the number of natural gas-bu rned vehicles amounts ro about 3.5 millio n in GO co untries. 
Box 3.7 The case of CNG uptake in Argentine 
In countr ies like Brazil, Egypt, Italy and Pakistan, driving CNG fuelled cars has become increasingly common . However, 
Argentina leads the world in the number ofCNG veh icles in operation, with some 1.25 million as of March 2004, and more 
than 1,000 service stations in 18 of its 23 provinces offering C NG fill-ups (!ANGV). Moreover, an estimated average of 
25,000 cars are being converted ro natural gas every month. 
Impetus was provided by bad air quality in combination with abundant natural gas reserves. The government can be dis-
cerned as the catalyst that acted to begin the CNG commercial iza tion process. 
Strong resemblance seems to exist between factors as distinguished by the Europea n Energy Agency (EEA, 200 1) determi-
ning the extent to which renewable energy technologies are successfully deployed and those of paramount importance for the 
successful adoption of driving CNG. These are: 
Political support; 
Legislative support; 
Fiscal support; 
Financial support; 
Administrative support; 
Technological development; and 
Information , education and training. 
1l1ird , a substantial number of countries are presen tl y adopting policies and measures to stimulate the use of alternative fuels in the 
transport sector, either for C02 emiss ion reasons or for other environ menta l reasons (for an overview see Table 3.5). Some examples 
are presented below. 
Within the EU- 15 voluntary agreements exist to among others enhance C02 emission reduction from cars with a (voluntary) targe t 
determined by the European Co mmission of 140 g of C02/km by 2008/9. 'll1e annual report on C02 em iss ions from new ca rs 
shows that the car industry has made progress in fulfillin g this targe t. Between 1995 and 2003, emiss io ns from new passenger ca rs 
so ld in the EU- 15 have decreased by 11 .8%, which implies a progress of 1.2% compared to 2002. The ultimate EU goal is to limit 
emiss ions to 120 g of C02/lun by 20 I 0. Environment Comm iss ion er Dimas: " .. .To respect the Kyoro co mmitments and reduce ou r 
oil dependence, we must reduce C 0 2 emissions from transport, the secror whose emiss io ns keep growi ng." Other measures include 
20 ~!he power secro r in rhe develop ing world rakes a seco nd pl<1 ce wirh :i 1 G7% increase (!EA, 2004 ) . 
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consumer in fo rm at io n (fuel e ffi ciency labeling) and fi sca l incentives. Simi lar initiatives ha ve been taken by the Canadian automobile 
manufacmring industry via a pact w hich com mits its signator ies to reduce the overa ll CHG emissions fro m vehicles so ld in Ca nada 
by 5.3 Mr, about 25 percent, up ro 20 I 0. 
New Japa nese energy policy guidel ines (expected to be adopted in June 2006) wi ll be the first to co n ta in spec ific targets for b io fuel s 
and GTL usage. T he a im is to rep lace 20 per cent of pet role u m produc ts in Japan - the wo rld 's third la rges r o il consume r - by 2030. 
-n1ese h igh ly ambirious targets (fo r exa mple w he n compared wi th the European U ni o n target of 5.75 per cent bio fuel content by 
20 IO) sho uld be approached w ith so me ca urion , t hough. For example, rhe introduction of auto fuel con ta ining 3 perce nt b ioethanol 
countrywide by April 2005 proved hard to reach. 
In Swede n a who le different approach is chosen . Aparr from providing incent ives through taxa tion , specific incenti ves were put 
to work. Such incemives includ e free parking in Swed en's larger c it ies a nd parricular pr ivil eges for cab drivers such as preferential 
trea tment at taxi stands. 111e pri vate sector joined in as wel l and , fo r exa mpl e, provides loans at lower inre rest rares for an 'Eco-car' . 
Now (2006), 2.7 pe r cent of transpo rtation fuel s in Swed e n are biofuels (mos dy ethano l) and last year the number of ca rs rhat dr ive 
on b iofuels has doub led. For the future, the Swedi sh government is pla nning to make the road tax d epe nden t o n the amount of C02 
a car ernits. 
Table 3.5 Strategies to curb transportation emissions 
Means Target Status (2004, Projected 
unless otherwisse avoidance of 
indicated) C02 emissions (Mt) 
EU Voluntary 120 g of co21km -11 .8% between 
1995 and 2003 
us California -22% in 2012 
(subsequently adopted by New York, culminati ng in 30% in 2016, 
New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode starting in 2009 
Island, Massachusetts, Vermontand 
Maine) 
Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) 
Alternative Motor Fuels Act (1988), the 
Clean Air Act Amendments (1990); 
Energy Policy Act (1992); 
replace 30% of 
petroleum based 
moto r fuels by 2010 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(CAFE) program, JOBS bill (biod iesel 
tax incentive 
Japan 
Ca nada Voluntary 
-25% by the end of 2010 5.3 
Brazi l • Program of In centive to Alternative 
Sources for Electric Energy 
(Proinfra), gua ranteeing to accept 
electricity delivered to the grid by 
co-generation using sugarcane 
bagasse (Law 10,438 of April 26, 2002); 
• Law 4,353 of August 30, 2002 that 
establi shes measures that 
strengthen the process regard ing 
the storage and acqu isition of fuel 
alcohol regulating stocks and the 
mechani sms for financing the 
sugarcane agriculture business; 
Tax incentives 
Sou rce: WAD E, 2005; EU; Negrao a nd Urban, 2004; Boyle , 2004. 
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Box 3 .8 Legislation to curb greenhouse gas emissions from cars and light trucks 
In 2002 , recognizing that global warming would impose compelling and ex traordinary impacts on Cali fo rnia, Governo r 
G ray Davis signed legislation (AB 1493, Pavley) that would curb greenhouse gas emiss io ns from ca rs and light trucks. This 
bill enables the state's Air Resources Board to set limits fo r auto emissions of carbon dioxide and other co ntributo rs to global 
warming, and gives car manu fac turers unril 2009 to comply with ri ghter regulations. Cali fo rnia, the wo rld 's fi fth largest 
economy, is home to 24 million motor vehicles, which are responsible fo r abour 40% o f the state's greenhouse gas pollution. 
N owadays, even the industry jo ins in on the momentum . Californi an transport company AC Transit is the first to join the 
California C limate Action Registry, thus committing to track (and report) its emiss ions of G H Gs. 
In the USA, through the Energy Policy Ac t (EPA) of 1992, 30 per cent of petro leum-based moto r fuels has to be replaced by 2010 
in order to reduce rhe natio n's depend ence o n fo reign oil and to increase irs energy securi ty th ro ugh the use of domesti ca ll y produced 
alte rn ati ve fuel s. Measu res to support this process are tax deductions and provisio ns, as we ll as mandatory Alte rn ati ve Fuel Vehicles 
(AFV) purchase agreemenrs in order ro meet a specific AFV percenrage requiremen t. In October 2004 rhe 'JO BS' bill was signed 
con raining the first ever federal biod iesel tax incentive, wh ich will be applicable fo r two yea rs. In o rder to ensure compliance with these 
laws (e.g. EPAcr), so-ca lled Executive O rders have been issued. Despi te rh ese incentives and O rders issued, ta rgets se t have nor been 
fully reached. Fo r exa mple, only ten our of 18 covered agencies met rhe 75 per cent requirement of AFV light du ty vehicle acquisitio ns 
(RRI , 2004). Those agencies rhar purchased mo re th an rhe required accumul ated credi ts ca n trade their surplus with agencies that have 
fa iled to co mply. Other federal initiatives include: 
• commodi ty C redit Co rpo rat ion (grants fo r bi oenergy production); 
• partnership fo r a New Generat io n of Vehicles (in creasing fu el eco nomy); and 
• freedomCAR and Vehicle Techn ologies (FCVT) Program (el abo rate resea rch effort with governmem/indusr ry wid e 
parti cipatio n). 
Alth ough the Federal C lea n Air Act (CAA) p rohibits states to adopt or enforce standards fo r new motor vehicles o r engines, Ca li fo rnia 
is exe mpted fro m this prohibitio n because of its severe air pollution problems (Sect ion 209(b) CAA) (for some ex pected policy in 
Ca lifornia, see Box 3.9) . Oth er stares are permirred the sa me as long as their motor vehicle emiss ion regulatio ns are identica l ro rh ose 
in Cali fo rni a. 
Pardy because of such an acti ve policy, 5 10,805 AFVs were operatio nal in 2003, representing an average 9.6 per cent inc rease per year 
since 1995 (ElA). ll1e AFVs used a va ri ety of alre rn ari ve fuels, 21 with a share fo r CNG, rh e typica l focus of this stud y, of abo ut 25 
per cent. In 2004 approximately 130,000 CNG-fuelled vehicles and 1,300 refueling stat io ns were in operatio n in the USA (IANG V). 
CNG-fu eled vehicles are especially popular with buses, and medium and heavy-dury trucks. CNG use in public t ransport buses incre-
ased mo re than 25-fold between 1993 and 2003, so rha r in 2003 I 0 .7 per cem o f all buses used CNG (RRI, 2004) . In January 2003, 
mo re than 20 per cent of all new public t ransit buses o n o rder use the CNG technology. Fo r exa mple, the US Posta l Service, traveling I 
b illi o n miles annually with 208,000 vehicles, o perates mo re than 7,500 CNG vehicles. Flee ts will continue to be the bigges t co nsumer 
of AF Vs in th e furure. Acco rding ro the ElA, in 2000 23 .7 per cent of all au to mobiles so ld were fo r Aeer use. 
Especiall y Aeer owners have switched fro m petroleum ro na rnral gas beca use of rhe clea r advantages in terms of reducing the emiss io ns 
ofC02, N O x, and other gases, as we ll as particulates, and in terms of no ise reduction, and thanks to an increas ing netwo rk o ffu eling 
stat io ns. Altho ugh lighr-du ry vehicles have not yet been conve rted on a large scale, car manu fac turers such as G M and Ho nda pbn ro 
in troduce such vehicles running o n natu ral gas in 2005. 
Ir remains ye t robe seen what role the va rious energy ca rri ers, including CNG, will play in rhe poss ible future mix of al ternati ve fuels. 
Another poss ibili ry is to use of gas-to- liquids (GTL) in the transport system . GTL technology processes natu ra l gas ro make clea n fu els 
such as low-sulphur diese l. GTL plants are expec ted to emerge as a new market fo r natural gas, thereby using cheap reserves loca ted fo r 
fro m traditio nal marke rs. Techno logical ad vances have reduced producti on cos ts in rhe pas t and will continue to do so in the furure, 
as companies will in creas ingly beco me interested in developing GTL projec ts. Moreover, fur ther techno logical improvements could 
21 Elccrric vehicles have grown mosc qui ckly for non-Acer s;i les, with hybrids (HE\/s) bei ng responsible for rhc lions share. 
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also reduce the energy intensity of GTL processes. G TL can be co nsidered an alternative o r a complement to LNG and may provide 
rhe industry wi th a viable alternative rn store natural gas . From 20 10 onwa rds, a further introduction ofGTL is foreseen , which wi ll 
increase natura l gas demand (see Figure 3 .12). However, the GTL conve rsion process is rather costly, co nsuming about 45 per cent of 
rhe gas supplied ro GTL plants (I EA, 2004a). 
Figure 3. I 2 World Natural Gas Demand by Sector 
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Source: I EA, 2004a. 
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C urrently (200 5), only two commercia l GTL plants a re in operation: the 22,500 bid Mossgas faci li ty in South Africa, wh ich has been 
operationa l since 199 1, and She ll 's 12,5 00 bid Bintulu plant in Malays ia, commiss ioned in 1993. Several other plants are currently 
under construc tio n or have been planned, most of them in Q ata r, using gas from its huge North Field. 22 23 If indeed, these projects 
were co mple ted, global GTL capacity could exceed 800 ,000 bi d by 20 I I , which is almost equiva lent to I percent of wo rld output of 
refin ed products. ' l11c !EA foresees a productio n po tenti al of 2.4 mbld in 2030 , compa red to 0 .4 mbld in 20 10 (for the projected size 
and regional di srributi on of GTL product ion, see Figure 3 .1 3) . 
Figure 3. I 3 GTL Production by Region 
Source: !EA, 2004a . 
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Assumption 13 New gases, such as green gas based on biomass, hydrogen and mixes of gases are successfully introduced in niche 
markets, among ochers through well-focused incentives and successful marketing campaigns. 
In thi s srnryline altern ative gases wi ll increasingly be introduced in va rious app lica tions. Although natural gas is seen as the transit ion 
fi.1el par excell ence, po li tica l pressure will remain to st imulate thi s rransit io n, among others by trying to inrroduce other, especially hy-
22 
-111e wo rld's brgesr non-:-1ssociared gas reservo ir with some 900 rrillion cubic feet of gas. 
2.) For exa m pit:. Shell is in rhe process of' dcv1.:·loping a project in Qar:ir: rhe Pearl CTL projecr. -niis pro jeer is csiimared ro produce over ten rimes Binrulu's currenr 
c 1pac it y with abot ll 140,000 bid towards th e en d of this decade. 
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drogen and biomass-based , gases, which are possib ly mixed to the feas ible extent with natural gas. 111e development of both hydrogen 
and biogas for large-sca le app lication is still at its infancy, but there is a rapid progress. Biogas has a clear advantage in that, if convened 
to the required quality sta ndard, ir ca n be used in the exisring transportation system. As far as hydrogen is concerned, research on the 
issue to what extenr hydrogen ca n be mixed with natural gas for being used in the existing tra nsportation system is still ongoing, but 
suggests that the scope wi ll probably remain limi ted. 
Neverrheless, this sto ryline expects governments and business firm s to se riously develop these gases and to ana lyze how and when 
implemenration could be feasib le. The fact that se rious ini tiatives in this regard have been taken already in a number of co un t ri es seems 
to make it likely that such green gases will , during the next few decades, become a common feature of overa ll gas supply worldwide. 
Th is is especially li kely as gas in irse lf will increas ingly dominate the energy system and as emiss ion penalties w ill increase. 
As far as biogas is concerned, initiati ves have thus far rema ined limited, bur there is a strong progress. One of the countries that takes 
a frontrunn er position in this regard is Germany. Accord ing to the G erman indusrry associat ion, Fachverband Biogas, in 2005 the use 
ofbiogas wi ll reduce German C02 emissions by about 2 .5 Mrons . Moreover, unril the yea r 2020 , this vo lu me is expected to grow to 
60 Mt. In this sector, I kW of installed power generation capacity rep resents a reduction of7,000 kg ofC02 per yea r accordi ng ro 
rhe associat ion's calcu lations. 
As far as hydrogen is concerned , several counrries are presently starring ro implement hydrogen programs. The Eu ropean Commis-
sion's p roposed Hypogen project, a€ 1.3 billion projec t to generate hydrogen and electricity produced from fossi l energy sources, is just 
one example. Of all known fuels , hyd rogen has the highes t energy conten t per uni t of weigh t (R R!, 2004) . In addition , pure hydrogen 
contains no ca rbon and th us burns to form water with no hydrocarbon or C02 em iss ions and ca n thus be co nsidered a zero- or near 
zero emiss io n technology. H ydrogen can be used as an alternative fuel in transportation with the fuel cel l. 
Especiall y promising in this regard is a hyb rid system that seeks to integrate gasificat ion with a fuel cel l (IGFC). 111ese so-ca ll ed IGFC 
hybrids have the porenrial to achi eve near zero emissions, with the concentrated C02 being removed by separation o r other capture 
means. 
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Chapter 4 
International Security of Supply Storyline 
4. 1 General description 
In thi s sto rylin e, rhe st rong eco no mic growth shown in Asia and parts of Lat in Ameri ca durin g the last decades will sustain th ro ughout 
the nexr decades. 111is co mpensates fo r a g radual decline in economic growth in t: he Western world and , due to the increasing weight 
of the fas t-growing 'newco mers' in wo rld economic growth , con t ributes to a co ntinuatio n of the world wide economic growth trend of 
abo ut 3.5 to 4 per cent per annum . Wo rld popul ation keeps growing in acco rda nce w ith th e high end of the UN populatio n scenari o 
by 2040 . Concern about cl imate change is overshadowed by g rea t opt im ism in As ia about economic p rogress and an increas ing 
internatio nal politica l role. Also afte r rhe Kyoto co mmitment peri od, subsequen t treaties show a low mitiga tio n am bitio n, continuous 
scope fo r free riding, and weak overall co mpliance regimes. The t rend in energy efficiency improvements therefo re shows no signifi canr 
diA~ rence with rhe pas r, so rhar the wo rld wide demand fo r energy keeps growi ng with abo ur 2 per cenr per an num , leading ro a 
do ub ling of demand each period of abour 35 years. There are insuffic ient incentives to achieve a signifi ca nt breakthrough in renewable 
techno logy; governments increas ingly rend ro rely o n a phas ing out of coal and fuel switch in o rder to meet their posr-Kyoto mi tiga-
ti on commi tments. 111e optio n of nuclea r energy remains subdued beca use of pub li c concerns and res istance. 
In thi s sto rylin e foss il fuels, no tably o il and gas, remain rhe backbo ne o f energy supply in a market which faces signifi cant increase in 
demand. Rea lizing th at oil reserves deplere rap id ly, at leas t against acceptable p roductio n cost co nditions, many countries try to secure 
their energy supply o n the internatio nal gas ma rke t. W ith Europe, NAFTA, Japan, C hin a and India all increasingly co mpeting fo r the 
ava ibble gas (a nd o il) resources, the wo rld increas ingly faces geopolitica l te nsio ns around Middle- Eas t and Russ ian gas (a nd o il ) fi elds. 
Supplie rs o f natural gas o n rhe internatio nal marker may use their increas ing ma rke t power ro furth er boost prices by res tricting their 
supply. 111e securi ty o f supply issue beco mes a do minant fac tor on the fo reign po licy agenda of most countries. Coun tri es increasingly 
try to secure their supplies via b ilate ra l co nt racts, and the world ca nn ot avo id increas ing hostility between rhe va ri o us blocs on the 
issue of access to energy in general and to natu ra l gas in parti cula r. 
4.2 Assumptions and rationale of the Security of Supply Storyline 
Assum ption 1 World economic growth and rela ted growth in world energy demand remain high, mainly due to the continuous 
rapid expansion of Asia and the failure to decouple energy use from economic growth . 
111is sro ryline assumes tha t the wo rld eco no my keeps grow ing at a ra re which is a r th e high end of mos t projec ti ons. Fo r instance, 
future growth projectio ns fo r th e period un t il about 2100 as ourlined in chap ter 2 suggest a worldwide growth ranging between about 
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As a consequence, the !EA expects natural gas ro overtake coal as a fuel in world prim ary energy within a decade (see Figure 4.4). 
Figure 4.4 World primary energy demand by fuel 
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Source: !EA, 2004a. 
A number of governments have announced that rhey will attempt to decouple econom ic growth fro m growth in trad itional energy 
use and assoc iated emiss ions. H owever, due ro the limi ted scope for a signi fica ntly d iffere nt trend in energy efficiency improvements 
(see also assum ption 6.3), such a deco uplin g seems very hard ro achi eve, al though some successes will p ro bably materi ali ze in specific 
sectors o r at industry levels (see Box 4. 1 ). 
Box 4.1 Policies and measures delinking economic growth and energy demand 
Policies and measures in order ro achieve abatement are increasi ngly effective, amongs t others based on experience in using 
them. Just to illustrate how effecti ve policies aimed at decoupling growth and energy use can be: CA FE standards on 
automobile use in the US since the early 1980s caused per capi ta US gasoline consumption to ri se by o nly 7 per cent while 
per capi ta income grew wi th 50 per cent. In the UK, overall energy consumption has increased by around 15 per cenr since 
1970, while the size of the economy has doubled . UK policy communicates the need to continue and accelerate this 1-rend 
to decouple economic growth from energy use and pollution to reach its ta rgets as elaborated upon in its White Paper on 
energy (see Box 3.4). 
The most recent initiati ve with respect hereto aims at preserving the wo rld 's rapidly depleting o il reserves: The Uppsala 
Protocol or 'Oil Depletion Pro tocol.' Such a protoco l would provide a fra mework fo r major consumers to use less oil and 
develop alte rnatives, while preventing major producers from benefiting as oil supplies become sca rce. It would also help 
poorer nations share more equitably rhe world's remaining oil to meet their developing needs. Accord ing to Mr. Campbell , a 
Board member of the London-based O il Deplet ion Analysis Centre, " ... a managed approach is needed through inrernational 
agreement. The altern ati ve is ever-soaring oil prices wi th des tab ilizing effects on the world economy ... " 
Assumption 2 C limate change concerns are somewhat overshadowed by the great optimism about Asian economic progress 
and its increasing international political role. The post-Kyoto regimes are therefore characterized by a mild 
regime in terms of commitments, compliance, and dealing with free riders; the rapidly growing Asian economies 
can, however, no longer retain their non-Annex I status. 
ll1 is storyline is based on the assu mption that the presently strong coa li tions between groups of develop ing co untries are ma inrai ned 
durin g the next decades in several in te rnational negotiation fo rums, including international cl imate po licymaking. As a result, these 
grou ps of coun tries (incl uding the rapid ly growing As ian economies) will stick ro the position that the industrialized wo rld remai ns 
primaril y responsible fo r mi tigat ion activities. ll1is is based on rhe argumenr that desp ite rapid growth in develo ping coun try em is-
sions (see Figure 4.5), even in 2030 the average per cap ita emiss ions in the developing regions still are co nsiderably lower than those in 
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the industrialized regions (see Fi gure 4 .6) . Co nsequently, the rapidly growing economies will only be willing to adopt weak abatement 
concessions, p rimarily based on international techno logy transfers to their regions. ·n1is position subsequently undermines the wil-
lingness o f industrialized countries to adopt substantially stricter co mmitments. 
Figure 4.5 World energy-related C02 emissions by region 
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Figure 4.6 Per capita energy-related C02 emissions by region 
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As a poss ible precursor of such a future developmem , reference can be made to the Vision Statement for an Asia- Pacific Partnership 
on C lean Development, issued in July 2005 (in Asia!) by Australia , C hin a, Japan, South Korea, and the USA. Both perceived as an 
alternative, as well as a complement to the Kyoto Protocol, the Partnership li sts a number of technology options that should be given 
priority, without being legally binding. Interes ting is Japan's part icipation as a signatory to th e Kyoto Protocol. 
Assumption 3 
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The past trend in energy efficiency improvements of about l % per annum does not change significantly; the 
share of renewables remains limited because credit prices provide insufficient incentives for serious 
breakthroughs towards massive implementation. 
111e points made in argument 6.3, a subsra nrial deviar io n fro m rhe long-run rrend in energy efficiency improvement is unlikely, apply 
here as well. 111is is also in line with the IEA projection, as illusrrared in Figure 4 .7 below, which shows the rrend in primary energy 
intensity in the I EA 2004 Reference Scenario (no re rhar in the IEA Alternative Policy Scenario , the impact of the 'modern' policy mi x 
on the energy effi ciency trend is st ill rather limited). To illustrate some past figures, during 1980- 2000, the average annual worldwide 
energy inrensiry fe ll with about 1.5% (Europe 1.4%; USA: 1.8% non OEC D: 0.8%) with a wide variety across countr ies. 
Figure 4.7 Energy efficiency trend, 1970-2030 
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As shown by the fo rmer argumenr, energy demand in developing countries will strongly increase during the nex t decades. Ir seems 
likely that this growth will be typically accommodated by foss il fuel s. 
First, coa l reserves, wh ich are loca ted in or nea r the main As ian econo mic growth cenrers and which can be mined at relatively low cost, 
are very large. 111e likely in troduction of clean coal and C arbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies in these areas may conrribute 
to rhe facr that coal wi ll remain an impo rtant foss il fuel at leas t in those regions. 
Seco nd, in the absence of clear incentives for a large-sca le introduction of renewables d ue to a lasting rel atively weak post-Kyoto 
regime, the rapidly growing energy demand wi ll primarily be mer by oil and natural gas, nex t to coal. 
Third, another reason why a clea r transition trend, except from the increasing share of natural gas in the foss il fuel mix, will not ma-
terialize could be the littl e politica l support, due to rhe prim e focus on economic progress and modernization, for allocati ng resources 
to the diffi cult and lengthy process of o rganizing the institutional framework and coa liti ons that are required for setting up alternative 
energy systems in the va rious sectors. 
The above trend of a strong growth in energy dem and with a dominance o f foss il fuel s will nor on ly preva il in the rap idly growing 
developing regions, bur also, albeit to a lesse r ex tent, in rhe OECD countries. In rhe larrer countri es, in the absence of a strong post-
Kyoro regime, the transition towards ca rbon-free energy systems is equally difficult to get off rh e ground in thi s storylin e. 
Although the demand for renewa ble energy w ill first increase so mewhat, in the course of rime irs development will stal l due to: a lack 
of incentives; increas ing res istance agai nst the use o f subsidies to promote renewables, particula rl y open-end policies and measures; 
and increas ing public resistance fo r a.o. aesthetic reasons (fo r an illustrarion , see also Figure 4 .8 derived from Shell 's scena ri os). 111e 
limi ted penetration of renewables can also be expbined by a number of sign ificanr practical and economic barriers. One of the 
problems is rhat renewable energy forms both tend to be inrermirrenr or unpredictable by nature and 'site dependent', i. e. they are 
primarily ava ilab le with in particular, bur not necessa ril y optima l, rime in tervals and ar particular sires. 111e share of renewable energy 
use will therefore reach a level of 5 per cent in some small green energy ni ches, bur its share in overall energy consumption in most 
regions will remain at a level of approximarel y I per cenr on ly through 2030. 
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Because of the lack of success with the introduction of renewables in the main indusrrial areas, climate policies in those areas will 
increasingly rely on fuel switch and therefore lead to a rapid increase in natural gas demand. 
Figure 4.8 Renewables growth and boundaries 
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Source: Shell, 2001. 
Assumption 4 The post-Kyoto compliance is mainly based on: replacing or even phasing out the use of coal, at least in the 
industrialized economies; and a fuel switch, i.e. replacing the use of oil and/or coal with the use of gas. Therefore, 
the rapidly increasing demand for energy must largely be met by supply of oil and, in particular, of natural gas. 
In terms of emissions, natural gas is clea rly superior to coal and oil in almost all applications (see Figure 4.9). Another significant 
advantage of using natural gas is that its emissions do not con rain parriculate matter, which is extremely detrimental for the human 
respiratory tracts. Moreover, ir does nor seem likely that a shortage of supply will take place during the next few decades. 
Figure 4. 9 C02, NOx, and SOx emissions of coal, oil and natural gas when used as a fuel for thermal power plants. 
Carbon lfioxide ICChl Nilrog.en oxides (NOxl Sulfur oxide~ ISOx I 
111ere is evidence that local air pollution is increasingly perceived of as a major health issue throughout the world. -Ibis perception is 
most likely to grow further due to: public availability of more information about the adverse health implications of bad air quality; 
increasing attention to local air quality policy measures; an increasing number of people living in (mega) cities (almost 5 billion by 
2030, see Figure 4.1); and an increasing share of emissions from transport in overall emissions. The combination of global climate 
concerns on the one hand, and local air quality concerns on the other, is likely to further support the increasing use of natural gas for 
a number of applications, especially in power generation and city transport. 
ln addition, the attractiveness of natural gas is enhanced because ofirs low cost and high efficiency as compared ro coal and oil. This 
may also explain why the 2001 Shell scenarios 'Exploring the Future: Energy Needs, Choices, and Possibilities' expect for the period 
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after 2010 that: about two thirds of the US coal-fi red power plants of over 40-yea rs old will be replaced with gas- fired plan ts; C hina 
will most likely increase its gas consumption by initiating majo r gas impo rt projects; and Latin American and Pan Asian gas grids will 
emerge after 20 I 0. 
An other facto r which may enh ance the fuel switch process in favor of gas is the impact of a substanti ally in creasing availability o f 
LNG (see as well assumption 6.1 O). O ne advantage of LNG is that it enables gas transport by vessels across oceans and delivery every-
where from rem ote locatio ns if compressed and refrigerated into liquid form. Another adva ntage of LNG thar may contribute to the 
expected increas ing popularity of natural gas is that it ca n be provided in a Aexible manner, which is in line with the grea ter Aex ibili ty 
demanded by the (end) users in liberali zed markets (see also Figure 4 .1 O). 
Figure 4.10 Primary energy demand in terms of solid, liquid, gas or direct electricity 
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Assumption 5 Post-Kyoto-based fuel switch incentives and rapidly increasing oil production costs lead to a decoupling, or at 
least less clear coupling, of prices of natural gas and of other fossil fuels, which leads to a relative price decline 
of natural gas. 
In the past there has been a strong trad it ion of linking gas prices to oil prices. One reaso n for thi s was the perception rhat gas should 
prim aril y be viewed as a side-p roduct from oil product ion. Second, unlike o il , there was no worldwide spo t market for gas. 1l1ird, in a 
large number of applications gas and o il were substim table. Probably a fourth reaso n was that the contractual linking of gas prices to 
oil prices was considered to be co nvenient. It should be mentio ned in this rega rd that in the 'decoupled' markets (e.g., the USA and 
the UK), gas and o il prices nevertheless showed a co mparab le price development pattern over time, with, however, recenrly clearly 
much stro nger Auctuatio ns of gas prices. 
In the mean time, the situatio n has changed considerably. -n1e importance of gas as a fuel has increased tremendously: as shown in 
Figure 4.3 it is well poss ible that within a decade or so namral gas will ra ke coal's second positio n as energy fuel. Moreover, gas and 
o il a re increasingly perceived as different fuel s beca use of rhe differences in em iss ions (see Figure 4.9) . In orher words, enviro nmenral 
concerns make gas and oil look increas ingly different. Also, a Aexible wo rld gas market is grad ually evolving, and along with it a 
number of spot markets where pri ces do nor necessa ril y have robe in line wirh co rrespond ing o il prices. 
Finally, present low-cosr o il reserves as compared to annual demand are significa ntly lower rhan gas reserves. In facr, despite the 75-
percent increase in gas production sin ce 1983, th e world's gas rese rves- to-producr io n rat io has ri sen over rhe last 20 yea rs to almost 
70 yea rs (in 2003, see Figure 4. 11 )! If rhe sca rcity of the two fuels is perceived as different, acco rding to eco nomic theo ry, rh ere is no 
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reason why the prices of rhe two commodities would behave similarly. All these arguments may well become stronger in the future, 
which could lead to an increasing tendency of gas and oil prices to show no longer quite similar patterns. In fact, with a view to a 
furth er development of an imernational and imegrated gas market, it seems likely that spot and future gas prices, rather than oil prices, 
will increasingly be used as the basis for indexing gas prices in long-term contracts. 
Figure 4. I I Natural gas-to-production (RIP) ratios for the world and particular regions 
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The tendency of gas and oil prices to get 'decoupled' may be supported by the increasing negotiation power of the trading communiry, 
which is characteristic for a liberalizing gas market. For instance, the present European Commissioner for energy, Piebalgs, has argued 
in favor of abandoning the international gas contract clauses which link gas prices to oil prices. 
Assumption 6 The concerns that oil reserves, at least if defined against acceptable prices and reliability of supply conditions, 
deplete relatively soon becomes widespread. "This perception, as well as the gradual introduction of decentralized 
energy systems based on the combination of natural gas and renewables, triggers policy initiatives to try to secure 
natural gas-based energy supply. 
On a globa l scale, there is a heavy debate on the question whether or not the world will run out of oil within a number of decades , 
and therefore out of projected reserves. 
Evidence from the International Energy Agency based on a summary of information from a range of sources, suggests that the current 
reserves are in the order of magnitude of about 1,200 billion barrels (roughly two thirds of which is located in the Middle East) (see 
Figure 4.12). If this amount is compared to the 2004 annual worldwide consumption of 28.7 billion barrels, and assuming that the 
demand for oil keeps rising and may well double within a number of decades, the scary picture emerges that the end of an era of cheap 
available oil is in sight. In fact , even if the demand for oil would not further increase from the presenr level, the world would still run 
our of oil in about 40-45 years if the oil reserves would not increase at all. This also assumes that rhe reserves are made avai lable by 
producers to satisfy demand, which is not certain eirher. To illustrate, in 2000, the USA had only 64 percent of its 1972 reserves at 
its disposal (McGarvey, 2002). 
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Irrespective of whether the dara on future oil rese rves are completely reliable, there is an increasing perception in the market rhat the 
world is gradually running om of oi l that ca n be produced at modest costs, and that it is fairl y irreleva nt whether this will be the case in 
three, four or five decades. Even oil companies have starred to rai se that awareness amongst rhe public at large. Chevron, for instance, 
starred a campaign in 2005 through rhe following adve rtisement in the Financial Times (19 July 2005): "Ir took us 125 years to use 
the first tri llion barrels of oil. We'll use rhe next tri llion in 30." 25 
Figure 4.12 Proven oil reserves (estimates) 
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Ir seems likely - also in view of the limi ted success in finding significant new o il rese rves over th e past few yea rs - rhar the perception 
of the world running our of o il may well ger stro nger during the nex t few decades. Although it is difficult to already speculate about 
how this perception will affect rhe position of natural gas as an alternative foss il fuel source in the eyes of both the public at large and 
policy makers, as well as rhe inves tors in rhe secror, ir seems rather obvious rh ar all rhis wi ll furth er support the rrend towards a clearly 
stronger and more dominanr role of natural gas in the worldwide energy system. 
Assumption 7 The nuclear option does not come off the ground seriously in most regions because of the perceived high security 
risks and associated costs. 
Severa l studies point at the importance of publi c acceptance wh en considering the potential of some energy options. For insta nce, a 
survey conducted in the former fifteen EU Member States revealed that Europeans are clea rl y in favor of clean and sustainable energy 
production from renewables although ir is widely acknowledged that a well-balanced energy mix is needed to secure energy supply 
(EORG, 2002). 26 ll1ese findin gs correspo nd with the result rhar nearly nine out of ten respondents (o r 88 per cent) considered globa l 
warming and climate change se rious problems that require immediate action. Another exa mple, a US study by MIT (2003) on rhe 
furure of Nuclear Power, also discerns public acceptance as a critical parameter for the further development of this secro r, especia lly 
wirh respecr to facto rs such as nuclear waste, safety, and costs. Moreover, as seems the case in Europe, people do not connecr global 
warming concerns with carbon-free nucl ear power. 
As far as nuclear energy is concerned , the general public sa fety concerns have clearly been rai sed by the 1979 ll1ree Mile Island and 
I 986 C hernobyl reactor accidents, bur al so by accidents ar fuel cycle faci lities in the USA, Russia and Japan. ll1ere is also growing 
co ncern about the safety and security of the tran sportation of nuclear materials and rh e security of nuclear facilities with a view to 
terro ri st attacks (NEA/OECD, 2000). In addition, there are security concerns related to the poss ible misuse/abuse of commercial o r 
associated nuclear faciliti es and operations to obtain techno logy or material s as a precurso r to the acquis iti on of a nuclear weapo ns 
capability. 
25 See www.wi llyoujo inus.com for Chevron's plarrorm on this issue. 
26 ll1cy vorcd, for exa mple, for renewablcs-reLncd reseu ch fa r ahead or foss il and nucl e<ll" energy research. 
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A final major public concern rela res ro nuclea r wasce managemenr, rhe challenges of which remain unresolved ro dare. No common 
rules on nuclea r reacror safecy or radioactive wasce di sposal haven been agreed upon unril roday, alchough the EC has proposed direc-
rives on the safety of nuclea r insra llari ons and on rh e managemenr of used nuclear fuel and radioactive wasre (EC, 2003). 
Given che maj or role of public acceprance of some spec ific forms of energy, it seems rarher unlikely rhac nuclea r energy wi ll beco me a 
dominant energy ca rri er in che nea r fucure in che Wesrern world. Limited R&D efforrs in this sector may also co ntribure to sragnacion 
in rhe developmenr of nuclear power facilic ies, as we ll as long lead rimes involved in rhe full operacionali za cion of a nuclea r planr. 
Moreover, nuclear power cannor prevenr the large C02 emissions from , for exampl e, transportation sys tems. 
Anocher obsracle ro rhe poss ible expansion of nuclea r capaciry are irs high overal l lifet ime power productio n coses compared ro nacural 
gas (e.g. with co mbined cycle curbine technology, CCGT) or coal, at leas t in the absence of a carbon tax or an equi va lent mechanism 
(see Table 4. 1 ). -111e real level ized cosc for nuclea r power producrion have been calculaced ar $6.7 cents/kWh fo r a Lighr Wacer Re-
actor (LWR) . Moreover, che nucl ea r cosr srructure is driven by high up-front capita l coses which may be an obstacle for additiona l 
inves tments in itself. 
Table 4.1 Power costs with carbon taxes (Coal & Gas) 
Carbon Tax Cases $50/tonne C02 $100/ronne C02 $200/tonne C02 
Levelized 
Electricity 
Cose 
cenrs/kWe-hr 
Coal 5.4 6.6 9.0 
Gas (low) 4.3 4 .8 5.9 
Gas (moderate) 4.7 5.2 6.2 
Gas (h igh) 6 .1 6.7 7.7 
Source: MIT, 2003: 7. 
In 2002, nuclea r power satisfied 17 per cent of world elecrriciry consumprion (see Figure 4.3). If public resisrance, or ar leasr relucr-
ance, persists in a major part of th e Wes tern world, che projected increase in nuclear ca pacity will be only marginal compared ro che 
subscancial increase in eleccricicy demand. In rhar case, demand for foss il fuels , contrary to non-fossi l fuel demand , is projected to grow 
above average growch of energy demand , and its share in overa ll energy needs will grow to over 80 per cenc in 2030 (EC, 2004: 155) 
(I EA, 2004a). In fact, w ithout a d ea r expansion of the roles of nuclea r energy and renewables in the foreseea ble future , fossil fuel s, and 
nacural gas in particular, are projecrcd ro sat isfy so me 90 per cent of rhe growth in energy demand between now and 20301 
Assumption 8 The energy and thus the gas markets become increasingly nervous due to: the increasing perception that we are 
running out of oil; the increasing sense of insecurity of energy supply; the more regular shifts in the destinations 
of international gas Hows; the limited substitutability of natural gas; the general lack of incentives to stabilize 
the market; and the domestic energy supply concerns in the main producing countries, which makes their export 
supply less predictable. This may lead to more price volatility and unexpected price hikes. 
When discussing rhe chances of increas ing marker vo latility, a clear di stinction shou ld be made between vo larilicy in che shorr run (e .g. 
within a month, week or even on a daily basis), medium run (e.g. on a seasonal or yea rly basis), or in rhe long run (over the yea rs). As 
far as the short and medium term is concerned , rhere is clear evidence that in the course of rime the gas price vo larilicy on the ex isting 
spot markets has significantly increased (see also Figure 6.2). In fact, in rhe libera li zed markers, gas price volarilicy has been much 
higher than the volatiliry of oil prices, to which gas prices have in fact been linked. This suggests rhar a further liberalization of gas 
markets may make gas price volariliry more widespread. 
Another majo r development char may have clear implica tions for gas marker vo larili cy is rhe gas marker integration itself, spurred by 
increasi ng demand , technological advances, cost reductions in producing and delivering LNG to markets, and marker liberalization. 
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Since a shift to a t ruly global gas market will make each major consuming or producing region more vulnerable to events in any other 
region, market integration may well lead to vo latility that spreads around the wo rld more easily and with a more pervasive impact. 
Although the gas price is expected to be graduall y increasingly 'decoupled ' from the oil price, the latter's vo latili ty can be ex pected to 
feed into the gas market for still a long time. This may also lead to typical patterns of long-term volatility. O ne sho uld remember that 
si nce 1970s the oil price has increased from about $3/bbl to about $50/bbl (see Figure 4. 13); during the 1970s, within less than a 
decade, the price increased by a factor of I 0 from $3/bbl in 1973 to over $30/bbl in 1980, which illustrates how quick oil prices can 
increase. In the 1980s, the oil prices, in real terms, co llapsed aga in and decreased to much lower levels. Although worldwide inAation 
has co me down significantly, a further ri se in oil prices (bm possibly collapsing oil prices the reafter) towards the earlier real oil price 
level could not be ruled out beforehand, especially with a view to the clear recognition of increas ing oi l scarcity and likely increase in 
market share of OPEC. 
Figure 4.13 West Texas Intermediate Oil Price 1947-2004 
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In fact, in a recent study, !EA po inted at the expectation of a real price increase, unlike the stable trend in rea l oil prices since the 
1980s, for oil from $27/ba rrel in rea l terms in 20 10, via $3 1/ bbl in 2020 to $34/bbl in 2030. During the sa me period, oil demand is 
expected to grow, according to the same TEA source, to 90 million bbl/day in 2010 (from 82.4m bbl/day in 2004) and 121 million 
bbl/day in 2030, which reAects that the impact of increased efficiency and structural shifts is more than offset by the increas ing volume 
of demand. 
In 2030 OPEC's share in global oil supply will be mo re than half of what the world needs (2004: 37% only). Since the political stabi-
lity in a number of large OPEC countries may well remain problematic, and with about 2/3 of the oil reserves loca ted in the Middle 
East, intermediate shocks in oil supplies seem almost inevitable. The picture for na tural gas may not be much different, beca use over 
70 percent of the international gas reserves is located in Russia and the Middle Eas t (notably Qatar and Iran). 
Assumption 9 The main natural gas producing countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa, Russia, and the FSU states 
start to exploit their market power by restricting their supply to the world market, which not only adds to the 
increasing price instability, but which also causes, during considerable intervals , significantly higher prices. 
This adds to the sense of unpredictability of international natural gas market conditions, and thus raises concerns 
about security of natural gas supply. 
27 One may quescion if rhe srr;negic oil reserves can have a serious impact in cases of co nsiderable marker disrurbances. Altho ugh, for instance, rhe US Srrategic 
Perroleum Reserves, rhar amounred to abom one day of ncr perroleurn imports in 1977, have been expanded to levels covering abour rwo rnonrhs wo nh of 
imported oil, such reserves seem insufficienr fo r serious lascing market d isequilibria. 
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1l1ere are a number of reasons why the risk of a limited number of suppliers using their marker power to raise prices cannot be 
ignored. 
First, evidence from a number of successful cartel-like actions, including OPEC during the 1970s, suggests that driving up prices by 
restricting supply, whether or not unexpectedly, may generate a rent, at least temporarily, for the producers if they, as a group, represent 
at least roughly half of total supply. 1l1e reason why such a marker dominance seems imperative for successful cartel action is that such 
coalitions, if smaller, will usually disintegrate when their success is too limited or too short-lived. OPEC's success was based on about 
its 70 per cent marker share during the 1970s (in terms of oil production); its successful market power more or less disappeared as 
soon as its share declined to less than half. 
1l1e question is whether in the foreseeable future comparable conditions may be fulfilled in the international gas market. During 2004 
of the overall volume exported by pipeline, or contracted as LNG (502 and 178 bcm respectively, together 680 bcm), 154 bcm was 
supplied by Russia and rhe FSU states, 45 bcm by rhe Middle Eastern countries;28 and 63 bcm from Northern African countries,29 
which in total amounts to 263 bcm or approximately 40 per cent of total exports. However, the share of these countries' proven 
reserves (at the end of 2004) in the world's total reserves amounted to: 32.4 per cenr,30 40.6 per cenr31 and 4.3 per cent respectively, 
or, when taken together, over 77 per cent (see also Figure 4.14)! Given that future supply of gas on the international market will 
increasingly reflect underlying reserves, the basic conditions for successful action to drive up prices could be fulfilled, possibly already 
during the next few decades. 1l1e six countries in the above group32 with the largest proven reserves together have a market share of 
practically two third. 33 
Figure 4.14 World proven reserves of natural gas 
World total: 180 tcm a• of 1 January 2004 
Source: Cedigaz, 2004. 
Second, the chances of being able to increase gas prices may become larger once gas prices are convincingly decoupled from other 
energy prices and substantial investments in the gas infrasrrucrure including LNG have been made so that gas demand will automati-
cally grow. It seems that also these two conditions will increasingly be fulfilled. 
28 Oman, Iran, Qar:ir and UAE. 
29 In particular Algeria, Egypt and Libya. 
30 Of which Russia has 26.7%. 
31 Of which Iran and Qa1ar rcprcsclll almost .10%. 
32 Russi:i. Iran, Qarar. Saudi Arabi;1, UAE, and Algeria; the marker sha re of the 'big rhree' of rhem, Russia, Qarar and Iran, is 56.4%. 
33 
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Russia is cxpccrcd ro remain rhc world's largcsr gas exporrer in 2030. By rhcn Ira n is projccrcd ro conrrol reserves the size oF which reprcsenrs abour lulF oF 
Russia's reserves. 
Third, in a liberalized world there may be considerably fewer long-term contracts and contracrua l cerrainry with more competition 
on rhe demand side. Flexible infrastructure facilities will support such competition and make ir physically possible rhar the direction 
of international gas flows change almost instantaneously, as soon as some parry anywhere in the world makes a better offer. In such a 
world, where the sense of urgency with regard to the security of supply wi ll anyhow be stronger and markers may more eas ily become 
nervous on that aspect, there seems to be a fertile breeding ground for successful cartel- like action. 
Assumption 10 The substantial and increasing share of LNG in the internationally traded volumes of natural gas, the destination 
of which is perceived by the demand side as being determined by anonymous market forces, contributes further 
to the perceived lack of security of supply. 
Security of supply (SoS) can be defined as the availabi lity of energy (in whatever type or form) at all times, in sufficient quantities, 
and at reasonable and/or affordable prices; or the perception that nothing is going wrong with regard to such factors. Keeping this 
in mind, it is undersrandable that the quickly growing role of LNG in the international gas market strongly affects the feeling of 
increased or, instead, reduced security with respect to deliveries of gas by the inrernarional marker. How LNG deliveries will affect rbe 
SoS perception will probably strongly depend on the question whether rhe marker can be seen as a sellers' or a buyers' marker. In the 
first case, a Ii mired supply, given a certain demand, gives sellers a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis demand, which could make the 
demand side feel insecure. The opposite obviously app lies if potential supply is large as compared to demand. 
It is hard to predict whether the future LNG market will develop into a buyers' or a sel lers' marker. Much wil l depend on the overa ll 
supply and demand balance of narural gas, invesrmenr in LNG infrastructure and pipeline systems, and of the number of sources of 
supply vis-a-vis sources of demand. Current evidence shows that the LNG market is developing from a sel lers' market to a buyers' 
market, which is driven both by volumes and destination flexibility, as well as by rhe diverse groups of LNG projects and new countries 
entering the export business. 
The increasing role of LNG is anyhow likely because it has a number of perceived benefits: rhe opporruniry for companies to com-
mercialize reserves which are currently considered too remote to exploit economically; and the opportunities for traders to benefit 
from price fluctuations and to influence local markets by arbitrage transactions. As of 2003, 169 billion cubic meters 34 (or 27% of 
rhe tota l volume of internationally traded gas) of LNG was traded internationally, whereas 455 billion cubic meters were transported 
internationally via pipelines. Due to a continuous trend of an increasing efficiency of the option, LNG's share in rhe total is projected 
to increase, which wi ll further change the trade and investment environment of natural gas. According to !EA projections, 250 bcm 
wi ll be traded in 20 10 and 680 bcm in 2030; a 272 per cent increase. The same source suggests rhar in 2030 more than 50 per cent 
of all inter-regional gas trade will be in the form of LNG (!EA, 2004a). 
Whether such a projected growth of the LNG market will materialize, strongly depends, however, on the willingness to invest: a sin-
cere LNG commitment within the sector at large is needed to susta in current growth figures. Huge investments are needed, nor only to 
build LNG tankers, but also terminals and liquefaction plants. A Shel l official 35 recently emphas ized rhe importance of'shared trust' 
within the industry and the institutional setting to allow for rhe expansion of LNG trade. He mentioned the following list of risks: the 
reservoir risks attendant on all oil and gas developments; the political risks in exporting and importing coun tries; the execution risks 
in undertaking such costly, complex and technologically-intensive projects; the marker risks of flucruating demand and price; and rhe 
cred it risks, where buyers are nor confined to strong utilities and aggregators (Brinded, 2004). 
It is questionable whether rhe comm itments of the stakeholders mentioned above wi ll actua lly materialize and whether the risks 
discerned can effectively be mitigated given the many uncertainties that characte ri ze the future natural gas market. Ar the beginning 
of 2004, there were 15 LNG export terminals, 43 import terminals and 154 LNG tankers operating worldwide. Eight liquefaction 
termina ls were being expanded and five new ones were under construction. In add ition, eight new import terminals were being built 
in the OECD region, 54 new LNG ships were on order and some 30 new LNG supply projects were planned (!EA, 2004a). Most of 
the new terminals to be built in rhe next decade and a half will be in the USA and Europe, shifting rhe current LNG destination focus 
from the Asia-Pacific region to rhe Western region (fo r the 2003 situation, see Figure 4. 15). Consequently, LNG trade destinations 
will become much more widespread. It is uncertain though if the same will also apply to the supply side: in 2004, o nly four cou ntries, 
Qatar, Algeria, Indonesia and Malaysia, were responsible for about 63 per cent of the globa ll y traded vo lume of LNG. Adding rhe next 
largest suppliers, Trinidad & Tobago, Nigeria, Oman, and Brunei, to this list increases the share to 87 per cen t. 
.Jli Flows are on a contractual basis and may nor correspo nd ro physical gas Hows (BP). 
35 Malcolm Brinded. Croup Managing Di rccror of Royal Dutch Shell pie. 
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Figure 4.15 Worldwide natural gas trade flows, 2003 (bcm) 
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Al though rhe narural gas industry has trad it io nall y been developed on rhe basis of lo ng-rerm sales agreements, LNG exporr is projec-
ted ro be less dependable o n those agreements, as LNG is increas ingly t raded on the spo t marker. Acco rd ing ro the I EA, LNG spot 
sa les, sho rt- term or single cargo sa les, are expected ro become more im po rrant (2004a). Spor t rading represented almos t 11 % of global 
LNG trade in 2003 up fro m less rhan 2 per cent in the late 1990s. Fur therm ore, several ships now being b uilt are nor earmarked 
fo r parti cul ar projects and could rhus be ava il abl e fo r spo t-trad ing opponuniries. In additio n, older rankers will be freed from rheir 
current ass ignments when long- term con tracrs expire and pan of rhe capacity of some liquefactio n pl ants buil t in recent years is nor 
covered by long-term contrac ts. 1l1ese ra nkers will thus also be ava ilab le ro supply rhe spo t m arker (!EA, 2004a). This trend may, 
however, fu rther add ro rhe perceived lack of securi ty of suppl y. 
Assumption 11 Energy concerns increasingly dominate foreign policy issues of most countries/blocs. 
There are a num ber of reaso ns why it seems likely that securi ty o f energy supply concerns will increasingly domin ate fo reign policy 
agendas o f severa l countries. 
First, natural gas imports (as a percentage of rora l energy consumpti on) are projected ro grow significa ntly in a ll in dustri a li zed regions: 
in rh e EU from 7 '% ro 20% during 2000-20; in Japan from 9% to 16%; and in North Eas t Asia from [ ')'(, ro 3% (see Figure 4 .16). 1l1is 
makes regions sys tematica ll y mo re pro ne ro d isrup tions which are beyond rhe co n tro l of their jurisdi ction . 1l1is may add ro security 
of supply concerns. Also rhe vo lume of internat ionall y traded gas is likely ro substa ntially increase during rhe next few decades (see 
Figure 4. 17). Since international trade seems inherently more vul ne rable ro disruption rhan do mes ti c transpo rt, th is may also increase 
co ncerns about future gas deliveri es . 
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Figure 4. I 6 Gas Imports as percentage of total energy consumption ( I 970-2020) 
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Figure 4. I 7 Major net inter-regional natural gas trade nows, 2002 and 2030 
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Source: !EA, 2004a . 
Second, as has a lready been argued befo re, rhe libera li za ri on trend and the projecred increas ing ro le of LNG in traded volum es, spo t 
market trading, sho n -te rm contracts, e tc., all add to the transparency, liquidi ty and fl ex ibili ty o f the gas marker, but may at rhe sa me 
rime make actual deli veri es less certain and contracts and co ntracr re rms less predic table. This changed contractual environment and 
srructure of rhe marker may be welcomed by some, bur blamed by o thers because it lowers their sense of SoS . To that extent fo reign 
po li cy may increasingly be used to resto re rhe required SoS levels. 
Third , SoS concerns will definitel y increase if energy insra ll ati ons or LNG transpo rt become the ta rget o f terro rist and other military 
a tracks, o r the subject o f regional confli cts. Analys is o f the main roures of international gas transport shows a number o f ris ky spots in 
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rh ar rega rd as di scerned in Table 6.1. In addirion , to menrio n jusr a few orher vulnerabiliries, ir can be poinred o ur char: 80 per cenr of 
rhe Russian gas producrion comes from rhree fields o nly (Urengoi, Yam burg and Medvezhye); 90 per cenr of Russ ian gas is rransporred 
via the Yamal-Neners corridor; 80 per cenr of Russian gas exports to Cenrral and Wesrern Europe rransirs thro ugh rhe Ukraine; 33 per 
cenr of lrali an gas co nsumptio n is rransported via rhe Ti·ansmed pipeline linking Algeria and Iraly; 30 per cent of Spanish consumption 
is transported via the Algeria/Spain GM E pipeline; e re. In face , rhere is ev idence thar narural gas companies are increas ingly hedging 
themselves against poss ible te rrori st attacks. Damage analyses show rhar the costs to sociery of a shortfall of gas, likely to occur after 
a terrorist arrack, ca n be enormous. SoS concerns may furth er increase as major oil/gas producing regions, such as rhe Middle East, 
Russ ia and N orth Africa, would, for wharever reason , increas ingly be perce ived as polirically unsrable . 
Another factor rlur may undermine rhe confi dence in furure inrernarional deli veri es of narural gas is rhe in creas ing involvement of 
governments, instead of pri va re companies, in the ex plora tio n and explo itati on of energy resources.36 For this reason, trade relations 
a re expected to increas ingly concern politica l rrade-offs. This may also explain why energy issues will probably increasingly be linked 
w irh other major issues of foreign po licy concern (e.g. inrernarional invesrment, transfers, economi c operarion, military assisrance, 
e re.) . Finally, accidents, espec ially wirh regard to LNG, may cause a di srupti on of supply on rheir own. A number of accidenrs and 
incidenrs ha ve alread y raken place (see also assumprion 6 for more derail s), which has shown rhar in acrual practice rhe LNG roure 
ca n be vulnerable. 
In rhe meantime, a number of governments have addressed the security of supply siruarion. T11e Chinese Govern menr, for instance, 
increas ingly tri es to secure irs energy supply (mosr notably oil and gas) to fu el irs economy. China's net oil impo rts are projected to rise 
on average by 8.3 per cenr per yea r between 2002 and 2030, thereby increas ing C hina's oil import dependency from abour 30 per cenr 
in 2004 to around 85 per cenr in 2030. Presenrl y, C hinese (s rare-owned) compa nies are buying oil from srare-owned companies in 
Iran , no r necessa rily in exchange for money. Fu rthermore, C hina is extending irs sr raregies to include Canada , comprehending plans 
for a pipeline and pons char would all ow as much as one million barrels per day o f o il from Alberta's rar sa nds to move to Ca nada's 
west coast for export to China. Furthermore, C hina has made a seri es of o il dea ls char extend irs inAuence in Larin America. Russia's 
emerging relationship wirh C hina can be seen as another srraregic alliance in rh e global run to secure rhe proper and timely availability 
of much needed energy resources. 
Anorher exa mple of increasing SoS arrenrion is rh e recenr study issued by rhe US Co ngress and ca rri ed o ut by rhe Co ngress ional 
Resea rch Service, which shows char LNG, due to irs visibility and recognizable characrerisrics, may be vulnerable to rerrori sr atraclcs. 
However, possibly due to high security measures and heavy conrtol, no re rrori sr arcad es have been reported in rhe recent decades. The 
report signals that rhe coses invol ved in securing and protecting of LN G transporrs (ships), terminals and sto rage capacities rapidly 
increase wirh a ri sing demand for LNG and co ncludes char, although security has so far been guaranteed and incurring coses Ii mired, 
US Congress may consider whether rhe LNG industry presenrly ca rri es an appropriate share of rhe burden for fmure LNG security. 
Anorher report by rhe Congressional Resea rch Service presenrs an overview of arracks o n oil and gas pipelines. For example: 
• In Colombia rebels have bombed Occidental Petroleum's Ca no Limon pipeline abour 950 rimes since 1986, shurring ir for 
mon rhs ar a rime and leading to lose revenues for rhe Colombian Government of some $ 2.5 billion. 
• In 1998 one of rhese arracks caused a fire rhar killed or injured over I 00 people. 
• In the lase 2 years, oil and gas pipelines have also been a cracked in N igeri a, Pakistan, Sudan , Myanmar and , mosr recenrly 
Iraq. 
• In 200 I a vandal's arrack with a high-powered riAe, also on rhe rrans-Alas ka pipeline, forced a rwo-day shutdown and 
ca used extensive eco no mic and eco logica l damage. 
1hese exa mples suggest rhat SoS co ncerns a re just ifi ed . 
Assumption 12 In the process of exploration and exploitation of natural gas, safety and environmental concerns play an 
increasingly important role, e.g. wirh regard to where and under what conditions gas exploration is allowed ro 
be initiated. 
36 An example is the claim the Russ ian gove rnment put on Yukos in 2003. Moreover, it is expected that soon a law will be passed making bidding by 
both fo reign and Russian offshore companies (non-government) on Russ ia's natura l resources impossib le. Another exa mple is sta te-owned 
Aramco, a Saudi state owned company abo ut 20 times the size ofl3P or Exxon Mob il. Recent examples are the developments of increasing state 
co nrrol of energy resources in Venezuela and 13oli via. 
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Alrhough legal res rri ctions o n gas ex ploration differ strongly among countries, such resrrict ions can slow down ex ploration , or even 
prevent considerable gas resources/reserves from being explo red at all. This puts further pressure on rhe increasing import dependency 
of a number of main industrial centers. An exa mple is the USA, where - ar least ar present - according to the Amer ican Gas Associa-
tion , a considerable amount of gas resources ca n nor be mined for va rious reasons. As far as the resources in the Rockies are concerned, 
approximately 29 t ri llion cubic feet (ref) of it are closed for development and I 08 ref is only ava ilable with restri ctions (see Figure 
4. 18). 
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Ar the end of2005, a plan to enable the dri lling for oil in the Arcti c Na tional Wi ldlife Refuge in Alaska was rejecred by the US Senate. 
As a ro ugh estimate, this Wildl ife reserve co ntains approximately l 0 bn bbl of o il equiva lent. 1l1is shows that res isrance can be succes-
sfull y mobilized by emphasizing environmental concerns, complica ting effo rrs to exploit remaining reserves. 
Another illustration of the in creas ing impact of enviro nmenral concerns is the recent announcement of the Russian President Putin 
that a new oi l pipeline to the Far East will not be constructed just pass ing lake Bajkal (containing about 20 per cent of the world 's fresh 
water reserves), but instead some 40 km to the north. 
Assumption 13 The structure of international gas contracting is increasingly dominated by security of supply concerns. 
In view of the expected increasing co ncern about security of energy suppl y, it seems fair to assume that there will be a conrinuous dis-
cussion o n the issue whether the shift from the traditiona l, highly st ructured gas world of government-backed , bilateral , fixed-pr iced 
in ternational contracts towa rds a world dominated by private, open marker co ntracts, is desirable. Several countries of destin ation 
may increasingly try ro secure th eir gas supplies via long-term bilateral co ntracts. In this process, new intermediary players will pro-
bably enter the marker. Also governments could increas ingly interfere with internation al gas co ntracting regimes, as shown by so me 
exa mples under assumptio n 4. 12. 
For instance, it is expected that the EU will rry to reach a compromise berween spot-marker transactions and long-term obligations, 
whereby long-term co ntracts wi ll remain bas ic, and spot transact ions wi ll be of secondary imporrance. In 20 I 0, about 90 per cent of 
demand is sti ll expected to be se rved by lo ng-term contracts. 
A large number offurther conrracrual implica tions ca n be foreseen if SoS co ncerns will increas ingly preva il. Such changes cou ld relate 
to the issues of: rake-o r-pay clauses, destination clauses, contract duratio n, coverage of swing factors, balancing co nditions, Force 
M ajeure, ere. Ir is diffi cul t to project beforehand, due to diffe rent trends of liberalization and increasing concern about SoS, what rhe 
precise direction of international contracr terms and condirio ns will most likely look like. 
Finally, increased SoS attention may create new partnerships for exploration and exploi ta tio n of gas reserves and strengrhen the ro le 
of public-private partnerships in this regard. 
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Chapter 5 
Coal, Oil and Nuclear Storyline 
5.1 General description 
In this storyline economic growth in Asia and correspond ing growth in energy demand remains high, whereas growth in the indu-
strialized world remains modest, i.e. less than 2% per annum. Asia increasingly wants to use its large coal reserves to accommodate 
its strong econom ic growth. Tn addit ion, it considerably expands its nuclear power capacity (and some renewables) to be sure that 
energy shortages can be tackled . In terms of the components of energy supply, the USA shows a similar trend: in order to become less 
dependent of foreign supply, which is considered unreliable, extensive investments are made in in the exploitati on of Canad ian tar 
sands. Europe and Japan have a relatively strong focus on renewables and face no serious problems in meeting their energy demand by 
traditional imports of mainly oil , especially because oil reserves turn out to be larger than anticipated. In short, the energy strategies of 
the various countries are assumed to be increas ingly targeted on self-reliance, i.e . to make sure that energy will be produced as much 
as possible through domestic primary energy resources or those of close allies. 
In this storyline the commitments under the post-Kyoto regime gradua ll y become tighter, but this process is very slow. There is 
quite so me optimism that the comb ination of clea n coal technologies, the nuclear option and renewables can solve the problem via 
technological breakthroughs. 
Thus, coal will make a considerable comeback, also because of new clean coal technologies, and the nuclear option gains considerable 
support, particularly in Asia. Because of the relative decline in oi l demand and still large oil reserves, these developments combined 
lead to a much lower worldwide demand for gas than anticipated. 
In such a world , both energy and carbon credit (-equivalenr) prices do not rise much beyond present levels (i.e. about €70 per barrel 
for oi l, and about€ I 0-20 per barrel for the credit). As a consequence, the sense that energy is an urgent source of public concern wi ll 
not emerge and incenrives ro invest in a large-scale expansion of gas infrastructure facilities remain subdued. Accordingly, natural 
gas will no longer be considered the transition fuel par excellence, and to the extent that governments feel committed to mitigation 
targets, also driven by green NGOs, they prefer, on average, to support the further development of specific renewables for particular 
purposes (e.g. hydrogen for transport; hydro for base-load power production, or solar for decentralized systems). In addition, the 
gas sector struggles with the new liberalization/regulatory regimes, which cause underinvestments in infrastructure development and 
exploration. Moreover, there may be concerns, especia ll y regarding internationally traded LNG, that gas could be an unsafe form of 
energy. All this leads to a market share reduction of natural gas in overal l energy supply. 
5.2 Assumptions and rationale of the Coal, Oil and Nuclear Storyline 
Assumption I 
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There is a general feeling that economic development will be vulnerable to the insecure imports of oil and gas. 
Such imports are not only costly because of the fairly high oil and gas prices in this storyline, but they are also 
increasingly considered unreliable and in conflict with the policy target of minimizing dependency from other 
countries, or even worse, from the inherently unpredictable world market energy supplies. This stimulates 
countries to actively develop an energy portfolio, which is compatible with such targets. 
Figure 5.2 Power generation capacity required by region (GW) 
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Assumption 2 Growth in Asia remains high throughout the period; opt1m1sm about clean coal technology, relatively safe 
nuclear power production and some renewable options make Asia increasingly rely on their own coal reserves for 
their energy needs. Together with a noticeable expansion of their nuclear capaciry and the introduction of 
some renewable energy sources, especially for decentralized systems, they succeed in considerably reducing their 
dependence on foreign energy supplies. Growth in the OECD region remains fairly limited: the USA actively 
tries to reduce its dependency on ' less reliable' energy sources and heavily invests in exploration and exploitation 
of Canadian tar sands for oi l production and in its domestically widely available coal reserves. The European 
Union and Japan also show limited economic growth. With overall oi l demand remaining low, these regions can 
maintain access to international oil supplies relatively easily, albeit at relatively high prices. 
There are a number of reaso ns to assume rhar countries like China and India will continue to rel y on coa l when satisfying rheir primary 
energy demand. "ll1e IEA projects, for example, rhat rwo-thirds of the increase in global coa l use over the nex t thirty years will take 
place in India and C hina . 
First, coal consumprion clea rl y has already been on the ri se (see Figure 5.3). During 2000-2004, for insrance, coa l consumprion in 
C hina has doubled from about 500 Mroe to about 1,000 Mtoe; subsra nrially above rhe growrh rare rhe underlying economy. 111is 
recent develop menr may underline the clear intenrio n of the Chinese aurhoriries to main tain a srrong focus on coal as one of the key 
energy drivers for rhe rapid econom ic progress. 
Figure 5.3 Coal consumption (seleaed Asian economies) 
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Wirhour acrive di vers ifi ca ri on polic ies, mosr economic blocs a re proj ecred ro beco 111 e increas ingly dependenr from impo rted fossi l 
energy, no tab ly o il and gas (fo r the projected impo rt dependency of gas, see Figu re 4. 16). As outlined in the former sro ryline, the 
assumed dominance of the securiry of supply (SoS) issue provides reasons why such an increased import dependency may give rise 
to major concerns in policy making circles and evenrually also among the public at la rge: people will suffer from high and vo la til e 
energy prices, the development of which seems to be completely beyond cont ro l; there co uld be oi l and gas shortages due ro vari o us 
inrerruptio ns during an ea rlier stage of the va lue chain ; the feeling m ay grow rhar rhere is less control of its own eco nomic progress 
and that one is left wirh vagar ies of an anony111ous world energy m arket; and one will actively try to refrain from rhe ri sks of se rious 
internati onal tension and conAict related ro energy matters. 
111e obvious response ro these concerns wi ll be ro strive fo r 111ore self- reliance in te rms of energy supply and therefo re to look ar options 
for energy product ion rhar would require less pri111 ary energy imports. 111e notion of increas ing se lf-rel iance, wh ich is cenrral in thi s 
story line, subsra ntially diminishes the attractiveness of o il and gas, and induces an act ive sea rch for the main alte rnati ves, whi ch are: 
coa l, at leas t typ ica ll y in a number of strongly growing regions; nuclear energy; and so me forms of renewables. Therefore, an importanr 
as pect in rhi s storyline is, unlike the transitio n storyline outlined in C hapte r 3, char natural gas is nor a 'winning' bur ra ther a ' los-
ing' fuel, wirh a decreas ing marker share. In comparison ro ea rlie r expectat ions, the ro le of natural gas w ill remain disappointingly 
Ii m ired. -n1is trend may be enhanced as more cr itica l quest ions are posed concern ing rhe ve ry sizeable projected investments (about$ 
6 trillio n cumula tive between 2003-2030) in gas and o il infrastructure, exploration capaciry, pipelines, other transport infras tructure 
and te rminals alike, and even larger projec ted in vestment in power generation capacity (about$ I 0 trillion cumulative). It co uld be 
questioned wherher inves tments would be needed for a continuing reliance on fore ign, expens ive and unreliable oil and gas as primary 
energy sou rces. 
111e implication of thi s increasing attenrion fo r rhe benefits of stronger energy self- reliance is that the shares of the several primary 
energy sources in 2030 w ill clearly differ from those projected in the ! EA Refe rence Scenario. According to the IEA, rhe share of oi l 
and gas in overall primary energy demand would increase from 57 per cent in 2002 to 60 per cent in 2030, which would be mainly 
due to a ri sing share of natural gas from 2 1 per cent ro 25 per cent. 111is sto ryline, instead , assumes a drop in the combined market 
share of oi l and gas ro a level of about 50 per cent, whereas coal, nuclear and renewables jointly gain ground; their co ll ecr ive share rises 
from 43 per cent to 50 per cent. W hich of the three sources in this 'alternati ve' mix (coa l, nuclea r or renewables) will become rhe main 
winner is typ ica lly region- or even country-specific. Ir seems fa ir to assume in thi s sro rylin e that coal will ga in marker share in rap idly 
growing, resource- ri ch regions, whereas renewables will win in a number of industrialized co untri es; the position of nuclea r energy 
wi ll depend on national priorities which may eas il y differ, even among neighboring countries . 
A specific point is that up to 2030 energy consumption (see Figure 5.1) and G H G emiss ions, as well as investment in the energy sector, 
are projected ro ex pand most strongly in co untries such as C hina, 37 India and Sou th East Asia. This is mainly rhe result of a relatively 
strong eco nom ic g rowth. In fact, about half of rhe projec ted 16 trillion required cum ula ti ve investment in rhe energy sector during 
2003-2030 is likely ro rake place in Asia (see Figure 5.2). Ir is conceivable rhar rhose co untries will , with a view ro such a tremendous 
inves tment activity, be careful nor to make rhe mistake made ea rli er by other countries, ro beco me economically too much dependent 
o n foreign supplie rs o f products that a re ind ispensable for econom ic progress. 111is is particularly likely since most of the important 
Asian counrri es in terms of projected g rowth have a long tradition of a certain politi ca l and eco nomic self- reliance. 
Figure 5.1 Energy consumption for selected economies, 2002 and 2030 
;ource: Marysek er al. , 2005. 
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C hina's 1mal energy consurnprion is projecrcd 10 incrl'ase by approximarely 250 per ccnr by 2030. Accordi ng to I EA 
projecrions. Chi 11:1 and India alone will be responsible fo r G8tYo ofrhe incre;ise in dema nd over rhc period 2002-2030. 
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Oil exploration technology and the use of new sources are now rapidly growing. lhcre is no reason why the spectacular progress 
observed in the past could not be repeated in th e fo reseeable future. For insta nce, four decades ago oil wells were operated close to 
shore in relati vely shallow water. Since then advances in exploration and production have enabled we lls to reach reserves on the deeper 
continental shelf and beyond. Acco rding to Jim Em me, vice presidenr for exploration at Anadarko, technology brea kthroughs are the 
reason why ex ploration techniques have continuously improved : "If you had asked me in 196 1 I'd have said rhar whar we're doing now 
was impossible" (Na tional Geographic, 2004: I 05). 
This justifies that one ca n indeed be fa irly optim istic about rhe possible impact of a number of new developments, not only with 
regard to prospective drilling success showing a ri sing trend anyhow (see Figure 5.8), but also with regard to: heavy o il s, tar sands and 
oil sha les (National Geographic, 2004). 
Figure 5.8 World oil exploration drilling success rote 
45 
40 
35 
30 
c 25 QJ 
u 
., 
a. 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
IEA, 2004a: I 00 . 
Heavy oils 
-
-
-
-
---
-
1946- 1951- 1956- 1961- 1966- 1971- 1976- 19Bl- 1986- 1991- 1996- 2001-
1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 19B6 1991 1996 2001 2003 
Using currenr technology, about one-th ird of heavy o il reserves is potentially recoverab le. Heavy oils can be pumped just like co n-
ventional petroleum , except that they are much th icker, more polluting, and require mo re ex tensive refining. About 90 per cenr of 
estimated reserves are in the Orinoco 'heavy oi l belr' of Venezuela, which contains an es timated l.2 trillion barrels. 
Tar sands 
The developmen t of oil sand deposits has beco me more important since the mid-1990s. Ta r sa nds are found in sedimenra ry rocks and 
must be dug out and crushed in giant opencast mines. It takes about 5 to I 0 times as much energy, area and water to mine, process 
and upgrade the tars as process ing conventio nal oil. 111e Athabasca depos its in Alberta, Ca nada are rhe world 's larges t resource, w ith 
estimated reserves of about 1.8 trillion barrels, an amou nt that may exceed rhe world 's remaining reserves of ord inary crude o il. Of 
this, only about 280-300 bn barrels may be recoverab le, either because the tar sa nd li es too deep, or is located in depos its that are too 
spa rse to be explo ited. In Canada product ion accounts fo r about 20% of Ca nada's o il supply and it is growing by 7 per cent an nually 
and is expected to have do ubled by 2010 from ea rli er levels of some I m barrel s per day. Venezuela has large documented depos its of 
oil sands as well. 
111e development of tar sands is stimulated by both technological improvements and Ca nada's cut in the roya lties that co mpanies had 
to pay during the first few years. In fact, due to this development, in terms of oil rese rves Ca nada is now ranked second , right behind 
Saudi Arab ia, and ahead of Iraq, Iran , and Kuwait. However, the development of ta r sa nds requires much effort. ;,o It takes rluee barrels 
of wa ter to extrac t one barrel of bi rumen , wh ich draws heav il y on the Athabasca Ri ve r. Moreover, heating all that wa ter takes vast 
amounts of natural gas. Worried about Ca nada's dwindling natural gas supplies, Alberta has even considered nuclea r energy instead. 
H owever, compared to world oil dem and of over 80 m barrels per day (B I~ 2005), Ca nada's production is rath er small (o r abour 4% 
of world tota l). Nevertheless, on e should take in to accou nt spin-offs emanating from recent effo rts in thi s industry. If Ca nada showed 
liO ll1 e sand h;1s 10 he strip-min t.:d , rwo rnnncs orir for e:H.:h b:irrd of oil. Trucks haul 400 rons in a single load, in beds hcarcd during rhe subarci-ic wint ers so rhc sa nd 
does not freeze. Next ro rh e mine, rhc s;rnd goes inro rhe eq uivalenr of gia nt washing machines, whcrl' 101Tcnr.s of warm wa1er and so lvent rin se our rhc rar, or 
bi rumen, leaving wet s:ind rh;ir is dumped in railing ponds. Even rhcn rhc bi rumen is nor ready to be piped of-Fro :i refinery like ordinary crude. To rurn ir b:1ck inrn 
crude oil, it is cirhcr cooked, or hea(ed rn lower rcmpcra rurcs and ch urned wirh hydrogen gas and a cara lysr {Nariona l Geographic, 2004: l 05). 
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the world (and Venezuela in particular) that it can economically develop these kinds of oil deposits (which are among the most costly 
in the world), there is a good chance that other countries will develop theirs at currently (2005) high oil prices. 
Oil shales 
Oil shales exist in large quantities in ecologically sensitive pans of Colorado, Wyoming and Utah at varying depths. However, the 
industrial process needed for oil extraction requires hot water, which makes it much more expensive and less energy-efficient than 
conventional oil. Currently, Shell, Exxon, Chevron Texaco and other oil companies are investing billions of dollars in this expensive 
oil production method. 
All such new developmenrs have led the US Geological Survey to conclude in a year-2000 study that oil availability is at least 50 per 
cent higher than pessimists believe, much of it is located the Middle East (National Geographic, 2004: 108). 
An odd reason why oil reserves may turn out to be larger than presently anticipated is the perception of oil scarcity itself. Increasing 
doubts about timely and sufficient oil supply as well as price hikes stimulate both government and business investments in other 
energy sources. This holds especially for applications that increasingly compete with oil in the transport sector, which seems a key 
development simply because at present about 50 per cent of world oil demand is for transport purposes. This percentage may well 
increase further. With an expected increase in the role of natural gas, biofuels and even hydrogen in satisfying demand for transport 
fuels, this could considerably slow down overall oil demand. The same impact could come from progressive fuel efficiency standards, 
which would simply be imposed by governments, as it is already the case in a number of countries. Such trends may well save oil and 
therefore considerably prolong the oil era. 
Finally, the low energy price period of the 1980s and 1990s has substantially reduced public energy research expenses in the Western 
world (except for Japan). For example, since the early 1980s, !EA Members have reduced their energy-related research and technology 
developmenr budgets by half. In the 1979-1999 period US budgets fell by two-thirds. If, under the pressure of rising oil prices and 
concerns about long-term oil availability, governments would once again support public R&D expenditures, possibly in close col-
laboration with industry, new insights and breakthroughs on saving oil seem feasible. 
Assumption 5 Fall-out risks and the risks related to nuclear waste storage are reduced because of new technologies. This makes 
nuclear energy more fashionable and rapidly increases its market share in power production, especially in Asia; 
nuclear power production costs can take considerable advantage of economies of scale and learning effects. 
The main problem with nuclear power production is the disposal of nuclear waste. Basically, a nuclear planr produces two kinds of 
toxic waste: fission products and transuranics. When spent fuel rods from power production are removed from the reactor, they are 
temporarily placed in underwater storages, next to the plant. '1liese rods are extremely radioactive because of the still active fission 
products, the so-called 90Sr and 137Cs, which, however, have only a relatively short half-life value: about 30 years. A much bigger 
problem is caused by the containment of transuranics, mosrly 239Pu. lhe half-live value of this type of plutonium is much longer: 
about 24,000 years. TI1e plutonium can also be used in a nuclear weapon program, which makes it even more dangerous. However, 
239Pu can be reused and recycled, which diminishes the amount of nuclear waste produced. 
Over the past decades, nuclear waste recovery and recycling techniques have improved and will continue to do so as the scientific 
community keeps searching for new ways of handling nuclear waste and reducing its half-life value. Current nuclear waste will remain 
very hazardous for approximately ] 00 years. After that period, it can be stored rather safely in underground storage facilities. 
The technological and innovative advantages of nuclear power over e.g. wind and solar energy are obvious. Nuclear power has, for 
example, the potential to develop batteries that will last for over lO years. Taking into account some other advantages, like low as-
sociated C02 emissions, it may well be that nuclear power will become a rather popular, if not standard, option for typically middle 
and high-income countries to meet ever increasing energy demand and to achieve technological innovation at the same time. 
Table 5.2 clearly indicates that the 440 globally operational nuclear power plants can be found in 30 countries all over the world 
ranging from rather poor developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Pakistan to wealthy industrialized countries such as 
Sweden, the USA and Switzerland. Within a few years from now, the number of countries with nuclear power plants will probably 
increase to 37 countries. TI1is expectation is based on the number of reactors that are under construction and have been proposed or 
planned and which would increase the number of nuclear reactors to 575 and raise installed capacity from about 368.000 MWe to 
about 485.000 MWe (a 32% increase). 
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Table 5.2 World nuclear power reactors 2004-05 
Nuclear Reactors Reactors Reactors 
electricity operable under panned Reactors 
generation construction proposed 
2004 July 2005 July 2005 July 2005 July 2005 
billion %e No. MWe No. MWe No. MWe No. MWe 
kWh 
Argentina 7.3 8.2 2 935 1 692 0 0 0 0 
Armenia 2.2 39 1 376 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 44 .9 55 7 5728 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil 11 .5 3.0 2 1901 0 0 1 1245 0 0 
Bulgaria 15.6 42 4 2722 0 0 0 0 1 1000 
Canada 85.3 15 17 12080 1 515 4 2570 0 0 
China 47.8 2.2 9 6587 2 1900 8 8000 19 15000 
Czech 26.3 31 6 3472 0 0 0 0 2 1900 
Republic 
Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 600 
Finland 21 .8 27 4 2656 0 0 1 1600 0 0 
France 426.8 78 59 63473 0 0 0 0 1 1600 
Germany 158.4 32 17 20303 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hungary 11.2 34 4 1755 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India 15.0 2.8 15 2993 8 3638 0 0 24 13160 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2000 
Iran 0 0 0 0 1 950 1 950 3 2850 
Israel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1200 
Japan 273.8 29 55 47700 1 866 12 14782 0 0 
Korea DPR 0 0 0 0 1 950 1 950 0 0 
(North) 
Korea RO 124.0 38 20 16840 0 0 8 9200 0 0 
(South) 
Lithuania 13.9 72 1 1185 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mexico 10.6 5.2 2 1310 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 3.6 3.8 1 452 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pakistan 1.9 2.4 2 425 0 0 1 300 0 0 
Romania 5.1 10 1 655 1 655 0 0 3 1995 
Russia 133.0 16 31 21743 4 3600 1 925 8 9375 
Slovakia 15.6 55 6 2472 0 0 0 0 2 840 
Slovenia 5.2 38 1 676 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 14.3 6.6 2 1842 0 0 0 0 1 125 
Africa 
Spain 60.9 23 9 7584 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sweden 75.0 52 10 8857 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland 25.4 40 5 3220 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4500 
Ukraine 81.1 51 15 13168 0 0 1 950 0 0 
UK 73.7 19 23 11852 0 0 0 0 0 0 
USA 788.6 20 103 97838 1 1065 0 0 0 0 
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2000 
WORLD 2618.6 16 440 367,684 23 17,431 39 41,472 73 58,145 
Nore: Building/Co nsrrucr ion = firsr co ncrere for reacro r poured , or major refurbishmenr underway 
Planned = firsr concrere for reacror pou red , or major refurbi shmem underway 
Proposed = clea r inrenrion bur sri ll wirhour funding and/o r approvals 
ll1e world tota l includes 6 reactors on Ta iwan wirh a comb ined capacity of 4884 MWe, wh ich generated a tora l of 37.9 billion kWh 
in 2004 Source: World Nuclear Association, 2005. 
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Assumption 6 Clean coal technologies will take a giant leap forward. Gasification of coal, modern pulverized coal combustion, 
electrostatic precipitators and other forms of Clean Coal Technologies (CCT) make the use of coal nearly as 
clean as natural gas, while still being price competitive. CCTs are widely implemented in energy production. 
Current conventional coal-fired power generation normally takes place via pulveri zed coal combustion (PCC): coal is pulverized in to 
a powder and burnt in a high temperature fornace to heat water and drive a steam turbine. 90 per cent of present coal-fired capacity 
uses this technology. Circulating Auidized bed combustion (CFBC) makes up for the remaining share. 
Except for the C02 pollution associated with the use of coal, other environmental concerns are emissions of particulates, S02 and 
NOx . Also for these emiss ions there is clea r evidence of improvement through technologi es which deal with particulate emiss ions 
(such as ash from coal combustion , electrostatic precipitato rs, fa bric filers, wet particulate scrubbers and hot gas filtration systems) and 
which reduce and in some cases eliminate SOx emissions (the most widely used technology being wet scrubbers). These technologies 
are now being applied in both industriali zed and developing countries. 111e same holds for technologies to cut NOx emiss ions, 
although these are less prevalent in developing countries. 
As far as particulates are concerned, Figure 5.9 shows improvements achieved at a power station in South Africa by mea ns of electrosta-
tic precipitators (ESPs). ES Ps use an electri ca l fi eld to create a charge o n particles in the Aue gas, so that the particles are attracted to 
collecting plates . This technology ca n reduce over 99 per cent of parti culate emiss ions. In the case of the Lethabo Power Station, the 
precipitators remove 99.8% of Ay ash , part of which is so ld on to the cement industry. 
Figure 5. 9 Particulate emission reductions at Lethabo Power Station, South Africa 
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With respect to S02 emiss ion reduction, the Aue gas desulphurization (FGD) technology ca n be effectively employed. This tech nology 
uses a sorbent, usually lime or limestone, ro remove S02 from the Aue gas. In 2003 FGD systems were insta lled in 27 countries and 
resulted in enormous S02 em iss ion reductions (WCI, 2004: 7) . As it is shown by Figure 5. 10, the cost of FGD units has significan tl y 
been reduced, at least in the USA. 111is, rogether with global concerns about the effects of acid rain, has led to the widespread utili -
za tion of these kinds of techn ologies. Major US utilities have ann ounced their in tention ro insta ll FGD systems in a number of their 
coal-fi red power stations. 
NOx red uction technologies include the use of low NOx burners, selective catalytic reduction (SCR) and select ive non-catalytic 
reduction (SNCR). The larter rwo technologies reduce NOx em issions by treating the NOx post-combustion in the Aue gas, whereas 
th e former technology, together wirh burner optimizarion techniques, is used to minimize the formation of NOx during combustion. 
The SCR technology has achieved 80-90 per cent of NOx red uctio n and has been app lied com mercially in Japan since 1980 and in 
Germany since 1986 (WCI, 2004). Nowadays, about 15 GWe of coal-fired SCR capacity is operatio nal in Japan and nearly 30 GWe 
in Germany, our of a roral of approx imately 53 GWe worldwide (WCI, 2004). 
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Figure 5.10 Reductions in FGD costs in the US 
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111e deployment and conti nuous enhancement of a range of advanced technologies allow for further reduct ions in the emiss ions of 
pollutants and improves effici encies of coa l power plants. These technologies include: Auidized bed combustion (F BC), supercriti ca l 
and ultra superc riti ca l (USC) power plant technology 41 and Integrated Gasificat ion Combined Cycle (IG CC). C irculating Auidized 
bed combustion (CFBC) is of particular va lue for low g rade, high ash coa ls rhat are diffi cu lt ro pulverize and which may have va ri able 
combustion characteristics, while sti ll ensuring low em iss ions of NOx and SOx. Presently, the first supercriti ca l CFBC plant is being 
esra blished in southern Poland; it is scheduled to beco me operational in 2006 with projected efficiency levels of around 43 per cent, 
which is about 7 per cen t higher than rhe current OECD average of 36 per cent. According to the World Coal Institute, CFBC is likely 
ro be the most amactive form of FBC technology and could thus achieve a se rious share of the global marker for power generation. 
Generally, supercritical power plants can achieve overall thermal effici encies of about 45 pe r cent, compared to a mere 30 per cent of 
traditional plants. Improvements in coal combustion efficiency dramatica ll y reduce emissions as Figure 5. I I highlights. When com-
par ing energy effi c iency rates of supercritical power plants with traditional o nes, C02 em issions are reduced by about 0.4 per MWh 
of electricity produced, whi ch comes down to 35 pe r cent. Generall y speaking, a one percentage-point increase in efficien cy reduces 
em issions by around 2 pe r cent (WC I, 2004: 6). 
In most countries supercritical plants are now commercial, with capiral costs o nly slightly higher than chose of conventional plant and 
with significantly lower unit fuel costs. In 2003 more than 400 supercritical power plants were o pera ting globa ll y, with a focus on rhc 
USA, Europe, the Russian Federation, and Japan (Paul , I 999: 1). Ch ina, rhe world's largest producer of coal, now app lies supercriti ca l 
plants as a standard for new plants. C urrently, nine superc riti ca l plants are in operation in C hina , with 16 under construc tion and a 
furth e r eight planned, altogether amounting to over 2 I GW of coal-fired capacity (WCI, 2004: 9). 
Figure 5.1 I C02 emissions per M Wh of electricity produced from coal at various efficiency levels 
So urce: WCI. 
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"ll1e further development and support of!GCC offers the prospec t of ne t efficiencies of 56 per cent and therefore its widening deploy-
ment w ill have an increas ingly favorable impact on the environmenta l performance of coa l (WCI, 2004: 9). Curren tly, arou nd 160 
IGCC planrs arc in operation worldwide. According to the National Mining Associarion, arou nd 16,500 MWe of IG CC is expected 
to be in operarion in the USA by 2020 (NMA, 2003). lGCC is deemed particularly important for the future as this technology may 
be the chosen parhway for the ultra low emissions sys tem of the future, using carbon ca pture and storage (see assumption 7), and as 
part of a furnrc hydroge n economy. In IG CC system s coal is not co mbusted directly but it reacts with oxygen and steam to produce a 
'syngas' composed mainly of h ydrogen and ca rbon monoxide. 111e syngas ca n be 'shifted ' to produce C02 a nd H 1, w hi ch ca n then be 
separated so thar the hydrogen is ava ilable as a clean fi.iel product for use in power generation via gas turbines and fuel cel ls. ll1e C02 
is then availabl e in a concentrated for m for capture a nd srorage. 
Finally, operational synergies ca n be achieved in using renewable energy resources (biomass-based options) in coal-fired power plants. 
Exis ting conventional coal-fired power stations ca n genera lly use berween 10 and 2 0 per cent of biomass w ithout modification. 
Furthermore, purpose-built coa l and biomass co-fired plants can also be constructed. 
"TI1e World Coal lnstirnte, th e IEA C lea n Coa l Cenrre and other institut ions are widely promoting CCTs. Although these technologies 
are presently still rather expensive, many research a nd marketing efforts are dedicared to support their developmenr (sec Box 5. 1 ). The 
coa l indusrry rea lizes that it has to invest in these technologies in order to survi ve in the lo ng run. 
Box 5.1 R&D projects 
Ultra-dean coal 
Engi neers in Nottingham are developing ulcra-clcan coa l chac could make power generacion 50% more efficienc and reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions by a third. When coal is dug from the gro und , ic conta ins about 15% mineral matter, including sulphates, oxides, clays, quartz 
and carbonates, which greatl y rescriccs its use. The chemical leaching process being developed promises to reduce this figure to less rhan 
0.1 %, meaning much greater efficiency per metric ton of coal and up ro 33% less C02 pollution from the power station. 111c main advan-
tage of ultra-clean coal is that it can be burned directly in gas turbines, reaching efficiency levels of arou nd 55%. This is a much better result 
when compared with traditional effic iency levels of about 37% (the OECD average). 
AD 700 Power Project, Europe 
The AD 700 Power Plane involves collaboration between the European Commiss ion and industry and is one of the projects financed by the 
EU's Fifth Framework R&D Programme. The project aims to raise effic iencies to 55% through ultra supercritica l technology, resulting in 
lower fuel co nsumption and a reduction in C02 emiss ions of almost 15%. 
CANMET Energy Technology Centre, Canada 
Ac the CAN MET Energy Technology Centre, clean coa l R&D focuses on a number of areas ... lhese include research into oxy-fuel com-
bustion, so that Aue gases from power stations might be made C02 rich (rather than diluted with nitrogen form the air) to eliminate the 
capture step prior to sto rage; Auidized bed combustion of steam coals for reduction of acid precursors; and mercury emiss ion reductions 
from coal-fired power sta tions. 
COAL21 , Australia 
COAL2 1 is a major initiati ve of the Auscralian Coal Industry aiming ar "fully realizing the potencial of advanced technologies to reduce 
or eliminate greenhouse gas emissions associated with the use of coal." Furthermore, the program is also to exp lore coal's role as a primary 
source of hydrogen to power the hydrogen-based economy of the future. 
EAGLE (Energy Application for Gas, Liquid and Electricity) Project, Japan 
Tl1e New Energy and Industrial .. li::chnology Development Organization (NEDO) is undercaking a major project to develop coal gas ification 
for use in fuel cells. A pilot plant has been constructed, with a coal processing capacity of 150 ton I day, which aims to develop a coa l gasifi er 
suitable for IGFC. Deployment of IGCC-fuel cells in Japan in expected ro begin in 20 I 0, with rhe introduction of 50 MWe discribured 
power generacion installations, fo llowed by the incroducrion of a 600 MWe system for utility use by 2020. 
ZECA, USA/Canada 
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ZECA is researching the development of the hydro-gasification process, whilst also cooperating with researchers who are looking into 
mineral ca rbonation as a route to C02 disposal. 
The future improvement of coal extraction technologies in te rms of lower material use and fewe r environmenta l impacts will play a 
key role in dete rmining whether coa l ca n be rhe fuel of cho ice, especiall y in develo ping countri es where coal is largely ava ilable. Fo r 
example, extraction of methane from coal deposits instead of from coal would reduce both the material requirements and the overall 
environmental impacts (Nakicenovic et al., 2000: 29). Ext racted methane is ano th er abundant category of'unconvenrional' gas robe 
ex pl o ited in rhe future and which may support the attractiveness of coa l as a fuel. Ir is interest ing to nme in this rega rd that the US 
government recently released a policy paper in which rhe use of coal is promoted, albeit under rhe conditio n rhat the technologies 
used wi ll be consistentl y cleaned up. 
Assumption 7 Similar breakthroughs are realized in the process of capture and disposal of C02. Economies of scale and 
learning effects make this technology increasingly cost effective and contribute to the acceptability of using coal, 
especially for power generation, for meeting primary energy demand . 
Until a few yea rs ago, C02 capture and underground srorage (CCS) as a technology tO save rime in the transition cowards low-carbon 
energy sys tems has acquired little attentio n. Until recentl y, a relatively sma ll g ro up of experts discussed CCS technologies, with li ttl e 
public awa reness and support. 
Why has attention for CCS, also during climate negotiations, been so lirrle' In comparing CCS with the 'competing' storage techno-
logies ofl and use, land -use change and fo restry (LULUCF), which have received much attention in the Kyoto di scuss ions, di scuss ions 
have made c lear that the LULUCF option has problems with respect ro pe rm anence and measurement. CCS, in stead , seems to suffe r 
less from these problems because: 
l stared C02 ca n remain underground forever; and 
2 the monitaring of the starage is rel at ively easy, among others beca use, on the who le, the proven lea kage seems rather lim ited 
if nor negligible (certainly< 0.1 % p.a .) .42 
Moreover, unlike LULU CF, CCS does nor require scarce land, the use of which may co mpete with other soc ially des irable uses (e.g. 
food production). Therefo re, CCS has no opportunity costs (except for rhe few cases where sto rage capacity could be used tO sto re 
o ther gases). In fact, insofa r as CCS enhances oi l, coal bed methane or even gas recove ri es, its opportunity costs can be nega ti ve! 
Tentative LEA-data suggest that deep sa line aquife rs offer sro rage capacity of at leas t 1,000 Gt (but probably ten rimes more) and 
depleted oil and gas fields and unmineabl e coa l seams offer another approximately 1,000 Gt sto rage capacity. Acco rding ro the !EA, 
sto rage potential in depleted gas fields is much large r th an in depleted o il fields. -n1e rese rvo irs tend to be bigger, and there arc more 
of them . Total capacity is es timated at about 1,000 G r of C02, equivalem to almost 50 yea rs o f current global C02 emiss ions (see 
Table 5.3) . Theo retica ll y, underground sto rage capacity is therefore suffic ientl y large to capture all likely anthropogen ic C02 emis-
sions projected for the nex t 50-100 yea rs even if fairly pess imistic assumptions about future emiss ions are used (CCS also compares 
favorab ly with LULUCF in this rega rd ). 
Table 5.3 Natural reservoirs suitable (or storage of C02 43 
Sro rage option 
Depleted oil and gas fields 
D eep sa line reservoirs 
Unmineable coa l measures 
Source: IEA, 200 1; l EA, 2004b. 
GrC02 
1000 
400- 10.000 
> 15 
Global capacity 
% of emissions to 2050 
50 
20-500 
> l 
l EA scenarios, based o n the Energy Techno logy Perspect ives (ETP) model , suggest char in the scenario-specifica tions whe re a $50 / 
rC02 penalty is in troduced (during 200 5- 15 and 2020-30 in the industri alized and develo ping countri es respecri vely), the inrroduc-
rion of the CCS o ption in the model lowers cumulative emiss ions umil 2050 by about a quarte r as compared to those with out-CCS 
42 
It shoul d be mention ed rhough rhar sa Fery co ncerns are nor completely absenr. Concerns :1bout the saFety oF undergrou nd storage sri ll have ro be dealt wit h. The 
S:lmc goes For solvcnrs used ro capru re C02. These grad ually dcgr;idc in use and consequentl y suirable proced ures fo r dcsrrucrion/disposal need robe in place. 
43 Acrnal storage potenrial may be reduced as the pressu re ca nn ot be brought back ro the o riginal pressure and pans oF rhe reservoi r may be water-flooded. 
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scenario. The !EA further argues (2004a: 120) rhar if rhe same cumulative emission reducrion (as achieved in the scenario with CCS) 
were to be achieved without CCS, "the undiscounred cumulative systems cost[ ... ] increases by $11 trillion, or 63%". Although such 
outcomes are very sensitive for a wide range of assumptions and shou ld be taken with a grain of salt, it is altogether clear that CCS 
deserves active public support. 
CCS technology development may also have a wider app lication. Successful CCS requires further technology development and ap-
plication regime in formation ofC02 capture, transport and storage. Such information can also enhance knowledge of capture, trans-
port and storage of other GHGs, such as merhane, nitrogen or hydrogen. But probably more importandy, CCS cou ld ass ist rapidly 
develop ing countr ies with a large coal basis, such as China and India, in ach ieving benelirs in terms of GDP growrh, conrributing 
positively to mitigation, 'saving time', and having to rely less on foreign energy sources (and/or nuclear energy). 111is could be helpful 
in mitigating pending worldwide concerns about the security of energy supply and add to world stability. 
On the whole, the costs of capture and pressurization are typica ll y responsible for the bulk of the cosrs whereas C02 transport and 
storage costs are modest (although this can obviously differ from one case to another). Whether or not there is enhanced fossil-fuel 
recovery involved in the CCS activity (a lthough th is wi ll be the exception rather than the rule) also makes a large difference. Keeping 
all this in mind, the present costs of the fu ll CCS chain per metric ton C02 (if no-regrets options are disregarded) probably range from 
very little for a number of options, such as transporting and storing pure C02 residues from industrial processes, to E 40-80 for most 
other cases. Such costs are indeed considerable, but not insurmountable if serious public support wou ld enable progress with the CCS 
technology. It seems fair to assume that such costs could probably be halved over approximately the next 25 years (IEA, 2004b: 17). 
In other words, investing now in learning about CCS application in combination with C02 penalties could bring large-scale com-
mercially feasib le CCS with in reach within a decade, especially if coal prices remain low in comparison to other energy sources. 
Along tha t track, it seems logical to srarr with developing low per tC02 CCS options first, e.g. enhanced recovery projects or projects 
where pure C02 is released from industrial processes. T11e present problem, however, is to ger such activities off the ground in the 
absence of clear incentives for potential private invesrors ro do so. First, stable and predictable long-term public investment supporr for 
such technology developmenr has thus far remained very modest intemarionally, if not virtually absent. Second, it is even sti ll unclear 
how underground C02 storage can be dealt with in the Kyoto-regime. Indeed, insofar as the KP provides incentives for mitigation , it 
is as yet unclear how th is would app ly to CCS, irrespect ive of whether CCS would be set up as domest ic action (i.e. how CCS should 
be accounted for in national inventories), or as an elemenr of any of the KP flexibility mechanisms. Even in the EU ETS the ro le of 
CCS is sti ll unclear, because irs inclusion in the scheme would require national srorage moniroring and verification gu idelines, which 
are not (yet) in place. It seems feasib le, however, rhat incentives become more concrete and certain as rime progresses. 
Nowadays, about one million metric tons of C02 per year is being injected inro a deep saline reservoir under the Norwegian sector of 
the North Sea in conjunction with gas production from the offshore gas field Sleipner West. This project started in 1996 and marked 
the first instance of C02 being srored in a geological formation because of climate change considerations. In 2000 the saline aqu ifer 
carbon dioxide srorage (Sacs) project demonstrated that the injected gas remains in place instead of leaking out. 
Given its ea rl y experience on CCS, Norway might become a recipient of C02 from European counrries as the Norrh Sea provides 
ample space to store its em issions over the following centuries. The formation can store 600 billion metric tons of C02. To allow for 
such far-going cooperation, rhe Norwegian government established a national fund of €240 million (US $ 307 million) to stimu lare 
the development of technologies for C02 capture and srorage related to the use of natural gas. 
With C02 taxes levied as it is the case in Norway, this option could become commercia ll y interesting. The Sleipner West licensees 
would have had to pay about the same amount of money in taxes as they pay now for injecting the C02 and being more environmen-
tally friendly. 
Another potential storage medium is unmineable coa l. Despite a subsrantia l amount of coal-bed methane (CBM) already being 
produced in the USA and elsewhere, so fa r there is on ly one C02-enhanced CBM project, which is the Allison Unit in New Mexico, 
USA. Over 100,000 metric tons of C02 have been injected at th is unit over a three-year period. 
G loball y, resources have been dedicated to study the possibilities of this promising technique; the 'Carbon Sequestra tion Leadership 
Fonlln' being the most extensive. 44 Europe's Energy commissioner Andris Piebalgs has dedicated €100 million to sequestration and 
storage of C02 from coal and stimulates both European countries and utilities to invest in clean coal technology, hoping to estab lish 
a large, Europe-wide research project in the field. In the beginning of April 2005, the European Commission adopted the Seventh 
!iii 
Particiµating coumries are: Ausrrali ;1, Brazil, Canada, Colombi;i, Italy, India, Japan , Mexico, Norway, the People's Republic of China, Russia, rhe Un ired Kingdom 
and rhe US. 
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available in a large number of counrries, w ill regain prestige, especially supported by the inrroducrion of CCTs and CCS. Also rhe 
prestige of nuclear energy as a modern , foss il free, domes ti c power production tech nology may grow considerabl y. If using renewables 
becomes fashionable, especially in indusrri alized coun tries with governmenrs rhat consider renewables as a typica l way to express rheir 
willingness ro innovate, the overall result could be rh ar mass ive o il and gas impo rrs are increasingly perceived as something from the 
past. 
Obviously, also in rhis storyline oil and gas w ill remain impo rtant primary energy sources, bur the perception wo uld change with a 
declining share in the use of oi l and gas altoge ther. In fact, oi l use is projec ted to be increas ingly co nfined ro petrochemical industri es 
and transport use onl y, which is in line with rhe histo ri c trend . To illustrate, whereas in I 973 o il still accou nred for about 20 per cenr of 
US power productio n, it has now decl ined to less than I percent. Domestic hearing by o il has declined from o ne out of fo ur houses to 
o ne out of ren nowadays. A likewise trend - although slower - can be discerned in rhe case of transpo rtation. To an increas ing ex tenr, 
the o il industry faces competiti on from newly developed tech niques, the fuel cell being rhe ultimate ai m of many. "The road hereto 
remains unclea r, but rhe trend seems CNG/GTL. 
Assumption I 0 The gas sector increasi ngly faces problems in dealing with the challenges chat result from liberalization, 
internationalization, and re-regulation of the sector. As a consequence, the seccor increasingly faces problems 
of meeting demand condi tions, including chose with regard to the growing demand for flexibili ty. 
In this sto ryline, the gas sector performs in fact rather bad ly, wh ich is also detrim ental to its image and adds to rhe perception chat gas 
muse be considered a fu el from rhe past, rather than of the future. 
111e first argument has already been ourlined and bo il s down to the poinr that an increas ing tendency rowards self- rel iance leads to a 
domination of coa l and nuclear energy in global power production. Oi l wi ll defend its market share and increas ingly focus on trans-
port. Governments will primaril y focus on rhe environmenr/innovarion nexus, which may also benefit renewables. In thar sto ryline, 
natural gas may only achieve a modest marker share in transport, hea ting and power productio n , and w ill bas ica lly be rhe los ing fuel 
in the big battle of the primary energy carri ers. 
Second, it should nor be ruled o ur that the li bera lization trend wi ll lead co increas ing securi ty of supply concerns (SoS) among the 
public wh ich furrher undermines the role and reputati on of natural gas. Nor o nly have libera li zed markers been characte ri zed by more 
price vo latili ty so far, bur also, and probably more importantly, by increasingly less SoS. So me exa mples of incidents in libera li zed 
energy markets may serve as an illust rat io n. -n1e tra nsiti onal policy regim e in the European Un io n and the USA has already caused a 
number o f incidents, especially in the electri city secto r, the most notable exa mple being shortages an d blackouts in lraly (UCT E) and 
in No rtheast America, both in 2003. The liberalization t rend on the gas m arke r puts a sim ilar pressure on rhe gas marker pl aye rs to 
be as competitive as possible, which has already resulted in a number of crises in rhe gas secto r as well (e.g. rhe 200 I Ca li fornia cri ses 
and rhe 2003 London cri sis). 
Figure 5.13 More efficient use of assets: North American pipeline capacity 
Source: !EA, 2004a. 
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One of the underlying reasons why the SoS situation would get worse through marker liberalization, is rhe decreasing availability 
of information for marker players about future marker developments, so rhar traders will increasingly rend ro focus on short-term 
profit making and increasingly act in an unpredictable manner. In fact, gas infrastructure planners may obtain fussy information 
from the marker, because of active speculation and arbitrage next ro 'normal' trading. 'This could lead ro wrong invesrmenr decisions, 
i.e. investing too much or too lirrle, in rhe wrong manner, and/or with a wrong timing. Such decision making by TSOs can be 
furthe r complicated if regulators have their own targets, for instance, to discipline rhe TSOs. A fundamenral problem wirh marker 
liberalization is that rhe resulting loss of information available to invesrmenr planners makes rhat theoretically past SoS levels can only 
be maintained with more investmenr capacity and therefore higher levels of invesrmenr in infrastructure. It is questionable whether 
such higher invesrmenr levels will materialize in actual practice in liberalizing markers. As Figure 5.11 shows, investment in rhe US 
liberalized market seems to be dangerously low, which could lead to transport capacity bottlenecks and therefore SoS problems. 
Finally, rhe role of natural gas may also be affected by an increasing concern about depletion of gas reserves during the next few deca-
des. Such concerns do not necessarily have to relate to global reserves, bur instead to reserves which are considered to be under control, 
i.e. domestic reserves or reserves within allied nations. Dara for gas reserves presented by the industry, unlike public data, do nor show 
that reported reserves have increased since the early 1980s (about 600 Tcf). Shell presented similar data in its 2001 report 'Energy 
Needs, Choices and Possibilities - Scenarios to 2050', which estimates ultimately recoverable convenrional gas resources at 15,000 
- 20,000 EJ and unconventional gas resources at another 13,000 EJ. 111ese resources could support 3% annual growth for some 25 
years on ly. In addition, earlier optimistic estimates regarding unconventional gas, e.g. from hydrates and clathrates, have substantially 
been adjusted downwards. Also the recovery rates of most gas fields do nor allow for much further improvement. 
Assumption 11 Governments are increasingly influenced by public opinion and green NGOs and particularly try to specify and 
achieve mitigation targets and targets with regard to the share of renewables in energy production and 
consumption. In this world, there is increasing pressure not to use gas as a transition fuel, but rather to aim at 
a mix of renewable technologies along with clean or zero-emission power plants, irrespective of the underlying 
fossil fuels. Consequently, gas will not succeed in acquiring an accepted status as the transition fuel of 
the future. 
To an increasing extent, the public focus on the environment and innovation reduces the acceptability of incurring high costs related 
to changing the currenr fossil fuel dependency by switching from one fossil fuel to another, especially in the Western world. Green 
NGOs and other pressure groups point our that replacing coal and oil with gas is just 'a trick' to postpone action and that fuel-switch 
acmally slows down innovation towards sustainable energy systems. 111e past resistance from the same green NGOs against the Kyoto 
flexibi lity mechanisms was in fact largely based on the same argument, namely rhar rhe use of these mechanisms would eventually 
postpone rhe need for domestic adjustments and reduce the focus on domestic efficiency improvement and introduction of renewa-
bles. Such pressure could, in combination with a concern about energy import dependence, increase governments' receptiveness of 
this argument. 
A recent Eurobarometer survey, the first survey of public attitudes to the environment across the enlarged EU-25 region, revealed 
Europeans' stance towards the environment in relation to both economic and social policies. In fact, the respondenrs want policy 
makers to consider rhe environment an equally important issue as economic and social policies (EC, 2005). Climate change and air 
pollution are among the environmental issues that citizens worry about most. Environment commissioner Stavros Dimas: " ... This 
survey is proof that European citizens care greatly about their environment, and believe that it is intrinsically linked to working to 
deliver a high level of environmental protection ... " 
Assumption 12 There is a growing perception that natural gas poses serious security risks, which is particularly related to the 
international transport and storage of gas. Terrorist attacks or other means of violence, e.g. based on national 
conflicts, turn out to pose a major threat to LNG ships and terminals. Also major gas pipelines are vulnerable. 
Compared to almost all other forms of energy, gas is perceived by far as the least safe and therefore less suitable 
for international transport, especially in off-grid systems. This seriously limits the volumes of international 
gas transport and therefore trade. 
As will be ourlined in Chapter 6 (see for instance Figure 6.8 and Table 6.1) international LNG trade is perceived by some as sur-
rounded by a serious security risk. 
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Chapter 6 
Underinvestment Storyline 
6.1 General description 
In th is storyline it is assum ed that for the period up to 2040 there are no clea r trends with regard ro: economic growth in the var 
regions, energy efficiency, the use, availability, acceptabili ty, and accessibi lity of particular energy sources, energy prices, or even 
direction of climate and other environmenra l policies. Consequently, there is a serious lack of certa inty and convict ion as to wl 
where, and how much inves tment wou ld be required to secure a reliable and sufficient energy supply. Taking in to consideration 
huge amount of resources and finan ce, as well as long lead rimes involved with most energy production and transport projects, 
lasting un certainty about energy world development para lyzes investment borh in exploration/ex ploitation and international em 
transport capacity. 
This uncertainty is furth er increased due to limi ted inform at ion about the size and direction of internationally traded energy fl 
(and LNG in particular), which is ca used by the liberali zat ion trends that increasingly characterize the va rious national and regi1 
energy markets. For insta nce, the unpred ictability of gas supply conditions is enlarged by th e replacement on the international 
marker o f allocation based on long-term, well -defined, government-controlled contracts with allocation via an anonymous o 
market system. This developmenr also increases the risks related to potential in ves tments. Also other uncertainties, such as the r 
for Aexibili ty services, the relevant regu lato ry regimes, the poss ibility of producer ca rtels, security risks due to international con 
or terrori sm, bilatera l contracts with o ther des tinations, etc., add to the overall picture of a world where co nfusion about the en• 
system is significanr, thereby making marker parties rel uctan t to inves t. 
The main result of the above will be underinves tment, which crea tes secur ity of supply problems for end-users. Even if potential en• 
supply remains avai lab le at acceptable conditions, it will quite often no t be ab le to sa ti sfy demand because of a lack of infrastruct 
Since a reliable infrastructure requires that all links in the chain are equally strong, the fact that some links are controlled by gov• 
menrs/ regula to rs and others by private secto r enrities on ly without a clear coordination mechanism between the va ri ous acto rs, ere 
a considerable ri sk thar the overall chain is too weak to serve rh e market properl y. 
6.2 Assumptions and rationale of the Underinvestment Storyline 
Assumption 1 There are no clear trends with regard to regional economic growth. Just as in the 1980s and I 990s, internati< 
financial crises occur at irregular intervals due to major economic disequilibria; in addition as time progre 
the supply of particular commodities and environmental concerns may impose sudden limits to economic gro 
in particular industries/regions. As a consequence, there is continuous confusion as to whether form 
perceived growth trends of particular regions can be sustained in the future . The related boom-bust cycles in 
investment generally feed into the energy sector, as well. 
Because of the clea r link between th e overall demand for energy and overall economic growth, economic growth proj ections are' 
so urces of information for investors in the energy secror. A number of organizations generate long- term eco nomic growth projecri1 
such as rhe World Bank, OECD and IM F. On the whole, base-case project ions do not dev iate much from exrrapolations of ' 
trends. However, long-rerm investo rs, nex r to necessa ry knowledge of the most likely authoritative economic development p rojecri1 
to know the likelihood that the picture will be much different due to unforeseen events, such as: political instability/conflicts, 
eseen policy action, sudden marker instability, technology breakthroughs, etc. Although it is beyond the scope of this report to 
sively deal wirh the srabiliry oflong-rerm growth projections, ir may be worthwhile to just briefly discuss a number of past even rs 
l seems to have had a severe overall growth impact and which show that, unexpectedly, things can eas ily rurn out differently. 
pies of events which bad a pervasive economic impact during rhe last few decades are: the 1973/79 oil crises; rhe 1982 Latin 
ica n financial crisis; the 1989 fall of the Berlin wall; rhe 1990/91 Gulf War; rhe 1997 Asian crisis; the 2001 9111 terrorist at-
and the subsequent war in Iraq in 2003/04. In other words, past experience suggests that each decade shows a number of large 
)ecred disruptions which have a potential impact on economic growth perspectives in at least parts of rhe world. 
ig the most risky factors for economic growth are significant macro-economic disequilibria, which eventually lead to abrupt 
rments. Financial crises are probably rhe clearest examples of rhe latter: according to rhe IMF, from 1975 to 1997, 158 currency 
li 5 and 54 banking crises 46 occurred, of which the 1982 Latin American debt crisis and the Asian currency crisis of] 997 were 
1bly rhe most severe ones. The first one resulted in a lasting economic setback in a number of developing and industrialized 
:ries, and threatened to undermine the stability of the international banking system. The latter crisis evenrually had a less severe 
>m ic impact, bur nonetheless caused dramatic economic disturbances throughout Asia and nervous responses on worldwide 
: ial markers, as well as a temporary reduction in economic activities in some industrialized countries. Because the underlying 
·s leading to financial crises are still intact, ir seems likely rhat financial crises will occur again in the furure . The risks that such 
escalate into worldwide economic shocks therefore still exist. Moreover, according to the IMF, crises during the last two decades 
different nature than those in earlier decades because of financial innovations and the increased integration of global financial 
ets during the last two decades. The latter leads to more pronounced and far-reaching spillover effects and a contagious spread 
ses (IMF, 1998: 74). 
' ience shows that the trend of economic progress can change so sudden ly that rhe relevant stakeholders are insufficiently prepared 
nay even carry our counterproductive policies. An example of this is the post-WWII development of rhe Japanese economy 
a significant growth during forty years: during rhe period 1951-1973, Japanese GDP growth reached about 9 per cent per year; 
~ 1980s annual growth was about 5 per cent. Then, after the stock market collapse and banking crisis in 1990, the economy 
ated and came to a factual standstill during more than a decade. Only recen tly authorities stem to have succeeded in reversing to 
ingful positive economic growth figures. 
her, opposite, example is the USA, where trend growth has accelerated from levels of around 3 per cent per year during rhe 1960s-
s to levels close to 4 per cent since rhen. This acceleration has come ar the cost of a current account deficit that accumulated to 
::; per cent of GDP in 2005-06. Without changes in growth rates, patterns of demand , or relative prices of different countries' 
n, projections show an increasing trade deficit, which may even culminate to over 10 per cent in 2010. The unprecedented high 
t is by many considered a non-sustainable situation that may require future correction and which could affect the long-term 
rh trend of the country. 
he r example is Germany where average economic growth figures of around 3 per cent per year during the 1960-80s reduced to a 
1 lower growth trend of about I per cent for a considerable number of years after the German reunificatio n. 
mption 2 The debate on the anthropogenic factor in the climate change issue continues during the post-Kyoto period. 
Also the question what the overall cost of climate policy and climate change damages to society amount ro, given 
the adaptation potential and costs, remains on the agenda. Consequently, a clear direction of the international 
climate policy regime concerning the period up to the year 2040 and a clear direction of the carbon credit prices 
and national policies and measures are lacking. 
1 fact that the average global temperature rose with about loC during the 20th cenrury. A large number of scientists argue that 
ncrease in temperature has contributed to the thawing of the permafrost, the rise of ocean levels and extreme weather events. In 
ion, many experts argue that further increases could seriously disrupt ecosystems, agriculture and human lifestyles (IPCC TAR 
I- ITT, 2001; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report, 2005). A number of disputes remain , however. First, some experts keep 
~ urrency c ri sis occurs when a specularive :irrack on rhe excha nge value of a cu rrency resulrs in a dcvaluarion (o r sharp depreciation) of the currency, or forces 
: au d1orirics ro defend rh e cur rency by expend ing large volumes of international reserves or by shMply r<li sing interest rares (IMF, 1998). 
1a nking cri sis refers to a sit:u ;Hion in which acrnal or porenrial bank- runs or -fa ilures induce banks rn suspend rhe internal converra biliry of their liabilities or 
ich co mpels the government to intervene ro prevcnr this by extending ass istance on a large scale (IMF, 1998). 
questioning to what extent the actual cl imate change ca n be attr ibu ted to anthropogenic, as opposed to natural factors. Second, t 
is no clear picture of the expected net damages due to climate change, because, depending o n the regio n, there may also be signi fi 
ga ins, and the regio nal impacts of climate change are less certain. Third, as there is no consensus o n the method for valuatio n 
overall assessment of a number of potential damages (e.g., ecosystem loss, increased frequency of diseases, casualties) is diffi, 
Fourth , there is no clea r picture of the ri sks of sys tem insrabili ry and consequent chances of climate change acceleration. Fifth , 
nor yet clear what the overa ll economic cos ts of mitigation regimes amount to and how such costs relate to adaptation action. Si 
there is no consensus on the prio ri ry that should be given to climate change in comparison with other ta rgets when allocating resoL 
(these other targets may turn out to be more cos t effective, at least on the short run). Finally, in the absence of clea r and internario1 
accepted and enforceab le in centive systems, there is no generally accepted solu tion to rhe free- ridin g problem of any internat i· 
cl im ate policy regime, i. e. countries may use a range of arguments why they should commit less or nor at all to policy action. 
The above explains why rhe creat ion of a first climate policy regime has been a fa irly lengthy and cumbersome process. Since it se 
unlikely that the disputes menrioned above will be solved in a genera lly accepted manner in the foreseeable future, significant s 
forwa rd beyond the Kyoto Protocol regime may be equally time-consuming and difficult, especially if different economic circ 
stances and public perceptions apply. ll1e various official and unofficial di scussions about a potential post-Kyoto regime have 
provided a clea r picture of the future system so far (i.e. by earl y 2006); ideas range from much stricter and enforceable targets base• 
cap-a nd-trade systems with a broader country coverage and effective anti -free rider regime, to systems based on weaker commi tm 
and (voluntary) action o n particular policies and measures instead. Surpri singly, whereas the EU o ri ginally preferred a regime base• 
po licies and measures but later embraced a cap and trade scheme, the USA, instead, seems to fo llow precisely the reve rse route. 
Irrespective of the future climate policy developments, the strictness of the climate regime will ultim ately dete rmine marker incen1 
for mitigation and innovation towards greener energy sys tems. Thus, the absence of a clea r trend on th e stri ctness of an evol· 
post-Kyoto regime would automaticall y lead to uncertainties abo ut incentives for accomplishing a transition towards a carbon-
energy sys tem. 
Uncertainty may furth er increase due to rhe fact that experiences on a smaller scale have so far demo nstrated that small shifts 
climate policy regime may have fa r-reaching implications for the resulting incentives . For insta nce, when in the framework of 
EU ETS during 2004 the subseq uent na tional allocation plans (NAPs) of rhe several EU members were submitted to the Euror 
Commiss ion, the cred it prices o n the forwa rd marker responded strongly as soo n as a particular NAP was perceived as strict or leni 
Also, when in the summer o f 2005 droughts in Spain halved hydro capacity and increased reliance o n foss il fuel energy product 
the co untry was expected to face diffi culti es with complying with its EU ETS target, which caused EU-wide credit prices to resp 
very heavily and to increase from about € I O,-/rC02 to levels of about €30,-/rCOz in July and slightly above €30,-/r C02 half 
Apri l 2006. At the end of April , however, prices fell again co nsiderably fo r various reasons (see assumption 3.5 and Figure 3.4). ~ 
exa mples illustrate that small , so metimes unforeseen market changes can eas il y lead to rather vo lat il e em iss io n penalties. 
Assumption 3 In the absence of a clear and convincing climate policy direction, energy efficiency trends remain on averag 
they were in the past. 
First, rhe long-term past trend of energy effi ciency improvement seems to be rather robust. Data fo r countries with long-term 
t: isrica l records show improvements in rota! energy intensities by more than a facto r of 5 since 1800, whi ch correspo nds wi ll 
average decline of total energy intensities of about 1 per cent per yea r (Na kicenovi c et al. , 1998). In most Wes tern countries this fl 
changed to an nual ave rages of about 2 per cent between the mid- I 970s and 1990s, which was most likely due ro rhe probab ly E 
unique, unexpected about 5- 10-fold increase in oil and energy prices during char period. After that, however, oil prices came d, 
co nsiderably without majo r rap id changes. O nly during 2004-2006, oil prices quadrupled again, which makes the present oil r 
hike comparable to what happened during the 1970s. 
Histo ri c evidence therefore sugges ts that without any other co nsiderable incentives, a development rowards an energy effic ic 
improvement wh ich is significa ntly higher than the approximately I per cent histori ca l trend , seems unlikely. Wi th a view to 
Nakicenovic et al. conclude, based on three global energy future cases, that (until 2050) "rhe overa ll global average energy inter 
reductions vary between about 0.8 and 1.4% per year. 111ese figures bracket the historical rate of approximately I% per year exper 
ced by the more industr ialized countries during the past hundred yea rs" (1998: 40). 
ll1e ques tion remains whether even a quite wel l determ ined internatio nal climate policy regime may be capable of se riously altc 
this past trend. Assuming that much o f the new incentives based on co ncern for climate change wil l bo il down to cred its, car 
ions penalties, or equivalent incentives, it should be born in mind rhar a credit of about$ LO,-ltC02, adds only about US $5,- per 
to the marker oil prices (assumed carbon content of oil: 85%; conversion factor C02 to C: x3.6; 1 barrel: 159 liter). 1hus, even 
.lit prices would rise to $50,-ltC02 levels , this would add merely about $25,- to the oil per barrel price. 1his impact would, in 
Tms, still be much smaller than the price development observed in the 1970s, and also clearly less than the 'spontaneous' marker 
1 price hike since 2004. 
1d, the largest potential for progress in energy efficiency improvement seems ro exist in the formerly centrally planned economies 
ral and Eastern Europe). Total energy intensities in China, the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central Europe range on average 
·en I and 2 kgoe per US (1990)$. In comparison, average energy intensity levels in Western regions are well below 0.4 kgoe. Ir 
fair to conclude that the relatively high energy intensity levels in the formerly centrally planned economies are linked to the 
io n of low and subsidized energy prices for the own population in these countries. Such practices are gradually being removed 
s region, although the speed of abandoning such traditional policies is severely limited by political acceptance factors or even 
:al system stability. Progress towards more market-based energy prices with incen tives to improve energy efficiency may therefore 
atively slow. 
, the potential to adjust the energy mix in poor countries must not be overstated. Traditionally, non-co mmercial energy repre-
abour half of the primary energy use in such countries (with an even larger share in final energy use). Past statistics suggest a 
·elation between modern energy forms and technologies and GDP per capita levels. On average, only at income levels well above 
10 - $6,000 per capita modern energy systems can be found, which is significantly higher than the present income levels of the 
·ity of the world population and which will most likely not be reached during the time frame considered in this study. 
h, it may be more difficult and costly to furth er increase energy efficiency once relatively high levels of efficiency have been 
~d. A clear example in this respect is that of Japan where energy intensity has been historically low in the absence of significant 
:nous energy resources (as early as 1900, the Japanese total energy intensiry already amounted to about 40 per cent of the cor-
11 ding level in the USA!). TI1is may exp lain why in the course of rime the reduction in energy intensity in Japan has been smaller 
in the USA, and in countries with a tradition of energy subsidies rather than energy efficiency improvement (see Figure 6.1 ). 
projections suggest a rather limited scope for energy efficiency improvement in the foreseeable furure in countries that have 
rypical energy efficiency frontrunners. Moreover, insofar as energy efficiency improvement can be attributed to a shift towards a 
c-based economy, also this factor may run out of steam, simply because the services share in GDP already amounts to 60-80 per 
n much of the OECD, and will therefore nor grow much furth er. 
6. I Energy intensity reduction in four selected countries and FSU, historical development from I 850 to I 990, as a ratio of primary energy to 
lomestic product (MJI$) 
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Finally, rhc scope for energy effic iency improvement is sometimes overstated through data manipulation . In literamre on rh e rel 
rionship between energy intensity of production and GDP per capita levels, international compari sons are ofren made by focusi ' 
on energy use without including non-co mmercial energy and witho ut co rrec ting for internatio nal differences in purchasing po~ 
(PPP-co rrection). Based o n that analysis, it was suggested rhar energy intensity would increase in the low GDP per ca pita range a1 
substa ntially decline with increas ing GD P per capita levels. Such da rn may have led ro rhe impress io n rhar furth er eco nomic progn 
would almost automatically lead ro very significa nt energy effic iency improvements. 
Should rhe focus be on rota! energy use and inrernational differences in purchasing power be corrected for, energy inrensiry differern 
between countries wirh differenr welfare levels would turn out to be much smaller. 111e following figures illustrate what the data lo 
like when using rhis more correct comparison: the total primary energy use in rhe main regions with below US $ 3,000,- per cap 
income levels lies between 0.3 5 and 0.45 roe/1,000 $ (1990) GDPppp, whereas the corresponding figures in the Western regions : 
between 0.25 and 0.4 (Nakicenovic, G rLibler and McDonald , 1998: 19). 111e main exception to this overall picture is Central a 
Eastern Europe where this figure ranges from 0.45 to 0.75. 111e above sugges ts that, although there is considera ble scope for encr 
efficiency improvements (in kgoe/value added) with increas ing welfare levels in considerable pans of the world, this scope should r 
be overes timated. 
Assumption 4 In the international energy policy arena, the official authorities fail to adopt a consistent long-term view on r 
key issues of concern, whether this would be security of supply, energy market instability, insuffici• 
investment, or climate change and other environmental concerns. Moreover, the debate on whether ener 
supply shifts will favor coal, oil, natural gas, renewables, or nuclear energy, lacks a clear and internatiom 
common strategic position. Private investors suffer from this absence of a uniform vision, which on the wh 
will make them reluctant to invest in various elements of the energy value chain. 
Over the past few decades the focus of public concern rega rding energy has varied grea rl y. In rhe 1970s, due ro rhe oil crises, over 
helming attention was paid to the ava ilab ility of energy and to the issue of how energy price volatility could affect overall eco nor 
progress. This awareness led among others to rhe crea tion o f stra tegic energy reserves, OPEC counterforce, and diversifica tion 
exploration. In the 1980s policy makers became gradually awa re of rhe climate change ri sks of using fossil fuel. 111is resulred 
activities ro se r up an international climate policy regime and to promote rhe development and use of renewables, which culmina 
in the creation of rhe UNFCCC/KP/Marrakech Accords policy framework since then. In the 1990s marker liberali za tion became 
buzzword in several parts of rhe world, which led to significa nt regulatory, marker, and strucrural adjustment in the energy sector 
the 2000-2006 period, awa reness increased rhar the world may be running our of oil within an overseeable number of decades and t 
this could lead to se rious security of supply issues, which may increas ingly dominate international foreign relat ions. 111is notio n · 
reinforced by the sudden and unexpected energy price ri se during 2004-2006, which also conrributed to awa reness in various capi 
that successful access to the international energy market may require new initiatives and new forms of diplomacy. 
In short, over rhe last 30-40 yea rs, as fa r as the energy issue is concerned , borh rhe dominant topic of co ncern as well as rhe po 
agenda has frequently shifted back and forth and iris hard ro see why somerhing similar would nor be rhe case during the next 30 
yea rs. 
Many political systems, especiall y those with a democratic rradition, face the problem that a long time horizon for srraregic vi 
and subsequent po licy act io n is hard to inco rporate in the generall y much shorter political rime horizons. This explains why po li 
and measures are rarely gua ranteed as app licable for decades: policies and measures taken by one administration ca n be revcrsec 
the subsequent administration. 111is creates a narural problem for lo ng-term pri vate sector investments which are sensiti ve to 
policy regime. The sa me applies to regulatory regimes that may even be adjusted overnight, and can therefore easily undermine 
invesrmenr climate. Also rhe strong rradition of command-and-control po licies in the area of environmenr/energy is nor helpfL 
rhat regard , because it may more eas il y lead to unpredictable adjustments than under marker-based regimes. 
The following exa mples illustrate rhe above. 
• Whereas, during rhe seco nd half of the 1990s, the European Co mmiss ion tried very hard to introduce a Euror 
carbon/energy rax in rhe spirit of greening rhe tax regime (amongst o thers to deal with rhe climate and other environ me 
issues), rhe initiative was dropped as soon as it turned our ro be polirica lly nor (yet) acceptable and was replaced I 
ca p-and-trade regime, which was successfull y introduced in 2005 (rhe EU ETS). 
• "ll1 e Chernobyl accident of 1986 led to rhe decision in a considerable number of (Weste rn ) counrries not to sta rt 
inves tments in nuclea r energy capacity, and to close down the ex isting capacity in due time. Only a few decades I 
concerns about the availabiliry of energy have resul!'ed in the fact that some of these countries reconsider this position . 
• With the PROAICOOL program Brazil successfu ll y introduced the use o f sugarca ne alcohol as a commercial fuel at 
end of rhe 1970s. Wirhin some yea rs, due ro rhis program even 2/3 of rhe domesri ca lly produced cars ran on ethanol. 
However, inrernarional price oscillations led rhe program ro slow down in rhe 1990s, ro only regain srrengrh once aga in afrer 
2000 as soon as ethano l and gasoline prices were on rhe rise aga in and car manu fac rurers introduced so-called ' fl ex ible-fuel' 
cars, which can operate on either pure ethano l o r erh anol/gaso line blends. 
umption 5 Investments are held back, because the various countries in the world have no universal system to organize the 
market. Country-specific conditions, along with political considerations, determine what is locally perceived as 
the best market regime. Some regions opt for a far-going process of energy market liberalization combined 
with a privatization of all chains in the sector, whereas other regions prefer co maintain a significant government 
control and even ownership on exploration, exploitation, transport and trade, or elements thereof. Due to the 
mixed experiences with the gas market liberalization, earlier policy initiatives into this direction may occasionally 
be reversed, and vice versa. 
pi re rhe clea r recent trend rowards liberali za rion of rhe gas marker, especially in rh e Weste rn world , rhere is no r yer worldwide 
sensus as ro rhe overall ga ins of liberali zing rhe gas marke r under all circumstances. 
·ker liberali zation and regulation typicall y focus on jusr a parr of the value chain . Al rhough rhe mix va ri es widely depending on 
-specific circum sta nces, as a ballpark picture fo r rhe broad , ave rage siruarion , one co uld say rhar rhe end-use gas pri ce is fo r about 
·determined by rhe co mmodity itself, fo r I 0-20 per cent by transmiss ion ro the gas co mpany and storage, and for 30-40 per cent 
lisrriburion ro consumers. Tradirionally, rhe liberali zation and regulation regime of national governments o nly focuses on rhe 
- and downstrea m part of rhe value chain: ir t ri es ro reduce transmiss ion and storage cosrs by regulatory measures, and to reduce 
riburion and co mmod ity costs by supporting as much co mpetition, marker transparency and liquidi ty as poss ible. 
overall expecra rion is rhar regularory measures can reduce rhe transmission tari ffs, and rhar rhe vari ous liberali za tion measures 
1bundling ofTSO and traders, T PA, enrry-exir, fa ir balancing rules, ere. - will enhance comperiri on ar rhe internarional gas marker 
thus lower disrriburi on and commodi ty pri ces. Ir is expected rhar rhe ove rall resul r implies more marker rransparency, more 
ker liquidi ty, more internarionalized markers, and eventuall y lower prices fo r end-users. An additional expecrarion of such marker 
ra liza rion is rhar co mperirion in trading may reduce price vo latility because of profit-seeking acriviries of rraders: as soo n as prices 
Jerceived to be low, rraders acr as ner buyers and vice versa, rhus srabili zing rhe marker. 
li e mean rime, however, a number of experi ences and insights have creared so me doubrs about wherher this liberali zarion optimism 
be complerely jusrified. 
r, rhere is no convincing evidence rhar prices ar liberali zed markers have been sysremari ca lly and significantly lower and /o r more 
le rhan in rhe non- or less liberalized markers (see Figure 6.2). In facr, precisely rhose markers where liberalizarion was introdu-
fi rsr (i. e. rhe Anglo-Saxon world), experi enced se ri ous disrup rions during rhe last few yea rs (rhe California power/gas cri sis in 
01200 I and rhe London gas crisis in mid-2003), or signi fica nt price volatili ty (ea rl y 2006) . 
·e 6.2 International gas prices ($per million BTU), 1985-2004 
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Second, one has become aware rhat in practice regulation may eventually undermine investment in infras tructure. On the one han 
regulated TSOs, usually state-owned or state-controlled entities, are capable, using their strong market position, of adopting ti 
long- run perspective required for appropriate investmem decisions. On the other hand , regularors may be tempted - based on t 
perception, whether or not justified, that TSOs should be viewed as leas t efficient monopo lies - to pur pressure on th e TSOs so th 
the optimal investment levels ca nnot be reached (fo r more arguments see also : assumption 6). This risk manifes ts itself even strong 
as TSO revenues are often used by the State for general budge tary purposes, which hampers rh e TSO in spend ing sufficiently < 
long- term capital projects. 
Third , experience has shown that free access ro the gas trading market may also arrracr increased arbitrage and speculative behavi 
to rhe marker. Alth ough such action could stabilize markers, ir can also have a destabilizing impact, especiall y if traders rry to bene 
from specific infrast ructural bottlenecks. Some experts attribute some of rhe recent marker volatility or even security of supply pt 
blems ro specific behavior of traders. 
Fourth , rhe unbundling of the ownership of rhe infrastructure fro m rhe trading acti vity sys tematically reduces the TSOs' mari 
information. Because infrastructure invesrmenr will eventually be based on insight in the most likely future marker needs, TSOs ; 
less certain about the future use of their transport sys tems. 111is problem applies not only to the long term , bur may also apply in t 
short run, because the TSOs do nor know the nomination plans of rhe shippers. As marker integrarion causes gas Aows to switch m u 
more easily depending on the best returns, TSOs may have insufficient insight to clea rly assess optimal in vestment levels. 
Finally, th e market stabilization impact of liberalization may well be much less than in markets with relatively high supply and dema 
elasticities. First, most empirical studies suggest that gas dem and elas ticities are fairly low because gas is rather inevitable in te rms 
production and/or comfort. Second, supply elas ticities may also be low amo ng others beca use of the long investm ent lead rimes rl 
gas market supply typically face. 
In short, the original optimism about rhe benefits of gas market liberali za tion seems to have been replaced in some circles with am< 
cautious assessment, based on rhe concern that marker liberali za tion may, under so me circumsta nces, deteriorate security of sup r 
reduce market stability, and prevent appropriate infrastructure invesrment levels from being activated. 
111e o ngoing debate on the pros and cons of gas market liberaliza tion makes it hard ro see why markets would develop in a clear di r 
rion based on a broadly accepted view on optimal market conditions. This is the more so because national gas market conditio ns. 
well as the quality of the insti tutio nal frameworks, widely differ so that opt imal marker regimes would differ from country to coun 
anyhow. 
Assumption 6 The regulatory regimes in the various countries will differ accordingly. A typical problem is that regulators 
actual practice typically act on the basis of trial and error, which is caused by one of the fundame r 
characteristics of regulation, i.e. information asymmetry between the regulator and the subject of regulati• 
This may create conflict and uncertainty, add to the uncertainty that market players already face, and may 
itself act as a disincentive to invest in regulated assets. 
The essenrial role of regulators is to se rve the public interesr and keep transporr tariffs low. -n1ey can do so by putting regulatory p1 
sure on the 'natural monopoly', wh ich rhey general ly believe is represented by the T SO. If rhe TSO is independent from the regula 
the latter may suffer from information asymmetry, which may be reduced by transparency and information requirements imposed 
the TSO, bur cannot be removed completely. 111is di sadvantageous position of the TSO may ca use the regu la rory body to use r 
and error stra tegies to achieve the maximum result. 111e outcome of rhe in formation-regu la tion game is unpredi ctable, but may I 
ro situations of over- regulation , i. e. rhe set of res trictions may become so binding that the TSO wi ll in fact refrain from making 
investment wh ich is required for an acceptable SoS situation.47 This may not only apply to the use of rhe grid, but also to rhe 
of underground sto rage. With rega rd to rhe latter, a prescribed TPA regime with low rares may, for instance, prevent investment 
storage capacity from taking place, even if such capacity cou ld provide an essenrial element in en hancing SoS. 
Alternatively, the regularor may - in the absence of approp ri are and reliable marker information - aim at cost-plus based strategic 
far as the tariff for infrastructure use is concerned. Such a regime may act as an open invitation for rhe TSO to overinves r, i. e. in 
beyond the level required from a SoS point of view. In rhe end , rhe cos ts due to this over- investment will be born by the end-u 
via increasing transport tariffs. All this wi ll eventua ll y have an upward impact on rhe end-use price of gas. In theory, the tarifF·rai! 
impact of over- inves tments could reverse any possible downward impact on end-use gas prices caused by increased competition 
to market libera liza tion. 
47 For rhc d iAlcu lries historically facing regulatory decisions in e.g. rhe US, sec hnp://www. na m rJlgas.org/ rcgul arion/hisrory.asp. 
.umprion 7 For a number of reasons, the complexity of the investment decisions on major infrastructural projects will further 
increase in the future. This may in itself slow down the speed of investment decision-making, because the 
investment amounts, the international interests at stake, and the uncertainties and investment risks are 
becoming so large char it will be increasingly difficulr co organize sufficient support for actual investment 
decisions. 
: future proj ect investment needs in rhe worldwide gas sector are enormous. According to the IEA Reference Scenario (2003), 
1ual amounts will probably increase from the present levels of about $90 billion to about $ 120 billi on during th e 2020s (see Figure 
) . 
;se subsranrial investment needs in the gas secto r are evidently linked ro the projected large increase in demand for gas. The ln-
1ational Energy Outlook 2004 projects 1.8 per cent growth per yea r in the dem and for gas in the industrialized counrries during 
) 1-2025 and 3 per cenr growth in the developing countri es. In th e Asian region , growth is projected ro reach 3.9 per cent in Korea, 
per cenr in India and 6.9 per cent in C hin a. During the same period , gas production is expec ted to increase in Russ ia/FSU from 
6 te rn to 45 tern ; in the Middle East fro m 8 .3 tern to 18.8 tern ; in Africa fro m 4 .6 tern to 14 .1 tern; and in Central and South 
cri ca from 3.6 tern ro I 0.6 tern. 
re 6.3 Global gas investment (billion $ per year) 
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rhe Figure indicates, most of th e investment needs mentioned above wi ll be in exploration, bur such investm ent wi ll on ly be ef-
ive if transmission infrastructure is developed simulcaneously. 111e Figures below, representing the existing and poss ible futu re gas 
asrructure for Europe, C hina, and India, may serve to illustrate rhe enormous challenges that investo rs in gas infrastructure are 
ng in view of servicing the future gas market. 
a number of reasons, dec isions on such future infrastructure inves tment are ex tremely cumbersome and complex. 
t, the amoum of reso urces and organizational capacity in vo lved in such projects is ve ry large. For instance, the cos ts per km of 
1snarional gas pipelin es range from about €2.5 m under easy co nditions to about €5 m under more difficult conditions. Pipelines 
i a length of several hundreds of kilometers, including rhe additional compression equipment, therefore will cos t hundreds of 
li ons, if nor billions of Euros. 
ond , in the absence of any long-term clarity with regard to the position of the regulators invo lved in the TPA and tariffication 
me, it wi ll be difficult to make long-term projections of expected internal rates of return. 'D1e sa me lack of clarity app lies to the 
t-Kyoto regime and the direction of the liberali zation process. 
rd , if, e.g. in the spirit of libera li za tion , long- term contracts , which usually provide certainty about transported vo lumes of gas, 
no r effecri vely be implemented , it would become more difficult to establish lo ng- term IRR estimates. 
Fourrh. in add itio n to uncertain ry about future demand for gas, it is also uncerta in what the domi na ting transporration modes a1 
going to be. Expecta tions of which part of inte rnational gas Aows wi ll be transported via the LN G route and which pan through rl 
pipeline system differ widely: for more de tails o n LNG projec tio ns, see assumption 6. 10 next. Finally. and probably most imporra n rl 
any future competition in demand from the major industrial centers wi ll crea te dil emmas, and th erefore uncertainty, for investors i 
gas infrast ructure o n the d irec ti on in which the infrastructure would need to be deve loped to obtain max imum expected re turns. 11 
main future gas exporters are expected tO be Russ ia, the Middle Eas t , the Caspian G ulf area and No rthern Africa (see Figure 4.15 an 
4 .1 7). These a reas may require fore ign direct in ves tment (F Oi) in order to finance the necessary infrastructure in ves tment. All the 
regions m ay eithe r way face the question , nex t to how much inves tment is needed fo r domes tic purposes, to what ex tent infrastructu 
for gas delive ri es w ill primarily foc us on e.g. the northe rn Ameri can, the Europea n. or the As ian market. 
Consequently, w ith a view to the uncerta inties which typicall y characterize the future inte rnational gas market, it is quite undersca1 
dable why invesro rs o n average a re reluctant to rake firm investment decisions on new gas infrastructure. However, because grids o n 
work when connected, th e slowing down of a pa rticular investment ca n block a much lo nge r transportation route and the refore lu 
ser ious secu ri ty of supply complica tions. 
During the last few years, the world 's private o il majors do not seem to use al l fea sible resources for in vestment in new energy su 
ply systems. Oi l co mpanies, such as Shell , ExxonMobil , Chevron and BP are a ll ve ry act ively involved in share buy back sche1rn 
ExxonMobil for $24 bn sin ce the 1999 merger thereby reducing rhe number of shares outstanding by over 8 pe r cent; Shell ca ncel, 
62. 5 min shares since the beginning of 200 I ; BP bought back shares for an amount of $ 13.5 bn since 2000; C hevron will emba 
on a com mon stock buy back prog ram of up to $5 bn by 2007, and repurchased fo r more than $2 bn a t the end of 2004; and To i 
bought back shares representing 17 per cent of its cap ital during 2000-2004. So, in to tal, during the last few yea rs, approximately$ ' 
bn va lue of shares was bought back by rhese compan ies. Just to illust rate, if one assu mes a debt/equity ratio of I /3, such an amou 
could have financed an additiona l production capacity of 4 .7 min bbl/d oil o r 160 bn m3/year natural gas. 
Figure 6.4 Natural gas pipelines 
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1re 6.5 Natural gas infrastructure development in Asia and FSU 
umption 8 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
r-
;,~;b ... ., __ .. _, CHINA GolmudO 
:;/ oi~!amilbad ·; 
;\ ,' )' 
/ NcwO~lhl 
,·~.' 9:hongqing 
/NOIA OQili 
·')/ 
Aldan 
0 
Shovorodino 
0 
Pipelines 
Existing 
' TMYf:) 
7, 
I 
) 
JAPA/I 
Under Con$truction ----
Ga~ Fields e 
~~~c~~~~~~:uction ~I~ 
Given the mere absolute and relative size of the energy investments projected for the next couple of decades, the 
funding of such investment programmes will be increasingly difficult because of the increasing investment risks, 
the location of the investments, and the reduced involvement of public authorities in the financing of these 
investments. 
·ording ro rhe reference scenario of the World Energy Outlook (2002), the rota! gross investment req uirement for energy-su pply 
·astructure worldwide over 200 1-30 is about $ 16.000 bn, assuming an ave rage annual energy demand growth of 1.7 per cent 
1ghly half of this amount wo uld be required for maintaining the present system, the other half for serv ing the increasing demand). 
ave rage rhis would correspond with about I per cenr of world GDP, but for some regions this percenrage can be even much higher 
,. Russia: 5%, Africa: 4%). Abour $3, I 00 bn of the above amou nr relates to investment in the gas secto r, excl uding investments 
11ired ro meet rapidly growing power station fuel requirements. 
otentially complicating facro r in finan ci ng this investment is that about 60 per cent of the overa ll investment amounr for energy 
1tioned (about $9,500 out of the US $ 16,000 bn) is expected to be needed in the non-Western world , including: C hina ($2,300 
; the rest of Asia (about $2,500 bn); Africa ($ 1,200 bn); Middle East ($ 1,000 bn); Russia and other transition econom ies ($ L ,600 
; and Larin America (a bout $ 1,000 bn). Moreover, abour US $5,500-$6,000 bn of the non-Western world investment (about one 
d of the future global energy investment requirement) will have to be made to serve the local market, which may typically face 
d ing problems because: futu re finance will probably be provided by less-p red ictable private instead of public sou rces; domestic ca-
.I markers may be unab le to hand le the financing of such massive domestic projects (ro illustrate, Africa's investment requirements 
)lint ro about half of total domestic savings!); and foreign investors may be reluctant ro step in. 
; hard to see how governments of poor cou ntries, whose domestic capital ava ilability for such massive investments is insufficient, 
where much energy is now provided at low or even nega tive returns on capital, would be politically ab le ro change conditions 
icienrly o n rime with rewrns (taking the high risks into account) at levels to successfu ll y compete for financing on the inrernational 
ita l marker. ·111is could create serious future problems in a lloca ting investments where they are needed most. Moreover, it could 
siderably weaken the overa ll energy supply cha in , and worldwide market stabi lity. 
~11' as natu ral gas is concerned, potential problems of finan cing the about $3, I 00 bn investment req uirement may become equally 
acute, fo r the following reasons: 
- Since the average annual demand fo r gas and gas infrast ructure investment is projected to grow faster than overall ene1 
demand (2.4% vs 1.7%), an annual increase of some 300 bcm of gas production capac ity would be required; 
A similar, relatively strong, growth expecta tion applies ro projected power demand , while rhe share of gas in pov 
productio n is expec ted to ri se to a level of abo ut 40-45 per cent (assoc iated cumulati ve investment requirements for 1 
period 2001 -2030: US $4,000 bn); 
- 55 per cent of gas- related investmenr requirement is needed for explorarion, mainly in countries where ri sks are perceived 
above-average in te rms of the predictability of exchange ra tes, po li tical regime, economic po licy, institutional sysu 
characteri sti cs, ere. (see Figure 6.6); 
- Gas exploration w ill shifr to offshore fields , which is more capital intensive and requires additiona l investment; 
- In the gas sector the re will probably be a massive shift towa rds market internationaliza tion with a larger role for Li' 
(which could po tentiall y represent about half of interregion al gas trade by 2030), which requires ve ry substa ntial investm e1 
in new infrastructural capacity; 
- Also in the gas sector, market libe rali zat ion and regu latory adjustment have typica ll y increased uncertainties about invesnrn 
requirements in transm iss io n netwo rks, w hereas in many countries rh is has not yet led to higher inves tments in SL 
sys tems; 
- The introduction of renewables and decentrali zed sys tems, as well as rhe tendency for past investment in infrastructure 
rema in below required leve ls, inc reases uncertain ty and en larges investment requirements in transmission networks. 
So, should such financing bottl enecks appear in so me parts of the gas cha in in some regio ns, this could not o nly have socia lly un d< 
rable consequences, bur could also affect worldwide gas prices and price vo latility. 
Figure 6.6 Cumulative Investment in Natural Gas, 2003-2030 
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Assumption 9 A number of factors cause the attention on the gas marker to shift from servicing base load to servicing Aexib i 
demand. This may require considerable adjustments in gas infrastructure investment and may require m 
rapid investment action to service the market, the planning of which is relatively difficult. 
First, less predictable marker co nditions due to marker libera li zat ion wi ll lead to an increas ing dem and fo r Aexibiliry (seaso nal, day 
day, ere.), which is increas ingly di fficu lr ro meet. 
Second , the libera lizatio n of the gas market inc reases the competition for pea k load, so that, poss ibly also due to the market beha· 
of trade rs, prices on rhe Aexibili ry market become more vo latile. 
Th ird , fl ex ibility by production slows down in a number of regions and is increas ingly taken over by Aexi bility fro m storage 
poss ibly by Aex ibiliry provided via impo rts of LNG or otherwise. This will require considerable adjustment in gas infrasrruc1 
investment. 
Fourth, decentra li zed energy systems are g rad uall y gaining ground rhroughout the world, although experrs have different opin ion: 
the extent to which and how quickly this rrend will continue in the future (see also Box 6. 1 ). Wi th decenrralized systems beco1T 
increasingly important, the demand fo r Aexibi li ty th ro ugh rhe g rid o r otherwise may inc rease substa ntia ll y beca use decentral 
system s usually provide lirde Aex ibility. Demand for Aex ibility services in gas supply wi ll furrher inc rease when gas w ill be used 
bling power companies ro provide addirional Aexibiliry. Alrhough rhe scope of rhis developmenr is srill unclear, ir seems obvious 
rhis will also require invesrmenr in new infrasrrucrure. 
lox 6.1 On the scope of Decentralized Energy systems 
)ecenrrali zed energy (DE) sysrems show a long-rerm rising rrend. During rhe lasr few years, however, irs world marker share has 
1or increased much funher and amounred ro 7 .2 per cenr in 2004. Global insrall ed decenrrali zed energy (DE) capacity srood ar 
round 280 GWe ar rhe end of 2004, rhe grear proportion of rhis consisting of high efficiency cogenerarion systems (combined 
1ear and power, C HP) in rhe industrial and disrricr hearing secrors, fuelled by coal and gas and, ro a lesser exrenr, biomass-based 
uels. Some 32 GWe of rhis was added during 2002-04, mosr of rhis being 'non-renewable'-based cogenerarion. Unlike rhe 
ogenerarion marker, PV indusrry growrh rares remain very high during rhe sa me period; from abour 700 MWe produced in 
:003 ro almosr 1000 MWe produced and insralled in 2004, an approximate Forry per cenr increase. 
n rhe US, DE cogenerarion developmenr has been slowed down recenrly by high gas prices and regularory barriers; in rhe 
~ U rhe EU ETS and rhe 2003 Cogenera rion Direcrive may somewhar reverse the srandsrill in DE capacity developmenr; and 
n some developing coumries, notably Brazil based on new gas discoveries and India based on biomass, rhe expansion of DE 
ystems seems promising. 
) n rhe whole, future D E marker prospecrs depend cririca lly on rhe removal of elecrriciry marker regularory barriers and of 
rng-sranding incentives/subsidies for cenrral generarion. Sti ll , elecrriciry market regulatory frameworks stimulate this centra l 
1odel of generation and supply. 
ource: Based on WADE, 2005 . 
Aexibili ry on the imernational gas market will probably be srrongly affected by the projecred increas ing ro le of LNG. Whi le 
;- term contracts wi ll continue to dominare rhe LNG business in rhe foreseeabl e furure due ro in vesrmenr requiremenrs, spot sa les 
H-rerm or single-cargo sa les) are expecred to become more important. Between rhe late 1990s and 2003, rhe share of spot rrading 
loba l LN G trade grew from 2% ro alm osr 11 % (!EA, 2004a: 142). Several ships rhar are presently being builr are nor ea rmarked 
1arricu lar projecrs, and wi ll thus be ava ilab le for spar-trading opportunities. Mo reover, part of rhe capacity of some liquefacrion 
1rs builr in recent years, which is not covered by long- term contracts, will be ava ilable ro supply rhe spor marker. 
ems likely thar more Aex ible pricing mechanisms and shorrer-rerm conrracrs will become more common in libera lized markers. 
::; suppliers are already adapring rheir pricing policies ro the needs of individual buyers, including power generarors who have 
111 ro co ntracr for their LN G purchases direc tl y. 
ers may increas ingly push for less rake-or-pay ob liga tions, because assessing rheir furure needs wi ll be harder in comperitive 
kers. More contractual Flex ibility and more LNG trade will increase the scope fo r buye rs in different countries ro swap supplies for 
Tenr rime periods, ro take advanrage of differences in peak load, and ro minimize purchase cosrs. 
1mption 10 The share of LNG in the internationally traded volumes of natural gas will increase substantially. This will 
require significant and coordinated capacity investment in the several elements of LNG infrastructure. 
projecrio ns suggesr tha r rnore than half of the growrh in gas trade will be in the forrn of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). One 
ie reaso ns for rhi s is thar co rnperirion o n gas rnarkers will encourage sho rt-te rm trading, wh ich may stimulate rhe use of LNG. 
: rher wirh declining uni t transporr cosrs (see Figure 6. 7 for a co rnpari son of modes of rransporr) , LNG may beco me increasingly 
ular. LNG may also enhance the abiliry of buyers ro deal with a supply shorrfa ll by seeking alternat ive sources. "ll1e development of 
mon operating srandards covering safery, gas qua li ty and other rechnical factors will further help fosrer inrernario nal LNG rrade. 
Figure 6. 7 Cost comparisons among modes of gas transport 
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In 2002, interregion al LN G trade amo unted ro 150 bcm (abo ut 6 per cent of wo rld consumption and so me 25-30 per cent of 
interregio nal gas trade; f-or an illustration of rhe LNG Rows in 2004, see Figure 6 .8). !EA expec ts rhi s amount ro in crease to 250 bl 
in 20 10 and 680 bcm in 2030. ln case this would happen by 2030, more rhan 50 per cent of all interregional gas trade wi ll be in l 
form of LN G. 
During rh e last decade, the overall LNG infras tructure investment has already grown ro substa nti al levels: a t the beginning of 201 
there were 15 LN G ex port termina ls, 43 import terminals and J 54 rankers operating worldwide. In addition, 8 liquefaction rennin 
were expanded, 5 new o nes under construction , 8 new import te rminals built in rhe OECD regio n , 54 new LN G ships on order a 
some 30 new LNG sup ply projects planned (!EA, 2004a: 14 1 ). G lobal LN G liquefact io n ca pacity is ex pected ro increase ro 9.4 
per yea r in 2007, based o n fac ilities currently under co nstructio n. 
In terms of volum es, LNG trade has so fa r quite heav il y been concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan , fo r exa mple, was r• 
ponsible for 66 per cent of world LNG imports in 1990. In that year, LNG was only a marginal source of supply ro US markets . 
however, all these investment plans wi ll be materi ali zed, LN G trade will become a tru ly international phenomenon (fo r an overvi • 
of possible furure LNG routes in 2010, see Figure 6.9). 
lt sho uld be mentioned tho ugh rhat the oprim ali ry of LNG may be res tri c ted by particular phys ica l, marker and regulato ry cond iti c 
at various des tinations. In actual practice, this may require gas suppliers ro be suffi ciently Aex ib le by offering a var ie ty of deli v< 
modes and contract terms. 
ire 6.8 LNG export flows, 2004 
LJ h 1rnr1Hs 
L_ f1fll lOliM 
1rce: Eni, 2005. 
ire 6. 9 Possible future LNG trade routes (20 I 0) 
irce: BP, 2004. 
;umption 11 Security issues with regard to internationally traded gas are increasingly incorporated in investment decisions. 
Since, on average, the security situation has become worse, also in the main natural gas producing countries, 
security becomes a serious issue that may block, or at least retard particular investments, especially in LNG capacity, 
bur also in pipelines for gas and related infrastructure. 
nost all future gas Aow projections suggest that natural gas will increasingly Aow through politically unstable regions, irrespective 
-vhether transport wi ll take place via LNG ships or via pipelines (see Figure 6.9, 4.14 and 4.17). With time this will probably 
rease attent ion for security issues and create reluctance within the international investment community to invest in international 
transportation infrastructure. 
Table 6. 1 shows rhar, presenrly, a considerable volume of gas (over 70 bcm in 2002) is already rransponed wirh LNG carriers 1 
specifi c srraregic seaways which seem vulnerab le for rerrori sr ac tion. Projections show that this amount could show a five-fo ld increo 
to levels of over 350 bcm in 2030. Such frequent international shipment via strategic maritime channels may therefore crea te 
considerable future safety risk, nor only with a view ro potential terrorist attacks, but also because it increases the chances of any otl' 
accide11t with severe damage and casualty potential. These concerns may hamper in vestment decision-making - it seems likely tha 
serious disas ter with LNG infrastructure leads to a setback in investments, ar leas r temporari ly. 
Table 6.1 Oil and LNG tanker traffic through strategic maritime channels 
2002 2030 
Volume Share of Volume Share of 
oil (mb/d) global inter- oil (mb/d) global inter-
gas (bcm) reg ion al net gas (bcm) regional net 
trade (%) trade (%) 
Straits of Oil tankers 15 44 43 66 
Hormuz LNG ca rriers 28 18 230 34 
Straits of Oil tanker s 11 32 24 37 
Malacca LNG ca rriers 40 27 94 14 
Suez Oil tanker s 1 4 3 4 
Canal LNG ca rriers 4 3 60 9 
Source: DOE/EIA, 2004; IEA ana lys is in : IEA, 2004a: 11 9. 
ln fact, a number of accidents and incidents (A run Indones ia, 200 I ; Bintulu Malaysia, 2003; Skikda Algeri a, 2004; Bontang lndo1 
sia, 2004) have already taken place, which has shown thar in actual practice the LNG route can be vu lnerable. 
Assumption 12 As the actual and contractual gas flows will increasingly differ, TSOs will at some stage no longer be able 
properly serve the market . 
In the modern intern at ionalized gas marker, the use of gas swaps, hubs and trading deri vat ives is expected to increase significantly. 
a consequence, however, contractual and acrua l Aows will increasingly deviate from each other. Ar the same rime, it may become 
creasingly difficult in an inrernationalized market, e.g. due to the use of entry-ex it, ro differentiate between rransir Aows and Aows 
domes tic des tinations. Moreover, increas ing international arbitrage activities, by choosi ng the optimum from d ifferent internatio 
transportation routes, poss ibly supported by some speculative positions, could increas ingly complica te TSOs' efforts ro simultaneoL 
sa tisfy all conrracrs and the va rious rules and regularions set by the regularo ry authori ties. 111is may eventually lead ro securi ty of s1 
ply problems that are, just like security of supply problems due ro roo litrle investmenr in gas infrast ructure, nor related to probk 
with the ava ilabili ry of inrernar iona l gas suppl y. 
Assumption 13 In a liberalizing gas sector the traditionally integrated multinationals are increasingly being replaced wi t 
wider range of, to some extent, new enterprises which operate on the (international) gas market, including 11 
market players in the rapid ly growing developing regions. This restructuring of the gas sector requires m1 
attention and energy, which may cause reduced attention ro investments in new initiatives. 
G lobally, a process ca n be observed of natural gas market liberali zation rogerher with unbundling of gas infrastructu re and gas rr:1 
which will result in a fully competitive inrernarionalized market. For gas marker players this process has ca used a lower predicrabi 
of rhe marker in which they operate, with regard ro the ro les and respo nsibil ities of all parties invo lved in transportation and trado 
natura l gas. 
At the same rime, there seems to be a clear resrrucruring process going on in rhe energy industry, characterized by the crea tion of 1 
players based on a process of mergers and acq uisitions. 
s combination of, on the one hand, unbundling of activities and , o n the o ther hand , combinations of new en tit ies absorbs much 
rgy in the business , which may crowd out rhe required anemi on fo r invesrmen t in new infrasrructure projects . 111e resrructuring 
1 also affect co mpetition in such a manner that it becomes increas ingly diAiculr to coordinate massive imernation al inves tm ents. It 
Id also lead to the formin g o f che intern ati onal co nsorcia chat are typically needed fo r che substan tial inves tm ents in che sector. 
Summary 
For rhe next few decades, rhe gas industry appears ro have a fairly strong card ro be among rhe winners in terms of its share oft 
market of primary energy ca rriers. A number of facrors provide strong opportunities: natural gas is the clean es t of all hydrocarb1 
energy sources; it has very low emissions of pollutants such as parti culate matter, sulphur and nirrogen oxides, and the carbon dioxi 
emiss ions of burning gas are less than half of the ca rbon dioxide emined by burning coal. New technologies for co nversion of naru 
gas into elec tricity and other energy forms red uce and virrually eliminate mos t of the adverse environmental impacts . 
These advantages of narural gas as a source and energy ca rri e r have six imporranr implications. First, gas has a relatively favoral 
position when compared ro other fossil fu els in contributing ro the ongo ing decarboniza rion of global energy, simply because t 
ca rbon emiss ions per unit of energy are relatively low. Second, based on rhe same characrerisri cs, gas ca n be seen as one of rhe m< 
suitab le ca ndidates for being rhe transitio n fuel par excell ence in rhe rransirion rowards more susta inable energy futures. The f: 
that natural gas also fares well in terms of orher emiss ions than ca rbon dioxide furrher conrribures ro its relarively environmenra 
fri end ly image. 111ird , unlike oil, gas seems ro face much less serious reserve and resource co nsrraints , which may lower its rela ti 
price. Fourth, efficiency levels of gas combustion technology are among rhe highesr, and in addition natural gas is rather Aexible 
irs va rious applications. Fifth , compared to most orher primary energy sources including renewables, gas is relati vely easy ro sro 
and fin all y natural gas ca n be seen as a precursor to hydrogen and therefo re as a way to prepare for a long-te rm developmem rowa1 
alternarive energy systems. 
Thus, natural gas has a good ca rd ro play. H owever, one will not win the ga me automatically. First of all, orher fuels also have soi 
strong ca rds ro play, which may unexpectedly aire r the way the ga me evolves. Furthermore, the gas sector typically also faces soi 
threats that, if nor rackled wel l, may di srurb the game substa ntia ll y, rhe mosr severe rhrear probably being increas ing concerns ab( 
international security of suppl y, and fin all y it should nor be taken for granred rhar the gas indusrry will automatically rake the measu 
and inves tm ent decisions char are needed to subsranriare irs prospective increas ing role. 
As far as rhe first th rear, security of supply probl ems, is concerned , it needs to be acknowledged rhat the narural gas import dep( 
dence of many regio ns and countries is projected to increase substa ntiall y, while supply is likely to be increasingly co ncentrared i1 
limiced number of counrries and coming typ ica ll y from regions wirh vulnerab le political systems. Also, rhe imernarional gas rransp• 
infrasrructure, particularly as far as LN G is co ncerned, seems ro be increas ingly susceprible to ri sks of accidents o r even attacks 
rransporr bottlenecks and other supply interruprions. Also rhe facr that internatio nal pipeline systems will connect a number of c 
ferenr countries adds to the infrasrructu re vulnerability. 
111e seco nd rhrear ro rhe prospecrive stro nger role of narural gas srems from rhe face that compering energy sources such as for insra1 
coal, nuclea r and renewables will nor rema in pass ive. Clean coal technologies are for insrance rapidly evolving, possibly joinrly w 
C02 capture and storage; the image in so me regions of nuclea r energy as bei ng unsa fe may well gradually shift towards the image 
being clean , Aexible and efficienr, and a number of renewable technologies may well develop rowards large-sc:i le co mmercial appli 
tion much more rapidly rhan anricipared. In other words , competing energy sources may well ga in strength and crowd out natural g 
especially if ar rhe same rime natural gas would increas ingly be perceived as a problematic fl1cl from rhe geopolitical perspective. 
The third threat that could airer rhe picru re subsranrially is thar investm ents by rhe major playe rs in che gas industry in the var ic 
stages of the chain will sray behind levels that would susra in a larger role for gas in the energy sys tem. 'll1e gas industry is typic; 
facing a large number of uncerrain ries such as: the climate and other environmental policy regimes, the liberalizatio n and regula t< 
reg imes, che link between gas and oil prices, the public versus rhe private role wirh regard to invesrment, or rhe role of LNG and G "I 
In add ition , rhe gas sector srrucrure may face changes char will absorb arrenrion and energy away from inves tment: dec isions. ·1 
substantial lack of clarity of many factors may cause the secto r to postpone signirl canr inves rments, which may weaken the ovc 
chain. G iven the long lead times and signifi ca nt resources typ ica ll y required for gas infrastructure developm ent, this may underm 
rhe porential role of gas during the nex r decades. 
'1allenges for the gas industry 
:h storyline carries its own implications for the gas sector. 
nsition Storyline 
transition storyline capitalizes on rhe perception that gas is green, safe, reliable, efficient and Aexible in application. lhe industry 
have to invest in order to make sure that this image lasts and is covered by facts. This may require clear marketing activity and 
fu l image building. Another implication could be that the sector tries to demonstrate more clearly that gas is the transition fuel 
excellence and will bring us towards more sustainable fossil free energy sys tems: examples could be demonstrations of green gas 
ects, decentralized gas fuelled systems combined with renewables, virtual power plants, increas ing attention for Aexibility services, 
igh safety standards. 111e image of gas as a reliable energy source could be further improved by investment in underground storage 
a stable contracting regim e. Substantial innovative activity should be developed to furth er improve efficiency levels of gas-fired 
1cr plants. 
ernational Security of Supply storyline 
his storyline, rhe industry and governments have to work together to establish and maintain good commercial and diplomatic 
tions with rhe major supplier countries and regions. Such international cooperation may require international technology trans-
. more attention for international joint ventures, and a larger focus in foreign policy (including development or international 
1ate policy) on international energy security of supply. To add to the secur ity of supply situation, countries could consider forming 
tcgic coalitions ro serve their energy needs, and to set up new schemes of strategic gas reserves to overcome unexpected shortages 
Jpply. 
al, Oil and Nuclear Storyline 
he coal, oil and nuclear sto ryline it is important for the gas sector to defend its market share by looking for coalitions with other 
ns of energy. For instance, decentralized energy systems may get off the ground more easily if gas and renewables can be combined. 
·otdd also seem perceivable that the combination of oil and gas may turn our to be attractive for a number of applications. In 
irion , the sector could rry to penetrate some new markets, such as the mobility sector and in some rapidly growing developing 
ntries in order to improve its presence on quickly growing markers. This may require rhe sector ro prepare for long-te rm predictable 
tracts and to offer integrated systems of both infrastructure for transport, training and implementation. 
derinvestment Storyline 
1e investment level is rhe major concern, it would be helpful to improve the quality of information about developments with regard 
rher energy sources, overall energy technology development and possible patterns of demand and supply. lhe better the informa-
, rhe better the scope for investment. Various measures would need to be taken to make sure that governments will not frustrate 
:s tment decision-making via cumbersome bureaucratic procedures or unpredictability. 1l1is will require good cooperation with rhe 
lie authorities and poss ibly more public-private-partnerships. Also, strategic coalitions, poss ibly with financial institutions, rhat 
dd be required for substantial inves tment programs would need to be prepared well in advance. 
era/I 
1rder for rhe sector to be prepared for a wide range of different futures, it is ext remely important not o nly to be well organized, so 
one can have a serious economic and politica l impact, bur also have and demonstrate a clear vision as to what posi tion should be 
:n and what directio n one wants to go. 
he same time, rhe information in the sector about the most likely developments needs to be updated continuously, so rhar one 
as clear a picture as possible of where the trends go and what that would mean for the gas industry. This also requires continuous 
ibility and preparedness to adjust, simply because the future will most likely be different than one anticipates now. 
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